CHAPTER II

20TH CONGRESS OF CPSU, FORMULATION OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
After Nikita S. Khrushchev's accession to power in 1954, Soviet domestic and foreign policy underwent significant changes. The 20th Congress of CPSU was a landmark in this respect during which Khrushchev announced new policy changes. It was here that peaceful coexistence acquired almost doctrinal importance with respect to relations with the West, primarily the United States.

In this chapter we would discuss the historical significance and political-ideological implications of the 20th CPSU congress, especially the concept of peaceful coexistence. We will also address ourselves to the Cuban missile crisis and its significance for Soviet-U.S. relations. Whether the Sino-Soviet conflict was a consequence of the 20th Congress and the new political formulations following the Stalin period would be examined. We would also examine the changed Soviet attitude toward the non-aligned (NAM) movement after the 20th Congress.

Admittedly, the 20th Congress of CPSU was a momentous and historic event. Mikoyan called it "the most important Party Congress since the death of Lenin". The Congress had a direct bearing on domestic and foreign policy matters of the Soviet Union and wider implications for the international Communist movement. It was also the root cause of the Sino-Soviet rift. Khrushchev's report produced bewilderment,


2. The 20th Congress of CPSU held from 14 Feb to 25 Feb 1956. During this period, Khrushchev made two speeches: Contd...
especially when Stalin, the hero of proletariat, was officially denounced and condemned for his alleged crimes. Stalin had been idolized by a larger section of communists, and had been deified within the Soviet Union. Now he was being condemned and the forced eulogization was referred to as "the cult of personality". Khrushchev’s speech during the Congress came as a shocking surprise for the leaders of other Socialist countries. Some of who closed their eyes to the revelations.

The 20th Congress instituted a profound break in almost all fields of Soviet policy. Khrushchev’s proposals sought to change the doctrine set by his predecessors. He argued that it was possible to prevent war and advocated different forms for transition to socialism. Peaceful coexistence with states, which during the earlier period were considered ‘hostile’ was advocated as the theoretical premise on, which the changed course of Soviet foreign policy would follow.

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On 14 Feb and a second "secret" speech on 24 Feb. The secret speech was made at a closed session, but in the presence of foreign delegates. The speech was never printed in the Soviet Union, but its text was made known to some activists and was published shortly afterwards by the U.S. State Department. Interestingly, the Soviets never denied the authenticity of the report, ibid., p.25. Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p.951. According to Alfred D. Low, the secret report was published months after in the *New York Times*, the Soviets made no attempt to disavow the authenticity of the Times version. See Alfred D. Low, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics* (New Jersey: Associated University Press, 1976), p.72. See also Roy A. Medvedev and Zhore A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev the Years in Powers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.70. Possibly Khrushchev and his supporters wanted to dramatise the break with the Contd....
Exorcising the Stalinist Past

De-Stalinization itself was an ideological response to the new specific historical situation that had emerged. The post Stalin leadership had to come to terms with the new situation. This new context was a popular resentment against Stalinist methods and practices. Keeping in view the popular mood, the 20th Congress can be called a powerful outburst of long-repressed feelings of resentment. The personal factor was not the only compulsion to condemn Stalin. Internal and external exigencies compelled a hiatus from past policies. But never envolved total break. Khrushchev talked about many of Stalin's crimes, but he ascribed them exclusively to subjective causes. This is believed to be a major flaw of Khrushchev's analysis. In his indictment, Khrushchev treated facts selectively so as to turn the evidence against Stalin thus giving a detailed and horrifying account of the purge.

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past. There can be little doubt that the content and timing of the speech were partly determined by the power struggle within the Presidium. See H.T. Willet, "Death and Damnation of a Hero", Survey (London), no.47, April 1963, p.5.

3. W.W. Kulsiki, "The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party", Russian Review (Hanover), Vol.15, July 1956, p.15. According to H.T. Willets, "Stalin was neither God nor devil. He was a harsh, vindictive, narrow-minded, power loving politician. His boldness and ruthlessness were the qualities which recommended him to the majority in the party which enthusiastically followed him. He was idolised and invested with terrifying power by those who expect to share it securely with him. Some of them paid for their information with their lives, others are among those who have inherited his power and are making better use of it", "Death and Damnation of a Hero", Survey, no.47, April 1963, p.10.

4. According to Boris Kagarlitsky, Khrushchev's analysis of Contd....
Khrushchev thus manoeuvred to break with past policies and yet maintained continuity of the major institutions, so that the strength of the regime would not weaken in any way.

It is believed that the real intention of Khrushchev was to reassure to the delegates, the Soviet citizens and the world at large that the 'dark period' of Soviet history was over. He also wished to convey that 'collective leadership' had been established so there was nothing to fear, since the new leadership was anti-dictatorial. Above all Khrushchev's attempt was to convince the world that the Soviet system as such was not to be blamed for the crimes and atrocities committed during the Stalin regime, rather the leadership of Stalin alone was responsible for whatever had happened in the 1930s. Although Khrushchev was definitely trying to project himself different from Stalin, he might have thought that the

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Stalin's crimes is "like a mockery of any Marxist-analysis of history". Because he was interpreting it in terms of subjective cause. The Thinking Reed (London: Verso, 1990), pp.141-42. See also Issac Deutscher, Ironies of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.3.

5. It was apparent to the international community that the Soviet system of government, born of a revolution, had been unable to guarantee fundamental democratic freedoms and legal rights to its citizens. It had been unable to develop and maintain itself on a basis of law and constitution and had relied on terror to strangle any opposition. See Roy A. Medvedev and Zhore A. Medvedev, n.2, p.72.

6. Terrible things happened during repression. Thousands of blameless people imprisoned, tortured, the innocent party leaders were executed and unjustifiable deportations of entire nationalities were carried out. Sometimes these were done out Stalin's personal directives. Those were the days of terror, torture and
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full denunciation of Stalin might provide the basis for the crimes of the Soviet state to challenge the legitimacy of the system itself.

Although Khrushchev's speech shook the communists, it was hailed by most of the intelligentsia and he became enormously popular. However, denunciation was not welcome in Georgia where anti-Khrushchev disturbances broke out as a reaction against any denigration of the "Great son of the Georgian people", the fact that these kinds of disturbances were confined to Georgia, shows that there was no resentment against Stalin's denigration.

Desecration of Stalin's image is believed to have been primarily motivated by Khrushchev's determination to score a definite victory in the internal power struggle with the Stalinists who remained in position of power within the Soviet hierarchy. However, Khrushchev's crusade against death. Ibid., p.69. This happened because "Stalin developed the concept of 'enemy of the people': this very concept made possible the most cruel repression against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin. This concept virtually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of personal views known on any issue. The only proof of guilt was the "confession of the accused himself". Betram D. Woolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p.106.


8. Khrushchev resorted to anti-Stalinism as a weapon against his enemies at the Twentieth Congress in 1956. He was a mere political opportunist engaged in a pure power struggle. In any case, Khrushchev's frontal attack on Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 was the decisive event in his struggle for primacy among Stalin's heirs. See Abraham Brimberg, "The Fall of Khrushchev - Causes and Repercussions" in John W. Contd....
Stalinism put a question mark on his intentions, especially when he kept silence on Trotsky’s assassination and that too when Trotsky’s stature and role in the revolution were not less than those of Stalin himself. Khrushchev thus wanted to propel himself, absolve his own group from stalinist crimes, initiate changes, but confine himself to the system established by Stalin. This system signified power, and Soviet expansion could only exist in the context of marginal changes.

In Critising Stalin’s foreign policy, Khrushchev evidently concluded that Stalin’s post war policies had dangerously over extended Soviet power to the detriment of Russian national interests. This was particularly true especially in Eastern Europe, where the Soviet Union had a tight grip over the domestic politics of the satellite states. Stalin’s idea had been to create compliant satellite empire as a protective buffer against the Soviet Union after the World War II. This buffer was initially sanctioned by the West to compensate the Soviet losses in the war against Germany. But the result was just contrary to what Stalin had anticipated. Russia’s western frontier united the West in armed opposition to the Soviet Union, incited the defection of Yugoslavia, and led to violent outbursts of anti-Russian agitation within the bloc. The famous 1953 revolt of East German workers was crushed by the Soviet troops. The brutal

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suppression had ignited strong anti-Russian sentiments among the masses within the Soviet Union in particular, and in Eastern Europe in general.

The seething problems in Eastern Europe led to the dissolution of the Cominform in 1957. The Cominform was created by Stalin at the beginning of the Cold War to promote the unity of the Communist Parties of Europe to ensure their subservience to the Soviet state and to show continuity with the tradition of the Communist International. 9 Apparently, Khrushchev reversed the Stalinist straight jacket. His efforts to relax the rigid economic and political constraints on the satellites of Eastern Europe should be seen in terms of an effort to placate the discontented people of that region. Around the same time the inmates of several Siberian concentration camps rebelled; although brutally suppressed, these revolts to a great extent helped to bring about a change in the repressive system. 10 These revolts indicated the popular mood of the masses, which in turn, influenced and shaped the attitudes of the new leadership. This influence aided Khrushchev in creating a new climate in the Soviet Union and in the Communist movement as a whole.

The resentment against Stalinism was not limited to Russia. It was evident everywhere especially in Eastern Europe where Stalin had established regimes to duplicate his


own. This resentment which ultimately became a source of acute danger to Soviet interest, first in Poland and then in Hungary. In June 1956 labour unrest engulfed the Polish city of Poznan, as thousands of workers' demonstrated for better economic conditions. By October, the isolated outbreak of social protest had evolved into a nationwide expression of resistance to Soviet interference in Poland's internal affairs. Several Communist leaders publicly urged that Soviet Officers be removed from the Polish army.\textsuperscript{11} The later changes indicated that these events left their imprint in Soviet Union and the entire Socialist bloc. In other words, these events could be seen as a trend setter against the Stalinist model.

**PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:**

Various ideological principles were reformulated at the 20th Congress in order to suit the changed international equations. Peaceful coexistence was one of the most publicized principles of Soviet foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence as a concept in Soviet foreign policy goes back nearly to the birth of the Soviet Union and, according to the Soviets, originated with Lenin (See Chapter I). Whatever the origin of peaceful coexistence, the policy was in the past a justification for the failure of the Russian Revolution to spark similar revolution throughout Western Europe as Lenin and Bolsheviks had anticipated. As a consequence of that failure, the Soviet Union, rather than being in the vanguard

\textsuperscript{11} Keylov, n.9, p.306.
of a general uprising against capitalism, found itself surrounded. The Soviets also found themselves with a host of internal problems. It was in this international situation that the Soviet Union in order for it to survive, had to choose peaceful coexistence as a guiding principle of foreign policy, in particular, in their relations with the USA. In fact, the concept is central to U.S.-Soviet relations, because the differences between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were real and deep. Peaceful co-existence was therefore an effective means to avoid any conflict arising out of their differences with the western powers.

In the period of cold war, the world was divided into two blocs led by two adversaries, both possessing nuclear capability to annihilate each other. In the face of this nuclear threat Khrushchev found that there was no alternative to peaceful coexistence. It was this realization of the realities of the "atomic statement" that led him to restate the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. In the 20th Congress Speech, emphasizing the importance of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev stated, "if the well known five principles of peaceful coexistence were to underline the relations between the USSR and the USA, that would truly be of great importance.

Admittedly, the CPSU had reason to justify peaceful coexistence as a central theme of Soviet foreign policy. Peaceful Coexistence incorporated the idea of bipolarity and status quo of the existing system. Thus accepting and forcing the US to accept the position of balance of power.

Another remarkable departure in Soviet foreign policy appeared when the new leadership disowned Stalin's point of view on the 'decline of capitalism', for Stalin had repeatedly asserted that the capitalist countries were on the verge of collapse, while, in reality, they were making notable industrial progress by the mid 1960s.

In fact, Mikoyan was very right in criticizing Stalin's simplistic observation. According to him, Stalin's thesis of capitalist and socialist economies had been propagandistic and superficial. It goes without saying that the subsequent developments have fully vindicated Mikoyan's position. Since its very inception, the Soviet Union has vigorously used propaganda, with the belief of sustaining its own system, and claimed to building of socialism and highlighted and exaggerating its achievements. However, this is not to suggest that the capitalist states have not been propagandists. Propaganda is necessary for domestic and international consumption and legitimation of the regime.

13. Ibid.
This is no way suggests that propaganda was necessarily desirable and embedded within the ideals of socialism, but merely states, that it was a ploy used by both systems.

The Soviet officials have emphatically argued that the adoption of peaceful coexistence was not a tactical move to fool the West. There was an urge to solve the differences arising between States by negotiation, rather than by war. They, in fact, believed that it was a form of the class struggle. Hence peaceful coexistence meant a continuation of class struggle, except in this case states themselves became 'classes' USA and the West exemplified as capitalist class and the socialist bloc presumably as the proletariat class. This was a strange extension of Marxist ideas. Because imperialist or anti-imperialist can exist as a category, but was it possible for a whole state to be classified as a "class"?

While peace meant the absence of military hostility, peaceful coexistence meant non-confrontation. However, it did not mean a conflictless situation at least so long as different social-political systems continued to exist. It was believed that political, economic and ideological issues would continue to cause tension. Though the Soviet Union adopted peaceful coexistence as the main principle of foreign policy, they did not relax their efforts to spread communism throughout the world.

Since the inception of the Soviet Union, peaceful coexistence became an integral part of Soviet foreign policy, although the emphasis always varied. Under Khrushchev, it was a policy suited to a power which, whatever its claim, was aware of its inferiority to the United States in the military field. This policy allowed the Soviet Union to plead for peace with the capitalist states and yet make the effort to achieve parity in the military sphere, by insisting that this principle was the only means which would bring about the final and complete victory of communism. Peaceful coexistence did not exclude the possibility of war, especially wars of national liberation. 16

Essentially, Khrushchev was projecting the Soviet Union as a peace loving country. This desire was further evidenced by the declaration at the 20th Congress, that they believed in various forms of transition to socialism. This peace loving image of the Soviet Union definitely proved to be an asset for the Soviet Union, because it enabled the Soviet Union to win friends and influence leaders and popular movements particularly in the Third World. This was also an attempts to develop Soviet hegemonism vis-a-vis the USA. At the same time, Khrushchev sought to end Soviet isolationism, by developing new allies amongst ex-colonial countries.

Khrushchev's Compulsion:

Khrushchev's real motive behind propagating the policy of peaceful coexistence were located in the situation of the

Soviet Union in the mid 50s. By the mid 1950s the U.S. dominance in nuclear missile technology had changed the whole perception of strategic thinking and equation between the power forces. Khrushchev was evidently concerned with the likelihood of a third World War in which nuclear weapons would play a vital role. Therefore, he undermined the importance of the ground forces and conventional weaponry. As a corollary logic he cut down the ground forces in number and reduced defence expenditure for conventional forces. This was a time of enormous U.S. pressure on the Soviet Union, for example, on the issue of rearmament of West Germany. Besides the U.S. had also deployed their missiles in West Germany, Britain was also armed by nuclear missiles adding to the pressure on the Soviet Union. Another important development was resentment and discontent in Eastern Europe, specifically in Poland and Hungary. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union sought greater involvement in the Third World. The Soviets thus wanted to establish relations with West and normalize the strained relationship for the simple reason; the Soviet Union could not manage tension between East and West and work on two fronts at the same time.

Most importantly, Khrushchev wanted to cut military expenditure in order to use it for civilian purposes. Khrushchev professed a real desire to achieve a relaxation with the U.S. which would enable him to concentrate greater resources on internal development. This however was periodically negated by actions that placed a strain on Soviet-American relationship. Because he had to prove that
socialism would surpass capitalism in every respect which he kept repeating, the Soviet system had to show excellence, efficiency and concrete achievement.

The policy of peaceful coexistence was strained greatly in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis. Because the West apparently believed that Khrushchev was indulging in propaganda rather than being serious. Western scholars, like Leonard Shapiro, maintained that coexistence was a fraudulent term used by Soviet writers. Notwithstanding Western apprehension about Khrushchev's intention, the 20th CPSU Congress was a sharp and decisive break with the past. This break was actually the beginning of de-Stalinization in all fields of Soviet life. It was this process of de-Stalinization that actually shaped all the succeeding political developments in the U.S.S.R. and the entire socialist bloc, the world equations were also influenced by this process to a great extent.

A. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND SOVIET-U.S. RELATION:

The period between 1956 to 1962 was a period of relaxation of tension between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. In 1962 the Cuban missile crisis marked a turning point in this relationship. The thawing of the cold war was a result of the changed attitude of the Soviet Union. The attitude changed after the Soviets adopted peaceful coexistence in order to project themselves as a peace loving country, and

17. While Victor Erlich called it a "Tricky World", see comment on Coexistence, Survey, No.47, April 1963, pp.53-55.
willing to pursue a non-confrontationist policy. Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence undoubtedly influenced the Soviet relations towards the U.S.A. As a result there was marked change in this relationship. Steps were taken to establish relations of cordiality between these two hostile powers.

Richard M. Nixon, then American Vice President, visited the Soviet Union on 23 July 1959, and the subsequent exchange visit by Nikita S. Khrushchev marked the change. During his official visit to the U.S., Khrushchev proposed a sensational plan for total and universal disarmament in four years. Khrushchev's talks with the U.S. President, Eisenhower at Camp David on 25-27 September, resulted in generating enormous goodwill. The Soviet-U.S. relations further improved, as both countries agreed to a broadening of bilateral cultural and technical exchanges and joint ventures in the fields of medical research and "atom-for-peace" programme. While the White House termed Khrushchev's visit as a successful experiment, Eisenhower saw it as "a beginning towards melting ice in East-West relation".

The Beginning of Crisis

However, this 'successful experiment' was not


institutionalized. It actually got shattered in 1959 when the Batista regime was overthrown in Cuba. The Cuban revolution came as a serious jolt to the United States, more so when Cuba adopted Marxism as the ideology to build its social-political system, and became an ally of the Soviet Union. By then both the USA and the USSR had emerged as global powers, both powers had worldwide areas of influence. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been keeping a close watch on the political developments in Cuba. The situation however was so unpredictable that when Fidel Castro led his revolution to victory and entered Havana with his troops, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. were not sure as to what political course his regime would follow. But soon it became evident that Castro was no longer "sitting on the fence". He began to behave like a staunch Communist even though he never claimed to be one earlier. He had already started inducting communists in his government. This was obviously a rude shock for the White House, while for the Soviet Union it was a pleasant surprise. The overthrow of Batista was at first applauded in the U.S. The Cuban-U.S. relations actually started deteriorating when Castro confiscated American property and established an avowedly communist government.

20. Analysing the revolution in Cuba in New York Times in February 1957, Herbert Mathews wrote, "It was easy to see that his men (Castro's) adored him,... He was an educated, dedicated fanatic a man of ideas of courage and the remarkable qualities of leadership", See Robert P. Smith, What Happened to Cuba? (New York: Twayne Publishers, INC, 1963), p.260.
Initially the American government was under the impression that the capitalist underpinnings of the Cuban economy would remain intact. But by the time Castro announced that he was going to "guide" Cuba on the road toward socialism, the Americans were not in a position to exert their influence. Practically there was no longer any force left which could be organized to fight on American behalf in Cuba. Now the only option was — invasion. It was really difficult for the Americans to reconcile with the left turn in Cuban politics. Americans had substantial participation in telephone and electric service, public service, railways, and sugar production. In such a situation it seemed that invasion was inevitable. Both Cuba and the Soviets are believed to have sensed that the U.S. was preparing an attack on Cuba.

In February 1960, Cuba and the Soviet Union signed a trade and aid agreement. And by the summer of 1960 Cuba was clearly in the Soviet-orbit and the Soviet Union had gained a foothold in the Western hemisphere. As a reaction to this, the next month President Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to train anti-Castro Cuban exiles for an invasion of their homeland. In July, in an attempt to cripple the Cuban economy, the U.S. cut Cuba's sugar quota, virtually stopping imports from the island to the extent of prohibiting

American exports to Cuba in October. Thus, by all means, the U.S. was bent upon destroying the Castro government and Cuban economy. Not surprisingly, they bombed three Cuban airports. This was a logical action by the Americans to safeguard their interests. The Cubans had already indicated the possibility that the U.S. might attack Cuba, because the new political process in Cuba had resulted in hostility between the U.S. and Cuba. Cuba had challenged U.S. hegemony, and could be the "wrong" example for the rest of Latin America.

Since the early days Cuba always held a prominent place in the foreign policy of the United States. And in some respects Cuba has been a testing ground for the Caribbean and Central American policies of the United States. The economic and strategic importance of Cuba been a consistent interest of the United States. Since Fidel Castro's triumph in June 1959, Cuba was a much talked about political issue in the United States. Interestingly, both the Democrats and the


Republicans were completely against the new regime in Cuba since it threatened to become what they feared most -- a "Communist out post". Moreover the new regime challenged US national interest which wanted to maintain Latin America as their backyard.

Castro's policies caused him many enemies. Because the Cuban government had "identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology", the U.S. pledged itself to complete isolation of Cuba. In a situation when the U.S. was thoroughly bent upon destroying Cuba, the Cuban's looked for other allies for support. Hence Cuba position vis-a-vis USA approached the Soviet Union For

See Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), p.491. The U.S. State Department has officially admitted that covert activities were designed to overthrow Castro because of "Castro's persistent anti-American bias and increasing contacts with the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc". A Committee of Congress, headed by the late Senator Frank Church disclosed that CIA covert action included several attempts to assassinate Castro. See The Tribune, Thursday, June 6, 1991. To quote a Cuban Journalist Juan Arcoha, on the one hand America had already declared an all out war on Cuba and bands of mercenaries were being given training at camps in Guatemala and Florida. "Cuba: Three Years of Revolution", *International Affairs*, Vol.1, January 1982, p.90.

assistance. The Soviet Union was only too willing to assist given their position vis-a-vis USA. The Soviet Union bailed out Cuba by importing their sugar and by exporting necessary things to Cuba including arms. The Soviet backing enabled Fidel Castro to successfully thwart the invasion. Yet Cuba remained vulnerable to its enemies. The Soviet Union seriously reflected upon this problem and tried to find a solution.

Soviet objective was to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean, they seemed to have concluded that the logical answer was the missiles. The Soviets justified and their action as the defense of a small and threatened ally.

**The Deployment of Soviet Missiles in Cuba and American Reaction:**

Although it is difficult to establish when exactly the decision to send missile in Cuba was taken, it is believed that Raul Castro, the Cuban Defense Minister’s visit to Moscow, starting on July 2, 1962, coincided with the decision on the missiles. However, Khrushchev claimed that this

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26. On 28 September 1960, "Committee in Defense of the Revolution" was formed. This obviously in a response of "the imperialist" challenge. V. Listor "Cuba Today", *New Times*, No.39, September 26, 1962, p.3.


idea occurred to him when he was on a official visit to Bulgaria. There he had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. It was this growing Soviet military presence in Cuba, that USA construed it as a serious challenge to its hegemony in Latin America.

The moment the American intelligence services learned that the Soviet Union was secretly shipping their missiles to Cuba, the White House became suspicious and aware of the danger since each of the missiles, as President Kennedy described, was capable of striking Washington D.C. or any other city in the South eastern part of the United States. A confrontation between the two giant atomic nations, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., seemed imminent, bringing the entire world to the abyss of nuclear destruction.

By placing missiles in Cuba the Soviet Union apparently wanted "to deter America from starting a war" and "to make them think twice by confronting" with Soviet missiles. But the United States interpreted the Soviet move as a war preparation against the United States. The Soviet Union, however, countered that the U.S. had no moral or legal quarrel with them and argued that they had not given the Cuban's anything more than the Americans were giving to their allies in terms of economic or military aid.

President John F. Kennedy, on the one hand, directed his secret agency to keep watch on Cuba and its military build-up and, on the other hand, asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to take action against what he called the "latest" Soviet threat to world peace and asked for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. Observers. The U.S. President asked Khrushchev to halt and eliminate "Clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace" and asked for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba. 32

Kennedy pledged that the U.S. would take whatever measures were necessary to remove the "threat" of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Even they started preparing aggression against Cuba on the excuse that the Soviet merchant fleet was carrying cargoes to Cuba. This, the Soviets argued, was a purely internal affairs of the States sending these Missiles and those which buy and receive them. 33 In fact, the White House's assertion, that Cuba constituted a serious threat to U.S. security, was a formula which guaranteed against rash action. Everyone realized that Cuba could never be a threat to security. The fact of the matter was that Washington's policy vis-a-vis Cuba was not based on concern for American Security but their desire to crush revolutionary government

32. Schlesinger Jr., n.28, p.343.

in Cuba.\textsuperscript{34} It is this fact that explains why the U.S. intended to invade Cuba.

This proved to be one of the greatest risks of a catastrophic war, after the advent of the nuclear age.\textsuperscript{35} History really offers no parallel to those thirteen days of October 1962, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union paused at the nuclear precipice. It represented a crisis in Soviet-U.S. relation which has been a hotly debated issue all over the world.

When President Kennedy gave a public statement, it was essentially an ultimatum served on Khrushchev to which he responded positively and exchanged letters with Kennedy. Immediately, Soviet officials met secretly with the Americans in Washington. On October 28, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the missiles and the United States reciprocated by promising not to invade Cuba in the future.\textsuperscript{36} The U.S. promise was hailed as a great achievement.

As soon as the Soviet Union announced publicly that they were ready to remove their missile from Cuba, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Y. Bochekoryov; "Hands off Cuba!" \textit{New Times}, no. 34, September 26, 1962, p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Paterson and Brophy, n.22, pp.104-5.
\end{itemize}
Chinese and American press drummed up the charge that Khrushchev had turned "coward and buckled down".\textsuperscript{37} This obviously distressed the Soviet Union. Even Cuban-Soviet ties also started showing signs of cracks. Because Castro was not consulted before removing the missiles from Cuba. Hence he interpreted it as a "betrayal" and a "sell-out" to the United State.\textsuperscript{38} One wonder why Castro was not consulted. It seems that the Soviet superpower status had led them to believe in the possibility and responsibility of taking unilateral decisions. This then can be construed as opportunism and arrogance.

**Various Interpretations of Missile Crisis**

There are indeed many interpretations of the missile crisis. However, the basic questions have been as to why the Soviet Union placed strategic offensive missile in Cuba? And why were the missiles withdrawn? These are some of the most controversial issues subject to various interpretations.

Graham T. Allison interpreted the installation of missiles in Cuba in terms of Khrushchev's intention to use them as a bargaining counter, so that the withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba would be traded for withdrawal of U.S. missile bases in Turkey. Thus Khrushchev's motive in


placing the missiles, was more political than military. Missile in Cuba would have provided him with a powerful negotiating lever for pressurising Washington especially with regard to Berlin.  

Students of crises believe that the Cuban missile crisis was "the finest hour" of the Kennedy Presidency, while Dean Rusk called it "the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen". However, the way in which students of the crisis have exaggerated Kennedy's skill in managing the crisis offers some corroboration of the suspicion that Cuba has been used to shore up emotional defensive against nuclear war. 

Yet another basic question has been raised by Richard Ned Lebow. He questioned whether Khrushchev had sent any missile to Cuba at all. He seems to believe that the missile deployment was one of Khrushchev's greatest strategic bluffs. He argues that a mystery surrounds the 1962 Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba, because there was no evidence that nuclear weapons or warheads had indeed arrived on Cuban soil. The CIA was at a loss to explain the absence of nuclear warheads and finally concluded that the warheads would have eventually arrived in Cuba. Lebow argues that the warheads were not essential to the objectives of protecting


Cuba, but were used to improve Moscow’s strategic position by subjecting the Americans to the same nuclear threat that their overseas deployments created for Soviet people. To establish psychological equality with the United States, none of these objectives required warheads. Admittedly, this so-called bluff hypothesis is speculative, but nonetheless interesting to look at the crisis from a different point of view.

In October 1987, a conference at Harvard University brought together for the first time three knowledgeable Soviet participants and a number of American scholars and veterans of the crisis. A frank and wide-ranging discussion yielded some new information on Soviet action in 1962. Finally, an awareness has grown in both countries that the crisis was an interactive affair. All of the new information has come from sources who unquestionably had direct knowledge of the events or access of the record on which they reported. While the US had very good intelligence on the missiles in Cuba in October and November 1962, its information on the number of Soviet military personnel was weak. Even the identity of the Soviet military command in Cuba in 1962 has until now remained unknown. It was this mystery that provided the ground for Lebow’s hypothesis.


Paradoxically the Cuban Missile Crisis was followed by signs of a thaw in the Cold War. Perhaps both superpowers recognized that the threat of a nuclear holocaust demanded some softening of the rivalry. This led to the opening of information channels and telephone communication between the two governments as a step towards alternative method of conflict resolution.

B. **Sino-Soviet Rift in the Context of USA**

The ideological rift between the USSR and China is considered to be an offshoot of the 20th CPSU Congress. The rift virtually changed the world in terms of power equation. It is this significance of the Sino-Soviet rift that draws the attention of observers and analysts. But interestingly, not even the "shrewdest analyst" seemed to have anticipated any schism between the Soviet Union and China, especially since the two countries were embedded in the same ideology.

It was believed that ideological affinity and identification of the West and the US as the main antagonist would be enough to hold the Soviets and Chinese as permanent allies. Moreover, most analysts considered the mutual assistance within the communist bloc, especially between the Soviet Union and China, to have been a sufficient element to bind the two regimes. However, differences between the two regimes in matters of internal policy, security and strategic perception, ideological differences, and territorial disputes were developing in a manner which would destroy common parameters or even common ground for their resolution.
The year 1956 was very important in the history of Soviet Union and the entire "socialist camp". Once Stalin was official denounced by Khrushchev the monolithic socialist camp witnessed far reaching changes and underwent serious convulsions and visible cracks.

This was further evidenced from the fact that the Chinese identified two main elements in Soviet policy as a root cause of dispute and difference with the Soviet Union. First, the repudiation of Stalin. Stalin's role in building socialism was a controversial issue. China differed from Khrushchev's assessment of Stalin. The Chinese maintained that though Stalin committed certain mistakes both in Soviet domestic and foreign policy his achievements were far greater than his mistakes. Secondly, the Chinese did not accept Khrushchev's "undue emphasis" on peaceful coexistence as the fundamental principle of Soviet diplomacy. They also dismissed the "parliamentary path" as a viable means of transition to socialism. Thereafter, the Chinese began to

43. Only a few months after the 20th Congress of CPSU, the Eighth Congress of the CPC was held in September 8, 1956 which reaffirmed the basic policies of Moscow and diminished Mao's exalted status. But later, when Sino-Soviet dispute started China claimed that their difference with Soviet Union began with 20th Congress. See, W.E. Griffith, Peking, Moscow and Beyond, (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1973), p.2.

44. See On the Question of Stalin (Subhas Sinchan Muzundar, 1963), pp. 1, 6. For a comprehensive study of Chinese position on Khrushchev's Policy, see The Great Debate, (New Delhi, 1963), p.4.

see the changed policy of the Kremlin as a policy of collusion with the US imperialism. Of course, many other issues were also involved. All such issues were debated in polemical language by the CPSU and the CPC. Though, initially they concerned only ideological issues but gradually they became wider and deeper and involved economic and political matters and domestic and foreign policy. These differences were just the reflection of policies and perceptions of the two communist parties - the CPSU and the CPC - on various issues.

However, the difficulties in relations between the CPSU and CPC existed even before Mao Tse-tung came to power in Peking. But the existence of such difficulties was not widely known particularly when the Soviet Union had hailed the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and provided substantial material, scientific and educational

help to China, during (1953-1957) the first five year plan. It was the time when Stalin often talked about the "great and indistructible friendship between the USSR and China" and similarly Mao also talked about the "eternal friendship" between the two countries.

Apart from ideological differences, the Sino-Soviet conflict was also a result of the clash of national interests. The territorial issue was prominent which had been a subject of prolonged polemics. In January 1957 Chou En-lai raised a wide range of territorial issues in Moscow, but they were rebuffed as he revealed later, "the issue was kept secret" because the Sino-Soviet dispute was not public at that time. But the dispute inevitably found expression in ideological language since the participants were leaders of communist parties who were addressing a wider audience than each other.

Another contentious issue between the two countries was the strategic one. That is to say, how is the communist revolution to be pursued? Khrushchev, under the umbrella

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of peaceful coexistence had advocated alternative paths of development to the colonial and newly free countries of the Third World. This path of development specified that newly free countries could take to socialism through a non-violent method, perhaps also through parliamentary methods. Soviet theoreticians encouraged the local Communist Parties and the (earlier despised) national bourgeoisie to build an alliance to develop these newly free countries towards non-capitalist development. These non-capitalist paths could be achieved by developing a public sector, nationalization of key sectors, land reforms, and a pro-Soviet foreign policy. This path of development was contested by the Chinese, who saw it as part of Khrushchev's "revisionist" strategies. They then, branded the CPSU with possessing hegemonistic ambitions over the world communist movement. The Chinese dubbed Soviet policy towards the Third World as 'social imperialist' and called for an alliance of Third World CPs with the CPC. Thus, ideological hegemony over the communist movement and socialist Third World it became a contentious issue in the Sino-Soviet rift.

The Soviet Union, being the first socialist state in the world, resented Mao's ambitions to become the leader of the world communist movement. This would have amounted to

a political suicide for Khrushchev and this would strengthen
the Chinese position.

China's aim of becoming a nuclear power was another
important cause for the rift. China needed Soviet
technological assistance to achieve nuclear status. In this
regard the process had been initiated on 15 October 1957 and
a Sino-Soviet agreement on "new technology for national
defense" was signed. But surprisingly in June 1959 the
Soviet Union refused to provide China with any such
assistance. 52 China obviously felt let down. The Soviet
refusal was interpreted as a gift to the United States. This
once again widened the rift. Thus the rift reached a point
of no return.

The deterioration of relations was demonstrated by
Khrushchev in the withdrawal of all Soviet technicians from
China and the cutting of all sorts of assistance at a crucial
juncture, when the Chinese economy was in shambles due to the
failure of the "Great Leap Forward" 53 campaign. However,
this withdrawal did not signify the complete breakdown of
relations. In fact, the relations between the CPSU and CPC
continued for some time. Though the ideological polemic
became more open and critical.

52. "People's Daily" and "Red Flag" cited in Gittings,
n.47, pp. 102, 106.

53. R.K.I. Quested, Sino-Russian Relations (Sydney: George
Allen and Unwin, 1984), p.124. See also New Left
Review, (Editorial) no.142, November-December 1983,
p.1.
Once again China was distressed when the Soviet Union turned their back on China on the issue of signing a nuclear test ban agreement. The Chinese viewed this as appeasement of US imperialism hence they objected. They argued that the treaty was an attempt to consolidate nuclear monopoly of nuclear possessing powers and bind the hands of all the peace loving countries subjected to the nuclear threat. China called it a "big fraud" to fool the people of the world. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Khrushchev demonstrated a renewed eagerness to improve his relations with the US. Khrushchev joined in establishing the so-called "hot line" between Washington and Moscow. All Soviet efforts to normalize relations with the West were greeted by Peking as additional confirmation of Khrushchev deviation from Marxism-Leninism.

Thereafter the economic relations between China and the USSR also ceased to exist. The Chinese press gradually stopped calling the Soviet Union a socialist country, now it was branded 'revisionist' and 'social imperialist'. The conflict reached its height during the Chinese cultural revolution when all government and party channels were almost


shut and ideological and political confrontation gradually reached to the point of military confrontation.\textsuperscript{56} The dispute thus degenerated from a doctrinal polemic to the complete breakdown of relations between the two countries.

The US Factor in the Sino-Soviet Dispute:

The United States had greeted the formation of PRC with extreme hostility. But the US hostility towards China was not for nothing. Since the early 1950s, the Chinese hostility to the US was quite obvious. In the US, China was referred to as "Communist China" or "Red China", reflecting the American bias. From the beginning, the Americans viewed the actions of China's leaders through a Cold War prism - as a junior partner in the "international communist conspiracy" headed by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{57} The US adopted a hostile attitude towards China also because, to many Americans politicians the Chinese brand of communism appeared to be much more militant, radical and anti-American than Soviet style communism. In fact, the US policy towards China was considered to have been the responsible factor for the creation of an atmosphere in China which made extremist policies inevitable.\textsuperscript{58}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} See, Roy Medvedev, "The USSR and China: Confrontation or Detente", \textit{New Left Review}, no.142, November-December 1983, p.6.
\end{itemize}
Ever since the rift between the Soviet Union and China started the US has been a pertinent issue which inflamed the differences. It may be argued that the Soviet Union was in a better position to cope with US hostility. Unlike China, the Soviet Union had no direct conflict of national interest with the US. Whereas China was in direct conflict with the US, since the latter protected Taiwan. The US had practically created Taiwan into a permanent threat to China. China then felt that not only was the US hostile towards China but even its 'eternal friend' the Soviet Union had become an enemy. In these circumstances the Chinese started readjusting their policies and strategic perceptions.

US hostility towards China prevented the Chinese from entering the United Nations. The US did not maintain trade relations with Red China. The question of recognition of the PRC continued to be an important issue in the US since the communists came to power.

The Sino-Soviet dispute can be identified as the most important cause of the change from a bipolar to a multipolar world. However, even prior to this tension, polycentric tendencies and multipolarity in the international system was evident. But China stood out as the single most important factor which regularly figured in both the US and USSR's

It was this change, from bipolar to multipolarity, that finally, convinced the US that it was both possible and desirable to deal with Peking and Moscow separately, rather than as part of a single bloc. Having realized this, American attitude towards China changed and as a result American policy underwent substantial change.

However, this change was not unexpected, especially when it meant to serve their vested interests. This is evident from the fact that in the US politicians and influential business circles had come to realise that they lost the "potentially vast Chinese market by boycotting and excluding itself". When Sino-Soviet economic relations shrunk at the beginning of the 1960s, China's trade with Japan and the countries of Western Europe began to grow. It was during the Kennedy regime that the need for modification of the US policy in relation to China was widely discussed.

As a result, the Western opinion changed in favour of China's admission to the UN and the Security Council, while safeguarding Taiwan's U.N. membership and its status as an independent state. US newspapers called on the government to


"seize the initiative" and "exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry in American interest". George F. Kennan, suggested, "it would be foolish for the American to sit idly by and ignore the conflict between China and the Soviet Union and not profit from the favourable consequences that it might have".63 Other pressures from Chinese emigres and academic establishment also helped build opinion on a detente with China.

These circumstances led the Senate Sub Committee on the Far East and Pacific Ocean to recommend to the president, the need to initiate, at a suitable time, the question of reestablising direct contact with "red China". As a result at the end of 1965, the State Department announced that doctors and medical scientists could now take up trips to China and Chinese Journalists could visit to US. In July 1966 a National Committee for American Chinese relations was founded on an official basis. The committee received donations from the Ford and Rock Feller Foundations and support from some of the biggest enterprises.64 This clearly indicated that America could not afford to lose its virtual economic and strategic interests which they realized, and

63. Ibid., p.93.

64. On several occasions in the mid 1960s, both houses of Congress organized hearings on China and the possible ways open to the US to alter its policy in the light of the Sino-Soviet split. "Senate Sub Committee report on Far East and Pacific Ocean".
hence reapproachment between China and the U.S. became a reality.

Interestingly, after that, China and the US became close allies. So much so that there was much talk about "Washington playing the China card against Moscow". The USSR was faced with a major foreign policy problem as soon as the Sino-Soviet split emerged into open. The Soviet problem was not balance the twin conflicting pressure from China and the U.S. After a long stagnation China's diplomatic efforts to seek partnership with Washington were a significant development. According to Soviet Scholar Dmitry Volsky, very few have interpreted China a proposals as a tactical dodge, and a number of points are cited which indicate that there were serious intention behind them.65

C. Soviet Building Relations with NAM

The end of World War II had initiated the Cold War. This institutionalized the antagonism between the two blocs - Soviet and American. The Cold War was not limited to Soviet US antagonism. It actually engulfed the entire world and had direct impact on the Third World.

The newly independent states came together in the mid-1950s and tried to project themselves as the "third force" vis-a-vis the super powers by espousing the policy of non-

alignment and Third World solidarity. This created a background for succeeding international alliances, conflicts and superpower rivalry which in turn exerted its influence on the international developments and inter-state structure or the world system.

Though the Third World coalition began to take form during the 1955 Bandung Conference, the seeds of the movement had originated towards the end of forties. Its formal organization shaped in 1961, during the first conference of newly independent states in Belgrade. Third World solidarity became the general international expression of Third World Nationalism. The first meeting brought together the leaders from twenty nine newly independent Asian and African states. It was an attempt to explore a common ground in order to assert their common interests in what was perceived as a tight bipolar world. However, the purpose of this group was not to constitute another bloc. The immediate purpose of the conference was "to promote good will and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa to consider social, economic and cultural problems". Evidently this unleashed

66. The term 'Third World' did not originate in the Third World. It was originally coined in post war France to describe those countries who were plainly neither communist nor western: See Peter Worsley, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1984), p.307.

tremendous political energies that affected Third World politics in the succeeding years.

Though the delegates at Belgrade did not reach a consensus on autonomous political and economic goals and continued to have differing views, they found common ground in their hostility to colonialism and racialism. The first generation of nationalist movement certainly mobilized on a sentiment for a more equal world. In this sense Bandung became the symbol of a goal - Third World solidarity, decolonization and economic development. In a bipolar world the Third World countries eventually began to play a balancing role.

From Apprehension to Natural Allies

Initially, the Soviet Union had apprehensions about the Non-Aligned Movement, and almost dismissed its very relevance. Stalin went to the extent of calling it an "imperialist device". Almost up to the 1960s, the Cold War blocs and the superpowers used to condemn, ridicule or suspect the legitimacy and the integrity of the policy of NAM. This did not deter the leaders of the movement. But gradually Soviet policy policy also changed considerably. The Soviet apprehension about NAM was rooted in Stalinist distrust of non-socialist states and leaders, especially


since they viewed the post World War international politics through the prism of an ideological state in which there was no room for neutrality or non-alignment. This was the Soviet understanding during the Cold War.

With Khrushchev's accession to power, Moscow realized that NAM could be treated as their natural ally. They began to focus on the similarity of Soviet foreign policy objectives with those of NAM. As a result of this understanding the Soviet attitude towards NAM radically changed and it began to endorse the NAM. Because the NAM, was an extension of the national liberation movement, hence it was pitted against imperialism. They had a common cause with the Soviets. This alliance was also connected to the idea of mutual assistance. Issues like peace, disarmament, anti-colonialism, promotion of international cooperation and the restructuring of international economic relations were identical as areas of common cooperation.

The Soviets thus sought a "natural alliance" with the NAM to tilt the balance of power in their favour, as the NAM grew, with more independent countries joining them from 40 in the 1960's to 77 in the 1970's. These countries joined new movements within them like the Group of 77. Their number

70. For similarity between NAM's objectives and Soviet Foreign Policy see Khaus Fritsche, "Soviet View on Non-alignment", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol.37, No.864, 1986, p.15.
increased their bargaining capability and negotiating power vis-a-vis the West, much to the delight of the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries adopted peaceful coexistence as a basis of governing relations among all countries, the Soviet view was different. The NAM used concepts like Peaceful Coexistence and was active on issues like racialism, and a more equitable economic order. However, since they were non-aligned, they took care not to be totally identified with the Soviet platform and ideology. Thus they always distinguished themselves from Soviet slogans. At the same time NAM countries and the socialist bloc come together in International Organizations, voting together in the UN on issues of decolonization and other matters concerning the rising Third World.

The Soviets thus became strategic partners of this new 'bloc', much to the chagrin of the U.S. which became highly critical of these tactics and of the U.N. itself.

The Soviet espousal for the cause of the Third World development was evident from the fact that, in 1960, the Soviet delegate to UNO presented a draft declaration on international economic cooperation, in which he demanded aid to the developing countries on conditions of mutual benefit and non-interference in their internal affairs. Later on, all these conditions were adopted at the first UN Conference on
However, the Kremlin's extent based, on the fear of pen Third World through various pacts, while some scholars maintain that non-aligned countries was essential Soviet confrontation with China in the late, this argument does not seem convincing for the first place, Moscow had already changed of non-aligned movement well before Sino-Sov, it ignored the similarity of basic goals, policy and the very basis of the non aligned. The close affinity of purpose between the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries was bound to create grave anxiety in the West. The West indeed felt let down in the race to win the favour of a vast number of newly independent countries which had opted for non-alignment as their foreign policy. The West charged this, a "communist trick", the reason being similar policies pursued by the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries. The credibility of the non-aligned movement greatly suffered at least in the West, when the Soviet Union invaded.

71. Singh, n.68, p.93.

Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the non-aligned countries were ironically reluctant to condemn the move. Even though all the non-aligned countries did not espouse a pro-Soviet policy. This indicated the extent of Soviet-NAM alliance, which had been nurtured in the 1960's and 1970's through a series of friendship treaties, mutual visits of leaders, trade and cultural ties, and other methods of building inter-state relations.

THE CONCEPT OF THIRD WORLD IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS

Generally the concept of the Third World is used in the context of the bipolar world order. The concept symbolizes a political and power confrontation between the power blocs. This is also synonymous with the term 'third force' that describes that non-aligned group of Asian and African countries. These countries, of course, pursued a different policy from the power blocs. Thus for all practical purposes, in a bipolar world it was usually viewed as third force. Although the leaders of the Third World have often


asserted that they were not interested in projecting themselves as a third bloc.

The proverbial relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. led them to acquire and maintain friends and allies throughout the Third World.75 "Where one superpower the other is not far away". As a result, there has been an apparent extension of Soviet-American rivalry to the Third World, basically due to their global reach, in terms of influence and various interests. Hence the Third World emerged as the major arena of Soviet-U.S. conflict. It was there that the two "found themselves face-to-face in a number of explosive and unpredictable"76 situations, not always of their own making. Though Third world conflicts were influenced by Soviet-U.S. rivalry, sometimes their rivalry itself was determined by the behaviour of their Third World allies.77 Evidently, this had reciprocal effect, Soviet-U.S. relations influenced the Third World and the Third World in turn influenced Soviet-U.S. relations.

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One of the reasons why the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. intervened in the Third World was that they were always obsessed with their 'self-righteous' and 'self-congratulatory' attitude. They have apparently shared a sense of obligation to promote certain values and ideas. In the process each of them considered the other to be the source of turmoil and instability in the Third World. Hence in reaction, they supported rival third world governments.  

While the Soviet Union pursued a policy of indirect competition, the U.S.A. sought to contain Soviet influence in the entire Third World. But it projected itself as being dedicated to furthering the cause of freedom, democracy and human right throughout the world. But in reality, the U.S. has openly supported many military dictators. This is just contrary to their professed goals. The objective for this

78. Allison and William, n.75, p.3.


80. Noam Chemsky, however, remarked that one should not be confused by American perception of freedom. The meaning of freedom was freedom for U.S. business to invest, sell and repatriate profit and its two basic requisites, a favourable investment climate and a specific form of stability. See Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979).
lay in the necessity to project their own systems as the correct system - politically and economically. Both superpowers thus advocated models or paths to development based on their own singular experiences. This was done in an effort to legitimise and maintain their own systems and regions and also to expand their alliance relations to counter the influence of the "other".

Both the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. thus played a decisive role in Third World conflict "as actors and managers". They did this "by linking their specific interests with the local roots of conflict". Over the years their involvement in Third World conflicts increased in depth and intensity. Of course, the style of their intervention displayed a variety of forms. In fact, the Third World countries themselves have encouraged this process, by seeking superpower commitments to their security. Clearly the superpowers involved, and their intervention in the Third World was a result of patron client relationship.

The Soviet involvement in the Third World came to assume an increasingly prominent place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, as several pro-Soviet communist parties seized power in Africa and Asia, though this was not a result of some kind of "Soviet-Master Plan". But because there were


82. Allison and Williams, n.75, pp.1-3.
several complex indigenous forces which were at work and could not be manipulated by outsider.\textsuperscript{83} Of course the Soviet influence in the Third World had expanded considerably. This obviously alarmed the U.S. and invited their strong reaction. The U.S. viewed the Soviet influence in terms of Soviet assertion of power and their effort in emerging as a prominent and decisive actor in the international affairs.

Yet, the U.S. was still in an advantageous position in comparison with the Soviet Union. They possessed power resources and could afford extensive military expenditure. Moreovr they had the capacity to influence the policy of international economic bodies,\textsuperscript{84} which the Soviets could not do. The huge U.S. economy and military might have always been decisive factors in the power politics and were used constantly with the view of isolating the communists and maintaining US national interests.

CONCLUSION:

The 20th CPSU Congress was a momentous event that saw significant policy changes in several fields. Khrushchev's primary intention was to get over the ghost of Stalin and

\textsuperscript{83} There are many factors in world affairs which are beyond the control of Moscow or Washington. Donald S. Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliance in the Third World", \textit{Foreign Affairs} (New York), Vol.57, No.41, Spring 1979, pp.733, 737. See also Dennis Chaplin, "The Soviet Union's Indirect Strategy in the Third World", \textit{Military Review}, Vol.57, No.6, June 1977, p.9.

establish his position properly within the Soviet regime itself. Secondly, Khrushchev was motivated by his conviction that, with the advent of nuclear weapons, war had become irrelevant. Under conditions Khrushchev thought the best way to deal with capitalism was to adopt peaceful coexistence. As a result East-West relations significantly improved. He had initiated several reforms like cutting down expenditure, unconventional forces, demobilizing some forces and economic reforms measures to improve efficiency of the different sectors. But the Soviet bureaucracy could not digest Khrushchev's reforms and mounted its reaction within no time.

Ideologically, peaceful coexistence served some very important functions. It did announce that ultimately socialism will triumph over capitalism because ideologically socialism represented a superior system than capitalism. On the other hand, it also gave the impression to the outside world that the Soviet Union was no longer a hawkish country exporting revolution to different parts of the world. In fact, it sought to present a picture of the Soviet Union as being a very normal peace loving country interested in friendly relations. It is quite natural in the historical context in which the Soviet Union found itself in the 1960's. Economic chaos and mismanagement had resulted in workers disenchantment in several East European cities. The riots in Poznan were a significant pointer. Khrushchev worried about such developments and wanted to stabilise Eastern Europe but
in the process he wanted to avoid using Stalinist methods. This did pose certain real problems for Khrushchev and not having been able to solve them, he was ultimately removed from power.

Interestingly, the West never took Khrushchev seriously. They believed that the entire concept of peaceful coexistence was as a political gimmick by Khrushchev. American policy makers were convinced that the Soviets were used to propagandistic campaign and peaceful coexistence was only another such campaign. That is why it was not surprising that peaceful coexistence collapsed during the Cuban missile crisis. It only exposed the hollowness of the system of relations sought by Khrushchev.

However when peaceful coexistence was initially started it did announce a lot of promises of good relations between the East and the West. In fact, several meetings and dialogues improved the relations between the superpowers. It is only when the Batista regime was overthrown in Cuba that relations turned sour. The Soviet Union, since it was ideologically committed to Cuba because of thir overall policy towards the Third World, sought to protect the Cuban regime from American onslaught by placing Missiles in Cuba. But US interpreted the Soviet move as a war preparation against them. This snowballed into a crisis which almost reached a nuclear threshold. However, because of the sagacity exhibited by the leaders of both countries, this
The Sino-Soviet rift began with the 20th CPSU Congress, and marked a decisive point in the World Communist Movement. Mao, the then leader of the Chinese Communist Party, was simply not prepared to accept Khrushchev as the undisputed leader of the World Communist Movement. Rather, he sought to project himself as a logical successor of Stalin. This personal grievance caused a sharp break between the two socialist countries. But there were also ideological and political differences, basically the reflection of policies and perceptions of the two Communist parties. Khrushchev also got irritated at Mao's ambitions and obstinacies. Moreover, Mao did not accept Khrushchev's destalinization programme nor did he accept his views on peaceful coexistence. For Mao war was not yet irrelevant. The Chinese disparagement of the Soviet viewpoints also contributed to the break in relations. The Soviet Union in turn suspended all economic aid and assistance to China, which further aggravated the situation. Besides, the Chinese meddling with Albania also irritated the Soviet leaders.

Apart from ideological differences, the Sino-Soviet conflict was also a result of the clash of national interest. The Chinese had of course border problems with the Soviet Union. But a significant problem was the changed Soviet perception of American imperialism and capitalism. This
became the main eye-sore for of the Chinese policy makers. The Chinese somehow could not accept the Soviet view.

However, in mid-seventies the American attitudes towards China changed because mounting temptations on the part of American policy makers regarding the huge size of the Chinese market. The American businessmen were specifically lured to it. Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking in 1969 marked a great beginning in this direction. The Chinese, with all the hostilities against the Soviet "Social imperialists", were greatly euphoric about their new-found love. This allowed US to use its new relationship to manouvre against the Soviets.

Initially, the Soviet Union did not appreciate the very idea of non-aligned movement and almost dismissed it. In the late sixties, however, situations changed with the advent of Khrushchevite leadership which had more favourable view of the NAM and the Third World as such. The Third World appeared to the Soviet Union as a vast area quite vulnerable to establishing Soviet type Marxist regimes. Thus, exporting revolution was one of the primary concerns of the early phase of Soviet policy. This was sought to be achieved through aid and trade, revolutionary propaganda and arms and equipment to friendly communist parties. Later on, the Soviet view significantly changed as they invented the idea of non-capitalist path of development. In this scheme, the Soviet Union hoped to established friendly relations with bourgeois regimes, which it only yesterday dismissed as 'reactionary
regimes' and supporters of Anglo-American imperialism. Such a turn around in the Soviet policy toward the Third World posed further challenges to the American policymakers. Henceforth, superpower competition for greater influence in the Third World became more acute.

The Khrushchev period was thus a crucial phase in the Soviet-U.S. relations. It signified a break from Stalin's isolationist policies, and put the Soviet Union on to the path of wider internationalism. The Soviets used peaceful coexistence to establish the status quo on their expanded power status in Europe. At the same time, through peaceful coexistence, they made inroads in establishing ties with the growing bloc of newly independent countries - the NAM - in an effort to confront U.S. hegemonism in the Third World.

Khrushchev's Achilles' heel was the deterioration of relations with China, which allowed the U.S. to take advantage of the split in the Communist block, dealing a major blow to the world communist movement. This also led to the stepping up of the militarization of the Soviet economy because of their isolation. Khrushchev's actions in Cuba, though they appeared heroic to their potential NAM allies, were carried out in a hasty and crude manner and were used for his removal in 1964.
Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence and Soviet foreign policy for the next few decades were given a concrete shape during this period which established continuity and change in policies, and provided a base for the policy of the new Soviet ruling elite.