CHAPTER III

NEW REGIONALISM AND ASEAN'S STRATEGIC RESPONSE

In substance, security is at the core of ASEAN's existence; indeed, in today's comprehensive concept of security, as well as in the original conception of ASEAN (Severino 2004: 5).

As discussed in the previous chapters, the new wave of regionalism, which took place since mid-1980s has dramatically developed in the post-Cold War period. Since the end of Cambodian Conflict in 1991, the most latent strategic issue threatening the survival of ASEAN has been the disputes over the South China Sea, which involved the disputants from some ASEAN member countries, China and Taiwan. To the lesser extent, the interstate territorial disputes have also caused some serious difficulties in intra-ASEAN relationship. However, the entire strategic scenario came to a significant change with the terrorist attacks in the United States (US) in September 2001 and in Bali, Indonesia in October 2002, which rewarded the region as 'the second front' in the US-led global war against terrorism. As a result, the US after her relaxing strategic role in the region in the post-Cold War period has again become the key actor in shaping strategic concerns in the region (Habito et al. 2004).

This chapter is to discuss these strategic developments, which remain the main issues in the new wave of regionalism and the responses from ASEAN. The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) is considered as the latest strategic response to these developments. Therefore, the concept of security community according to constructivism will be demonstrated as well as the processes to achieve security community will be examined. In addition, the key players in shaping strategic concerns in the region as well as the mechanism that ASEAN implemented prior to the initiative of establishment of its security community will be the topics of discussion.
3.1 ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC): IT'S STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO NEW REGIONALISM

At the ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2003, its leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Community comprising three pillars, namely the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (ASEAN 2003o). This initiative was considered as the latest response to the new wave of regionalism, which mainly resulted from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the impact of terrorist attack on the US in 2001 and on Indonesia in 2002 respectively. This chapter would focus only on the ASC.

The areas of cooperation in the ASC are concerned with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the ASEAN Treaty and Amity of Cooperation (TAC); the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ); South China Sea; security dialogue; counter-terrorism; and cooperation on transnational and non-traditional security i.e. transnational crime, immigration, law and legal matters, drugs and narcotics and civil services. Accordingly, the ASC covered all security issues between pre- and post-9/11, it comprehensively embraced traditional and non-traditional studied of security, so-called comprehensive security (ASEAN 2003o).

The Council for Security and Co-operation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) provides a definition of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security is the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means. (CSCAP Memorandum no. 3: The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security 1995; Devare 2006: 8).

As a result, the security study that in its early phase focused on only strategy has changed to the broader extent. Accordingly, strategy means the art of planning and directing military activity in a battle or war and the science and art of conducting a military campaign by the combination and employment of means on a broad scale for gaining advantage in war (Marckwardt 1998: 1239; Crowther et al. 2000: 1179). This clearly defined traditional-military approach to security study had also been embraced by a comprehensive security study (Collins 2003).
The new approach of security study had been significantly development in the post-Cold War period. With the end of the Cold War, there has been change in the field of security studies moving away from the traditional state-centric approach to non-traditional security, as well as issues relating to intra-state security concerns. This resulted in a growing realization that the concept of security needs to be redefined since it has been witnessed that the threat of war between two nations is often not the only cause of insecurity (Devare 2006). Its concept comprehensively embraces military and non-military dimensions such as political and social stability, economic development, environmental problems, population growth, disease, refugees, resource scarcity, people-smuggling, international crime, and AIDS, which is so-called “comprehensive security” (Hernandez 1996; Alagappa 1998; Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999; Collins 2003; and Griffiths and O’Callaghan 2004). Therefore this chapter will discuss the ASEAN strategic response to new regionalism not only in term of traditional but also non-traditional security, which considered as a threat to the survival of the Association as a whole.

In other words, there is a question whether the study of security is relevant to ASEAN’s context. This question is due largely to the Declaration in establishing ASEAN that did not mention security as the purpose of the Association. Accordingly, Severino (2004: 5) noted that the aims laid down in the Bangkok Declaration were deliberately muted in terms of regional security, and the security was referred to in the promotion of regional peace and stability. However, the answer to this question is ‘yes’ because there are at least three undeniable reasons in assuring the relevance of security study in the ASEAN’s context.

First is the situation in Southeast Asia prior to the inception of ASEAN, which was prevailed by the military operations between the two blocs namely communist and non-communist countries against one another from both intra- and inter-regional operations. The similar operations within individual countries between the governments against insurgent and separatist groups were also internationally evidenced (Acharya 2000, 2001).

Second, with the establishment of ASEAN, the region had been bi-polarized leading to the confrontation between the communist Indochina and non-communist ASEAN, which was worsened by the invasion of Vietnam to Cambodia. This had really put the ASEAN member countries on the alert in cautious avoidance of war.
Thus, the creation of ASEAN was primarily concerned with regional security in awareness of and response to the ongoing Indochina War (Wanandi 1979).

Third, ASEAN claimed itself as a successful Association, not from economic areas, but referred to the settlement of Cambodian conflict without any resort to military force, and the no-war community of the Association within member states since its existence. Thus, the matter of security has been the ASEAN’s central objective from the beginning (Severino 2004).

Moreover, ASEAN aimed to establish the ASC in response to the developments of security in the emerging new regionalism. It envisaged a security community as a mechanism leading to achievement of the multi-dimensional comprehensive security (ASEAN 2003o). The following will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter with a focus on the concept of security community and the way to establish it within the context of emerging regionalism in the East Asian region or Asia Pacific region.

3.1.1 Concept of Security Community (SC)

The concept of security community had been developed by Karl Deutsch (1961) and his associates in the 1950s: a group that has become integrated. The integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time.

It ‘describes groups of states which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in setting disputes with other members of the group’ (Acharya 2001: 1).

It saw ‘international relations as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, interactions and socialization’ and ‘recognized the possibility of change being a fundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in the perceptions and identifications among actors’ (Puchala 1984: 189).

Accordingly, ‘states may develop greater mutual interdependence and responsiveness, develop ‘we-feelings’, and ultimately come to abandon the use of
force to settle problems among them' (Jacob and Teune 1964: 4). This was the influence of constructivism, which ‘has been the main theoretical framework for security communities’ revoluted ‘against neo-realism and neo-liberalism’ and presents three areas in establishment of constructivist security community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 12; Adler 1991; Wendt 1992, 1994).

Firstly, ‘the habit of war avoidance found in security communities results from interactions, socialization, norm setting and identity building’. Secondly, ‘norms play a crucial role in the socialization process leading to peaceful conduct among states, which form the core of security community’. Thirdly, material and immaterial forces (ideas, culture and identities) provide the emergence of ‘we-feelings’, which is ‘a crucial feature of security community’ (Acharya 2001: 3-4). According to Acharya (2001), the notion of a security community (or SC) has four meaningful layers. It is a ‘particular description’. The description implies a ‘prepositional concept’. The concept implies an ‘analytic framework’. And the framework, in turn, connotes a ‘general theory’ of international relations. Emmerson (2005: 168) further adds the fifth notion of a SC ‘as a ‘normative project’. However, in regional context, the SC observed as group of states that have renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts (Yalem 1979: 217-223).

From these views, the key features of security community are the absence of war and the absence of significant organized preparations for war vis-a-vis any other members (arms race), which can be categorized into two kinds namely ‘amalgamated’ and ‘pluralistic’. The former undergoes the formal political merger of the participating units. Whilst in the latter case, the members retain their independence and sovereignty (Acharya 2001: 16). In addition, a pluralistic security is a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). Emmerson (2005: 171) differentiated the nature of pluralistic and amalgamated security community that the more pluralistic the security community, the more sovereign its members. By the same token, the more amalgamated the arrangement, the less sovereign its components.
Table 9 Security Community and Other Frameworks of Security Cooperation

**Security regime:**

1. Principles, rules and norms that restrain the behavior of states on a reciprocal basis.
2. Competitive arms acquisitions and contingency planning usually continues within the regime, although specific regimes might be created to limit the spread of weapons and military capabilities.
3. The absence of war within the community may be due to short-term factors and considerations such as the economic and political weakness of actors otherwise prone to violence or to the existence of a balance of power or mutual deterrence situation. In either case, the interests of the actors in peace are not fundamental, unambiguous or long-term in nature.

**Security community:**

1. Strict and observed norms concerning non-use of force; no competitive arms acquisitions and contingency-planning against each other within the grouping.
2. Institutions and processes (formal or informal) for the pacific settlement of disputes.
3. Long-term prospects for war avoidance.
4. Significant functional cooperation and integration.
5. A sense of collective identity.

**Collective defense (Alliance):**

1. Common perception of external threat(s) among or by the members of the community; such a threat might be another state or states within the region or an extra-regional power, but not from a member.
2. An exclusionary arrangement of like-minded states.
3. Reciprocal obligations of assistance during military contingencies.
4. Significant military interoperability and integration.
5. The conditions of a security community may or may not exist among the members.

**Collective security:**

1. Prior agreement on the willingness of all parties to participate in the collective punishment of aggression against any member state.
2. No prior identification of enemy or threat.
3. No expectation of and requirement for economic or other functional cooperation.
4. A collective physical capacity to punish aggression.

States that belong to a security community come to see their security as fundamentally linked to other states and destiny bound by common norms, history, political experience, and regional location. A security community exists when states reach the level of confidence that security can only be attained if they cooperate with each other. It is a regional grouping that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intraregional conflicts. In addition, a security community is also characterized by

(a) the absence of a competitive military build-up among the regional actors,
(b) total absence of armed interstate conflict,
(c) the presence of formal and informal institutions and practices which serve to reduce, prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and disorder,
(d) high degree of economic integration, and
(e) the absence of territorial dispute among member states.

Unlike a security regime, where the renouncement of the threat or use of force is still inhibited by the existence of a balance of power or mutual deterrence situation, a security community is based on a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors in the avoidance of war (Sukma 2003).

The absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict; some serious differences have arisen among states in security communities (Holsti 1988: 437). But the member states have an ability to manage conflicts within the group peacefully in the manner to keep actual mutual hostilities and damage to a minimum--or else refuse to fight each other altogether (Deutsch 1988: 276). This distinguishes a security community form other types of security relationships (Acharya 2001: 16). (See Table 9)

3.1.2 Evolution of Security Community

The idea of security community is often taken as a culmination of an approach or an end of the process, rather than as a process because such communities are by definition supposed to have developed dependable expectations of long-term peace (Acharya 2001). Accordingly, the process to achieve the security community must be explored.
Adler and Barnett (1996) characterized the evolving stages of security community into three phases namely nascent, ascendant and mature. These phases may be evidenced by 'processual and structural change', 'precipitating factors' and 'common identity' of member states respectively (Beyer 2005). Among the member states, depth of trust, nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system, as well as the existence of their security community based either on a formal anarchy or the verge of transformation will characterize the nature of that security community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). Particularly, in each phase will be developed through either 'loosely coupled' or 'tightly coupled' communities (Acharya 2001: 35). The former is 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change', meanwhile the latters identified with 'a system of rules that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government' (Adler 1998: 30). In other words, loosely coupled and tightly coupled security communities are identified with pluralist and amalgamated security communities respectively.

The decline of security community is based on its ability in facilitation for peaceful adjustment of norms and ideas about cooperation. In the long run function, the security community might face a situation where resources available or the principles governing the conduct of cooperation proved to be inadequate in addressing the new strains and burdens created by increased interactions and socialization as well as an expansion of the community (Deutsch 1961; Acharya 2001).

3.1.3 How to Build Security Community

Security community is a result of the social interactions constituted by member states in measurement both quantitative such as border crossings and mail flows (Deutsch 1961) and qualitative namely institutions, norms and the intersubjective process of identity building (Acharya 2001). These can be developed through institutions, norms and identity.

Institutions. Institutions formal or informal, even though they are not requisites of security communities, but may provide a framework conducive for their development (Wagenen 1979). According to Acharya (2001) institutions regulate state behaviour, and constitute state identities and interests, where state interests are
not a given, but themselves emerge from a process of interaction and socialization (Checkel 1998: 326).

**Norms.** Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations which are significantly implemented by states to prescribe and proscribe behavior (Krotochwill 1989: 59; Acharya 2001: 24) of actors. Norms both legal and social or what can be redesigned in legal-rational and socio-cultural will establish the expectations about how particular actors will behave and teach states new interests and identities (Katzenstein 1996; Checkel 1998: 345; Acharya 2001). Checkel further concluded the relationship between norms and states in the building-process of security community that agents (state) and structures (international norms) are mutually reinforcing and mutually constituted.

**Identity.** Identity is an inter-subjective notion, which tell us ‘who we are’, ‘how we differ from others’, and ‘who others are’ (Jepperson *et al.* 1996: 59; Hopf 1998: 175; Acharya 2001: 27). Meanwhile, identity is the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties, and ‘we-feelings’, which is a key feature of security communities because the development of a collective identity can ameliorate the security dilemma among states (Deutsch 1988: 271; Wendt 1994: 384; Acharya 2001: 27).

### 3.2. KEY STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Unlike other parts of the world, Southeast Asian states have had to combine the defence of the state from outsiders with its internal consolidation and legitimation within a context of numerous and persistent ideological and physical challenges. As a result of these complexities there is a variety of ways of thinking about security in the region (Bellamy 2004: 156).

However, given the threats of modern terrorism, insurgency and transnational crime; the sometimes bitter relations between various Southeast Asian states, and the conflicting claims in the South China Sea, are these contentions truly defendable? These are some of the core issues that security community frameworks (SCFs) have the potential to address (Roberts 2006: 271).
Among others, the issues that will be examined in this chapter are i) interstate territorial disputes, ii) the conflict over South China Sea, and iii) terrorism. The reasons in selecting these issues are based on a) the frequency of the issues referred in the ASEAN's official documents; b) works contributed in the strategic or security issues by its staffs and other academicians; and c) significantly these issues present three holistic levels of conflicts. The first issue reflects the interstate conflict between the ASEAN member countries or intra-regional nature; the second presents the interregional conflict between some of the ASEAN member countries and China and Taiwan, which affects ASEAN as a whole; and the last reflects the global threat affecting the entire region.

3.2.1 Interstate Territorial Disputes

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<th>Disputant 1</th>
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<th>Dispute (Conflict Initiators)</th>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Ambalat oil block, Sipadan and Litigan Islands in the Sulawesi/Celebes Sea,</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Pedra Blanca Island/Pulau Batu Putih, maritime boundaires including Singapore's land reclamation projects</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Territorial and Maritime Boundaries (Limbang)</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>Territorial Boundaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Territorial and Maritime Boundaries</td>
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The nature of security problems in Southeast Asia, which, among other things centre around unresolved territorial disputes (Sukma 1999). The disputes over territory caused intra-ASEAN conflict. These include the Mayasia-Singapore dispute over the Pedra Blanca Island/Pulau Batu Putih in Singapore Strait, Indonesia-Malaysia dispute over Ambalat oil block, Sipadan and Litigan Islands in the Sulawesi/Celebes Sea; Brunei-Malaysia dispute over Limbang; and the Philippines-Malaysia dispute over Sabah etc. (see Table 10).

Additionally, a number of disputes exist in the maritime arena over issues such as boundary demarcation, exclusive economic zones, fishing rights and resource exploitation (Acharya 2001: 130). (see Table 11).

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<th>Table 11 Disputed Maritime Areas in Southeast Asia with Petroleum Potential</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Northern Andaman Sea</td>
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<td>The Eastern Gulf of Thailand</td>
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<td>The Southwestern Gulf of Thailand</td>
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<td>An area North, West and East of Natuna Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Off-shore Brunei</td>
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<td>The Gulf of Tonkin</td>
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<td>The Spratly Islands</td>
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<td>The Arafura Sea</td>
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Apart from the intra-regional disputes over territories between the ASEAN member countries, there have also been within the individual countries the groups willing to resort to violence in seeking to gain independence or autonomy for their regions. In Indonesia, according to Alan Collins (2003: 200) these include the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Free Papua Movement (OPM); the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) operating over Mindanao in the Philippines; and a number of
militant organizations in Southern Thailand. Some of these groups had collusion with the Jemaah Islamiah (JI). In addition, a number of domestic separatist movements have continued to have cross-border security implications, which caused the suspicions between the neighboring countries (Acharya 2001). For instance, the Philippines has been unhappy with Malaysia in its supporting Moro separatists in Mindanao. Meanwhile, Thailand faced the same difficulties with the former when it realized that the separatist insurgencies in the South have been sympathized by Malaysia (Vatikiotis 1997).

Moreover, the use of force by the states in Southeast Asia cannot be ruled out as a means of conducting policy. This, at least, evidenced with the Thai-Myanmar clashes in February 2001, when Myanmar forces took over a Thai border post in an effort to clear a Shan-controlled area were quickly repelled by Thai troops after an extensive exchange of fire (Collins 2003). In addition, in May 2002, the Thai army fired shells at the Myanmar’s army (the Tatmadaw) when its elements together with the United Wa State Army crossed into Thailand’s territory while in battle against the Shan State Army (Tun 2002). Their relations remain problematic.

Military Buildups

The disputes have featured military buildups and deployments and arms race. The military buildups and arms race in the region in the post-Cold War has been mainly driven by those latent conflicts between the ASEAN’s member states and to lesser extant by the fear of military rise and aggressiveness of China as well as internal threat from insurgencies (Huxley 1990; Acharya 2001). This intra-ASEAN arms race suggests self-stimulating military rivalry between its member states in which their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause them to enhance the threats they pose to each other (Buzan 1987: 69). As a result, the more arms races they pursued the more mutual suspicion they posed, and the suspicion is the core obstacle to build up a security community.

According to Collins’ (2003: 95) argument, by acquiring such power-projection weapons, the states of Southeast Asia were equipping their armed forces with weaponry capable of attacking their neighbors’ territory. Arms buildups could still worsen state relations, as the potential exists to do harm (Schofield 1998). This is
also compatible with thirteen factors\textsuperscript{xxvi} behind the arms buildup in East Asia, which was compiled by Desmond Ball (1993:78-112). Fears about Japan and China, regional conflict among Southeast Asian states, and arms race dynamics are among them. Witnessed with the statements of a senior Thai military official (1992) that naval forces should be at least as well-equipped as those of other members of ASEAN in order to have bargaining power, and Malaysia’s Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak (1992: 27) that Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have the F-16 while we have none such fighter aircraft. Owing such aircraft will place our air superiority on par with other countries in the region.

But, Malcolm Chalmers (1996: 104) argued that the ASEAN political leaders have no reason to fear their existing counterparts, they still harbour concerns about future political trends. Signs of arms builds in neighboring states will, therefore, tend to encourage precautionary build-ups in response. In this regard, four aspects of the military build-up undertaken by the ASEAN member states in the post-Cold War era are particularly noteworthy.

The first is the rise in defence expenditures, but is not a reliable indicator of the region’s military build-up because of the impossibility in obtaining accurate data.

Second, a more pertinent aspect is the trend in arms procurement, which shows a clear shift towards conventional warfare capabilities in contrast to the counter-insurgent orientation of the past.

Third, apart from extending their reach, the armed forces of the ASEAN member states have enhanced their strike warfare capabilities by adding to their inventory of advanced precision-guided missiles, including those geared to air combat, aerial ground attack and air defence roles.

Fourth, several regional armed forces have been redesigning their ground forces for ‘rapid deployment’ missions (Acharya 2001: 136-37).

\textsuperscript{xxvi} The thirteen factors, according to Ball (1993) are: i) economic growth and increasing resources for defense spending; ii) the requirements of enhanced self-reliance; iii) the drawdown of the US presence and capabilities; iv) fears about Japan and China; v) regional conflict among Southeast Asian states; vi) requirements for protecting exclusive economic zones (EEZs); vii) broadening regional security concerns; viii) prestige; ix) technology acquisition; x) corruption; xi) supply-side pressures; xii) pre-emption of international restraints on arms transfer; and xiii) arms race dynamics.
Prior to the 1997 Financial Crisis, the states of Southeast Asia began to increase their defence budgets in line with the economic growth they enjoy. The Defence Minister of Singapore, Yeo Ning Hong (1992), stated in 1992 that ‘no country in Southeast Asia has reduced its defence expenditure’ in the post-Cold War period. The economic crash in the summer of 1997 stopped the arms spending in its tracks (Cheeseman 1999; Collins 2003). Indeed, the only country to emerge with its plans still in place was Singapore with its defence budget in February 1998 raised spending from 4.4 percent of GDP to 4.6 percent (The Straits Times 1998, Jayasankaran 1998). However, as the region recovers from its bout of “Asian flu”, there are signs that weapon procurement is rising again. Projects mothballed because of the crisis have been reinstated (Collins 2003).

It should be noted that a trend toward increased defense spending and arms acquisitions has been evident throughout the Asia Pacific region, including China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan and not just in intra-ASEAN (Acharya 2001). Actually, the arms race in Northeast Asia has spilled over to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea (Collins 2003).

This is the strategic concern for the ASEAN member countries, which is directly caused by interstate territorial disputes. Now we turn to the interregional issues over the South China Sea.

### 3.2.2 Conflicts over South China Sea

South China Sea is located between the Eastern and Southeastern coasts of Asia. On the north, it faces China and Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo on the East, the Gulf of Thailand on the Southwest, and the Gulf of Tonkin and Chinese island of Hainan on the West. The total area of the sea is 2,319,000 square kilometers (895,400 square miles). The chief ports on or near this sea include Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), Hong Kong, and Macau. The principal rivers draining into the South China Sea are the Mekong and the Xi Jiang. Shipping and fishing in the sea are economically important.

The conflictual area since the 1950s, over the Sea is the Spratly, which is the chain of islands comprising more than 600 islets, coral reefs, sandbars, and atolls. The islands are located to the Northwest of Brunei, the Malaysian state of Sabah, and the
Philippine island of Palawan. Ownership of some or all of the Spratly is disputed between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The largest of the 12 main islets is Itu Aba, with a total area of 36 hectares (90 acres); none is permanently inhabited. Geological surveys indicate that the Spratly lie atop vast oil and gas reserves, perhaps greater than any previously discovered. The islands also lie along important shipping lanes. All the competing claimants except Brunei maintain military installations on one or more of the islands. There are periodic armed clashes in the region: in 1988 more than 70 people were killed during a confrontation between China and Vietnam. The Spratly Islands are regarded as a potential flashpoint for regional conflict, especially because China has so far resisted submitting the dispute to international courts (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2002).

The South China Sea dispute primarily concerns ownership of a group (230 in total) of small islands and reefs, the Spratly Islands. Their significance has greatly increased since the discovery of potentially significant oil deposits and because they offer access to large fishing grounds (Bellamy 2004).

In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef and placed markers on several atolls within waters claimed by the Philippines. Previously, China had only occupied islands in areas claimed by Vietnam. The ASEAN member states disagree on how to deal with China as well as mistrust each other on the issues: The Philippines and Vietnam would like ASEAN to confront China over the Spratly. Malaysia, with suspicion of China, believes that this approach would not work. In turn, Thailand, which has no claims in the South China Sea, has a very different view of China as a potentially useful counterweight to other powers. Indonesia, despite its own long-standing suspicions of China, has attempted to broker a resolution of the dispute by adopting a neutral stance and sponsoring several international conferences on the South China Sea. If China were to exploit these differences successfully, targeting one ASEAN member for an aggressive approach, while adopting a conciliatory approach to the other ASEAN claimants, it could lead to rising tensions in the organization and weaken its ability to operate effectively. From the US perspective, the Spratly issue poses several problems. It is certainly a definite hazard to regional stability and may pose a long-term threat to the ASEAN’s unity and effectiveness as well. The United States does not judge the merits of any of the disputants’ claims, rather, it supports
freedom of navigation and a peaceful resolution of the dispute through regional not the US mediation (Wood 1996).

China seemed to employ a dual track policy, a “talk and take strategy,” encompassing both diplomacy and unilateral, aggressive assertion of its claims in dealings with other claimants over South China Sea (Nathan 1998-1999; Ghoshal 1999). The former was evidenced with the apprehensions about Chinese intentions come from Beijing’s willingness to use force in 1974 and 1988 to expel Vietnamese encamped in various islands, and the occupation of Mischief Reef near the Philippines in early 1995. Meanwhile, at various other times, the Chinese have adopted a more conciliatory approach. For example, in July 1995, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman insisted that it had no interest in disrupting freedom of navigation in the Spratly area and said that China felt the issues could be resolved without any outside mediators or interference (Ghoshal 1999).

In Southeast Asia, (Acharya 2000, 2001; Hassan 2000; Collins 2003) claims over territory and resources in the South China Sea would, nevertheless, tend to reinforce latent fears in ASEAN of Chinese hegemonism. China’s military posture in the South China Sea vis-à-vis the Spratly issue is bound to prove worrisome for other claimants. Beijing’s occupation of Mischief Reef claimed by the Philippines in early 1995 and subsequent clashes to date with the Philippines in the South China Sea underscore the yet unresolved issue of territorial claims in China-ASEAN relations. Indeed, the Spratly problem might well turn out to be a multi-dimensional security issue engaging the maritime interests of the United States, Japan, and Russia at the global level, as well as the security interest of China, India, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia at the regional level. Although the Spratly issue has been somewhat moderated by the ASEAN’s and especially Indonesia’s mediatory role with nine workshops on the South China Sea having been concluded to date the region continues to remain wary of China’s power projection capabilities into the 21st century. Reports of Chinese-Myanmarese military cooperation in developing a naval base off the southern Myanmarese coast at Haingyi Island tend to reinforce concerns in several Asian capitals that Beijing intends to play a more assertive role in the Asian balance of power of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the rise of China has significant implications not only for the economic and security interdependence of Southeast Asia, but also for the other major powers into the 21st century.
overlapping claims in the South China Sea among some countries of the region which among other things, is motivated by the need to secure vital resources needed for the continuity of national development of each country (Sukma 1999). On the issue of the Spratly, the US offer to mediate the dispute has received mixed reactions, with the Philippines endorsing the idea, and Malaysia expressing reservations (Nathan 1998-1999). Mercado, the Filipino defense minister called for a meeting of Spratly Island countries and the United States to help resolve the dispute, but Malaysia and Vietnam objected to the proposal, saying the matter should be settled by the claimants themselves (Ghoshal 1999).

According to Acharya (2001) after the end of Cold War as well as the last major conflict centered on Cambodia in Southeast Asia, three sources of interstate and regional tensions in the region have remained. First is 'the spillover effect of domestic conflicts, which are a challenge to the 'state structure and regime security. Second source of intra-ASEAN conflict relates to disputes over territory. Third, relations between Southeast Asian counties are also tested by lingering animosities, which have ethnic, cultural, religious and nationalist roots. He identified the Spratly dispute as the major 'flashpoint of conflict' in post-Cold War Southeast Asia, which is widely viewed by the ASEAN governments. The dispute is regarded as a potential flashpoint in Southeast Asia because not only does it encompass an amalgamation of security problems, but it could also impact such extraregional powers such as Japan and the United States and thus spill over into a much wider conflict (Collins 2003).

The Spratly Islands dispute involves China, Taiwan and four ASEAN member states, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The claims of the three differ from the rest in significant ways. First, unlike China, Vietnam and Taiwan, they do not claim the entire Spratly chain, but only certain islands. Manila has the largest claim on the Spratly of the three, covering some sixty islets, rocks and atolls collectively called Kalayaan (this does not include Spratly Island itself). Malaysia’s total claim includes three islands and four groups of rocks. Brunei only claims the Louisa Reef, although a 200-mile (320 kilometer) EEZ around the Reef would extend to the Southern Spratly. Unlike China, Taiwan and Vietnam, the rest of the ASEAN parties base their claim not so much on historical grounds, but on the 1982 International Law of the Sea, including its provisions regarding the natural prolongation of the continental shelf (although the Philippines’ claim is based on the
argument that the islands were 'discovered' by a Philippine businessman in 1947 (Acharya 2001). All participants, with the exception of Brunei, have sought to strengthen their claims by stationing troops on some of the reefs and have engaged in a number of activities such as granting concessions to oil companies and publicizing maps showing their claims etc. (Collins 2003).

In 1992, the Chinese People’s Congress codified in legislation Beijing’s claim that the South China Sea is rightfully the sovereign territory of China. Since the flare-up in the Mischief Reef dispute in the mid-1990s, China has soft-pedaled its claims. But it has not disavowed them and continues to strengthen Chinese outposts in the Spratly (Ott 2006). Although violent confrontations have generally been avoided, the Malaysian navy fired on Chinese fishing ships in 1995 and the Filipino navy has sporadically done likewise (Bellamy 2004: 160).

ASEAN’s Disunity over Spratly Issue

It was Indonesia, and not ASEAN (Acharya 2001), with Canadian support, which sought to project its South China Sea initiative as an example of the ASEAN’s role in regional conflict management (Djiwandono 1990: 102) in the form of a series of workshops. Indonesia and others soon realized that it might never be possible to unite the views of ASEAN in light of conflicting claims between some of its members. Any attempt to solve the conflicts would come true only through the mutual trust and collective action between the ASEAN member states (Djalal 1996).

However the collective movement of ASEAN proved less effective when it could not win the consent from China. In fact, the Association took the first collective action by issuing the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in response to the bloodiest military confrontation between China and Vietnam in 1988 at Johnson Island. During the clash, the Vietnamese lost two ships and over seventy crewmen (ASEAN 1992; Dillon 2002). The Declaration aimed to repress any continued escalation of armed conflict over the Sea (Acharya 2001). But, it faced the hardship with China when China rejected to sign the Declaration and passed the Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in the same year (Roberts 2006), through which Beijing “essentially claimed suzerainty over the whole of the South China Sea”. It
appeared to confirm that the claimant with the greatest military clout was embarking upon a revisionist policy in the South China Sea (Guan 2000).

However, skirmishes and larger scale confrontations have continued. These respectively occurred in 1992 and 1994 between China versus Vietnam; 1995, Taiwan versus Vietnam, China versus the Philippines; 1996 and 1997, China versus the Philippines; 1998, the Philippines versus Vietnam; and 1999 Taiwan versus Vietnam (Dillon 2002; Roberts 2006).

Even there has been an attempt to bring all parties on the China-ASEAN negotiation table, but the slow motion of Sino-ASEAN multilateral negotiation on codes of conduct resulted in the emergence of bilateral agreement between China and the ASEAN member countries. That was signed with Vietnam in October 1993 (Thayer 1995: 34), with the Philippines in August 1995 (Klintworth 1997). This displays disunity on the Spratly dispute within ASEAN in dealing with China, which was worsened by intra-ASEAN tensions when Manila’s discovery in April and June 1999 of Malaysia’s construction of structures on two reefs claimed by the Philippines (Straits Times 1999: 16). Furthermore, in 2003 and 2004 China respectively forged a deal with the Philippines and reluctantly Vietnam for petroleum exploration in the area. The lack of solidarity that resulted in this bilateral, and later trilateral approach, has left other claimants, such as Malaysia, out in the cold (Roberts 2005, 2006).

However, ASEAN has claimed some success in dealing with China on the Spratly issue in managing to place the dispute on the agenda of the ARF, despite a strong initial objection by China, backed by intense lobbying (Hague 1994). Whilst the Spratly Islands issue remains a militarized problem, all parties have shown a degree of restraint. The Spratly problem has therefore been shelved rather than resolved and, with a few minor but notable exceptions, the interested states have respected international rules prohibiting the use of force (Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) to settle international disputes (Bellamy 2004).

3.2.3 ASEAN’s Response to the Global War on Terrorism

Although the end of the Cold War has seen the demise of externally backed communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, many states in the region have been
confronted with emergent threats from radical Islam and terrorism, which were aggravated by terrorist attack on the US in 2001 and later in Bali, Indonesia in 2002 (Bellamy 2004). Accordingly, the ASEAN’s efforts to address terrorism and transnational crime started even before the attack on the US. ASEAN adopted the Declaration on Transnational Crime in 1997 and an ASEAN Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime in 1999 to implement the Declaration. However, the attacks on the US provided a strong impetus for the region to come together to fight terrorism and related crimes through cooperation at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels (Pushpanathan 2003). It is noteworthy that the ASEAN responses have been with reservations within its member countries, which reflected its different position towards terrorism as well as the counterpart US.

However, the attack in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002 that killed over 180 people resulted in the reference to Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the global war against terrorism (Collins 2003). In this regard, ASEAN should have the collective cooperation toward terrorism but what was evidenced in the region reflected the different standpoint of countries concerned. For example, Indonesia, with a claim of lack of evidence, rejected to arrest the leader of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) Abu Bakar Bashir and Nurjaman Ridduan Isamuddin (also known “Hambali”). Later, Bashir, according to confessions from Omar al-Faruq, authorized al-Faruq to bomb the US embassies, including the one in Malaysia (Pereira and Go 2002), and had a role in the Bali bombing (Lee 2002). Meanwhile, Hambali was suspected of masterminding the December 2000 attacks, in which twenty bombs exploded simultaneously in nine Indonesian cities; he is also thought to be behind the Bali bombing (Burke 2002).

However, Bashir was detained after the Bali attack and was put on trial for trying to overthrow the Indonesian government and establish a region-wide Islamic state (Aglionby 2003). It was not in connection with this terrorist incident but the December 2000 bombnings. This suggests that the Indonesian authorities’ reluctance to crack down on Bashir and other militant Muslims was more likely for domestic political reasons than lack of evidence (Collins 2003). In short, domestic factors were proving to be a significant hurdle to substantive regional cooperation (Chow 2005).

The Jemaah Islamiah’s political ambition to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region including Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei will
be achieved through an alliance known as the Rabitatul Mujahideen alliance, created in 1999 with the MILF and terrorist groups in southern Thailand. The ambition slightly posed the threat to state security, but its impact considerably affected economic security and human security in the region. The latter was evidenced with the significant drop of tourist sectors as well as the disappearance of foreign direct investments (FDI), which already suspended by the region’s unsolved 1997 Financial Crisis worsen by a wait-and-see attitude from the investors (Collins 2003).

ASEAN’s Difficulties and Differences in Counterterrorism

Against this backdrop, ASEAN took collective steps in order to cope with the terrorist issues. As a result, the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism was issued in November 2001 at the Seventh ASEAN Summit in Brunei. The Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime and Terrorism was adopted in May 2002. The Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing was agreed and the Intersessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) was established in July 2002 at the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei; the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was agreed; and an ASEAN Network Security Coordination Council to develop an information security center and national Computer Emergency Response Teams to serve as “early warning systems” against cyber-terrorism was established in August 2002. A Declaration on Terrorism was announced in 2002 in the Eighth ASEAN Summit in Cambodia (ASEAN 2002a; Collins 2003; Pushpanthan 2003; Chow 2005).

The specific measures to be implemented by ASEAN were outlined in the 2001 Declaration as follows:

i) review and strengthen national mechanisms to combat terrorism;

ii) call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

iii) deepen cooperation among ASEAN’s front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing “best practices”;
iv) study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;

v) enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel;

vi) strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organizations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice;

vii) develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts;

viii) discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN’s role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the RoK), the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavours;

ix) strengthen cooperation at the bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard (ASEAN 2001).

In implementation of these measures, the 2002 Plan adopted six strategic thrusts: information exchange; cooperation in legal matters; cooperation in law enforcement matters; institutional capacity building; training; and extra-regional cooperation (ASEAN 2002a).

The ASEAN’s series of attempts in dealing with terrorist threat can be seen as follows. The Annual Conference of the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police
(ASEANAPOL) held in May 2002 in Phnom Penh, called for joint cooperation among the ASEANAPOL members in fighting terrorism. The ASEAN Chief of Police were committed to developing capacity-building initiatives to ensure that each ASEANAPOL member has the capacity to effectively monitor, share information on and combat all forms of terrorist activities. At the workshop on combating terrorism held in Jakarta in January 2003, the ASEAN police and law enforcement officials agreed that each ASEAN member country shall establish an anti-terrorism task force to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism and to collaborate with the affected ASEAN member country following a terrorist attack (Pushpanathan 2003).

Notably, the 2001 Declaration considered the 9/11 attack on the United States as “an attack against humanity and an assault on all of us” (ASEAN 2001), but does not refer to the US attack on Afghanistan. This was due to differences among the ASEAN members over whether to condone or condemn the action (ASEAN 2001; Collins 2003). Significantly, public disagreement within ASEAN over how to combat regional terrorism was evidenced despite the issuance of the declaration. For instance, Mahathir not only opposed any resolution backing the United States, he also wanted ASEAN to go on record against the US action in Afghanistan (Simon 2001). Nevertheless, the declaration was significant as a statement of intent and an acknowledgement that terrorism was a serious long-term issue that had to be faced (Chow 2005).

Collins (2003) in order to point out the disunited views of countries concerned, referred to Hence Andrew Tan’s (2003) comment that regional cooperation in countering terrorism has not been well coordinated and has continued to be ad hoc, due to constraints of conflicting national interests and mutual suspicions. Whist Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines are actively pushing for a regional mechanism to deal with the new terrorism, there is palpable resistance from Indonesia. Particularly, Indonesia strongly reacted against Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s charge on Jakarta’s unwillingness to hunt down a ‘nest’ of terrorists within its own borders (The Australian 2002). This resulted in the demonstration, which protested Lee’s statement at the Singaporean Embassy in Jakarta. Together with an editorial of an Indonesian newspaper, the Koran Tempo demanded Singapore to provide clear proof that a terrorist network existed in Indonesia. Differences between Indonesian and Singaporean governments in implementing approaches to
combating terrorism rooted in political systems between ‘democratic pluralism’ and ‘authoritarianism’ were bluntly suggested by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda of Indonesia. Particularly, the newspaper also charged Singapore on ‘infringing upon Indonesia’s sovereignty’ (Straits Times 2002).

Apparently, the ASEAN’s principle of non-interference has enabled members to manage problems within their national boundaries, but when transnational problems arose, it has proven to be a hindrance. At the regional level, the ASEAN’s response has been limited, hamstrung by the non-interference principle (Collins 2003: 206). Accorded with Jones and Smith’s (1992) statement: ASEAN cannot agree upon a collective position and individual member states will be left to their own devices to deal with the threat as they see it.

Particularly, a multilateral arrangement outside ASEAN such as the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures signed by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in May 7, 2002, and later in July and November by Cambodia and Thailand respectively (Collins 2003; Chow 2005). The agreement proved (i) the regional states’ cooperative response to terrorism has occurred below the level of ASEAN and (ii) the Association is unable to achieve a coordinated response among its entire membership (Collins 2003). Accorded with what Simon (2001) rightly noted that for all of the ASEAN’s declarations and action plans, there is no “operational coordination to seek out and hunt down terrorists operating cross-nationally, revealing once again the ASEAN’s limitations as a security mechanism”. In addition to this agreement, added Collins (2003), a number of bilateral agreements have had some success.

**Inter-regional Cooperation**

Pushpanathan (2003) stated that ASEAN is committed at the highest level to fighting terrorism bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally. In adopting a comprehensive approach to the problem, ASEAN will also address the root causes of terrorism through regional integration and narrowing of the development gaps among member countries so that the measures employed will be effective and will bring sustainable results. In doing so, ASEAN would require the continued support and cooperation as well as understanding of its dialogue partners and the international
community. In this regard, he demonstrated the extra-regional cooperation between ASEAN and its forum and partners: the ARF, the ASEAN+3, the UN-CTC, China, the EU, and the US. These will provide ASEAN alternative and various platforms to effectively work with its dialogue partners.

Within the ARF, at its 9th Ministerial Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan on 30 July 2002, the ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing was adopted. Its participants agreed on concrete steps that included freezing terrorist assets, implementation of international standards, cooperation on exchange of information and outreach, and technical assistance. The meeting also agreed to establish the inter-sessional meeting on counter-terrorism and transnational crimes (ISM CT-TC) (ASEAN 2002b).

Under the ASEAN+3 process, ASEAN working with China, Japan and South Korea, its first ASEAN+3 Consultation was held in June 2003 in Ha Noi, Viet Nam, agreed that the ASEAN Secretariat would draft a concept paper on the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) Plus Three cooperation to combat transnational crime identifying the convergence in interest of ASEAN and the Plus Three Countries (ASEAN 2003p). The Concept Paper would cover the following elements and issues: a) areas of common interests of the ASEAN and Plus Three Countries; b) modalities for implementation of activities such as seminars, workshops and training; c) funding mechanisms along the principle of cost-sharing with some flexibility for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam; d) establishing ‘lead shepherds’ and focal points for the ASEAN Plus Three countries for each of the priority areas of cooperation agreed upon based upon consultation and on a voluntary basis; and e) project development.

In order to cooperate with the UN, the ASEAN Secretariat participated in a Special Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) in New York, in March 2003. The meeting focused on three main agenda items namely global standards on counter-terrorism; the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in strengthening global counter-terrorism capacity; and the role of international and regional organizations on assistance including the gaps in the provision of counter terrorism assistance especially with regards to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and enhancing information exchange. Additionally, a consultation between the IMF, World Bank and some ASEAN member countries on
capacity building to combat money laundering and terrorist financing was organized by the Secretariat during the Workshop on Money Laundering in Kuala Lumpur, 1 July 2003.

Apart from the ASEAN+3 framework, ASEAN and China held their bilateral consultation. Their consultative process has been started at the 6th ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002, the ASEAN Leaders and the Prime Minister of China issued the Joint Declaration on ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues (ASEAN 2002c). Terrorism has been included as one of the priorities for their cooperation. As a follow up to the Declaration, the ASEAN-China Consultation was held in Hanoi in June 2003 and an ASEAN-China Workshop on Law Enforcement Cooperation against Transitional Crime convened in Beijing in August 2003. These attempts are to identify priority and potential areas for joint actions and to enhance communication; to adopt an ASEAN-China long-term and mid-term cooperation plans in the field of non-traditional security issues; and to establish ad-hoc working groups to implement concrete cooperative measures (Pushpanathan 2003).

With the ASEAN-EU cooperation, they issued the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism at the end of the 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on 28 January 2003 (ASEAN 2003q). The Joint Declaration reiterated the commitment of the two sides to work together and contribute to the global efforts to stamp out terrorism. Following up the Joint Declaration, an ASEAN-EU Consultation was held in Hanoi in June 2003 and the European Commission agreed to undertake an assessment mission under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to the region, including the ASEAN Secretariat and other relevant regional institutions. These attempts are, among others, for technical assistance and capacity building in regional counter-terrorism operations and systems; border security; and anti-money laundering and suppression of terrorist financing (Pushpanathan 2003).

Under the wake of the US global anti-terrorism campaign, the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism adopted during the 35th AMM/PMC in Bandar Seri Begawan on 1 August 2002. Following up the Joint Declaration, the First ASEAN-US Consolation was held in June 2003 in Hanoi, Vietnam; and the Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism was also agreed during the
Consultation. These have been harnessed for the cooperation in preventing, disrupting and combating international terrorism by all possible means (Yong 2004).

US Global War on Terrorism and ASEAN's Response

In campaigning a war against terrorism with Southeast Asia as the second front, the US aids and cooperation with the Philippines and Indonesia, and direct involvement proved to be divisive for ASEAN hindering a regional substantive cooperation and created new cleavages within ASEAN, making unified threat perception more difficult (Chow 2005).

In case of the Philippines, President Arroyo accepted a US$100 million package of military training and equipment in November 2001, and by February 2002, the number of American troop deployed to the Philippines had risen to 660 (Irish Times 2002). On the Indonesian front, President Megawati accepted an aid package totaling some US$657.4 million, its nature varied from training police upto trade and investment assistance and restored the bilateral military ties, which severed after the 1999 East Timor crisis (Jakarta Post 2001). The two presidents had faced the popular oppositions in their own countries and were criticized by Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid Albar that we have always thought that the best way of handling internal or regional problems is between regional countries. This was also against the allowance to presence of joint military exercises with the United States in the Philippines (International Herald Tribune 2002).

To sum up, according to Chow (2005), the post-9/11 period was marked by the ASEAN's attempts to change its approach to terrorism from a primarily domestic to a more regional orientation. Two major internal cleavages influenced this effort. First, the ASEAN member states disagreed over the extent to which they should fight terrorism collectively, because of varying degrees of domestic political stability and fears of outside meddling. Second, the states differed over how deeply the United States should be involved in regional counterterrorism cooperation. For example, Singapore and the Philippines supported American involvement, while Malaysia advocated a more indigenous response to terrorism.

However, the ASEAN member states realized that they needed both intraregional collective and interregional cooperation in dealing with terrorism. These
evidenced with the first annual Intersessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC) at ARF in March 2003 in Malaysia (ASEAN 2003r). This significantly brought together not only the ASEAN member countries but also extra-regional dialogue partnersxxvii in an effort to share information and develop counterterrorism solutions; and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters signed by eight ASEAN member countries on November 28, 2004 etc.

Yet, Chow (2005) commented that it remains to be seen just how far cooperation will go. The real test of ASEAN’s capacity for cooperation lies in the ability of its diverse member states to agree on substantive policy implementation and common standards, as well as on sharing responsibilities and costs. Since the costs of implementation can be expected to vary drastically from state to state, it is likely that such issues may create new rifts within ASEAN, or simply be ignored for the sake of organizational unity (Pushpanathan 2003; Chow 2005).

3.3 KEY ACTORS ON SECURITY OF ASEAN

Generally speaking, since the end of the Cold War, there were two major events took place in Southeast Asia urging ASEAN to collectively take serious and concrete response. They were Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, which, among other results, led to the change of political power in Indonesia; and the terrorist attack on the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and later in Bali in October 2002, which labeled the region the ‘second front’ in the global war against terrorism.

The end of the Cold War resulted in transformation of the global security environment in Asia and the world as a whole (Smith 1996). The old certainties of the Cold War are no longer relevant, but the outlines of the new post-Cold War era remain vague and uncertain (Wood 1996). The post-Cold War milieu, some Southeast Asian analysts feared, would see an unleashing of conflicts, which had been effectively frozen or suppressed during the colonial era and the subsequent period of superpower rivalry (Buszynski 1990). In Southeast Asia, ASEAN was preoccupied with addressing the Cold War’s chief legacy in the region, the Vietnam-Cambodian debacle (Gilbert 1996), which took five years later to establish confidence-building

xxvii Included the EU, the United States, Japan, China, Australia, and Russia.
and preventive diplomacy resulted in the admission into the Association of Vietnam in 1995 and Cambodia in 1999.

Strategically, Southeast Asia has been profoundly shaped by its interaction with other, more powerful forces from outside the region. The contemporary nature of the Southeast Asian region is in large part a consequence of influences from outside the region itself. This pattern of regional susceptibility to external influences and power shows no sign of abating (Beeson 2004). The major powers influencing the strategic scenario of Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era and beyond are the United States as a truly global power with its outside-regional allies: Australia and Britain; Japan, the regional economic superpower whose political-military role is likely expanding; China, Russia, and India with their rising potential might and economic influence. Among them, the crucial actors are the US, Japan and China (Wood 1996; Gilbert 1996; Alagappa 1998; Nathan 1998-1999; Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999; Beeson 2004). The three countries have the capacity, to varying extents, to influence the overall regional context in which the individual members of ASEAN are embedded. An examination of Southeast Asia's relations with these three is pivotally important. Particularly the case of the USA will tell us much about the distinctive nature of individual bilateral relations between the USA, China, Japan and the ASEAN member countries; and will illuminate the emerging hegemonic contestation for regional leadership amongst the major powers themselves (Beeson 2004).

In the Asia-Pacific region, the role of major powers would tend to be governed by geoeconomic rather than geopolitical conditions. Consequently, the ASEAN's stance will continue to be governed by the economic, political and security interdependence as well as the desire for equidistance with those powers. In return, its consciousness of interdependence should result in greater, not lesser security for the region (Nathan 1998-1999).

In the following section there has been an attempt to analyze the individual roles of these states in shaping the shifting security architecture of the region.

3.3.1 ASEAN and USA

The United States in the post-Cold War era, remaining as the only superpower in the world, continued to provide a security umbrella (Hernandez 1996) through
consolidating already established security linkages with the region. Particularly, the demise of the Soviet Union as a strategic rivalry, and the apparent exhaustion of central planning as alternative to free market capitalism, has further reinforced the dominant position of the US (Buzan and Little 1999). Among others, its pillar of security policy will continue to be the US-Japan security alliance, which entered into since 1951 and its new lease in April 1996\textsuperscript{xxviii} (Nathan 1998-1999). Among ASEAN member countries, Singapore is playing a key role in facilitating an enhanced the US military presence in the region by allowing the United States to use its piers in a naval base (Ghoshal 1999).

As the strongest military power in the region, but one with no territorial designs, US forces have served to buttress regional stability, which was the necessary precondition for economic growth. It has assured that sea-lanes through the region remain open to commercial traffic without danger of interdiction. This role will remain vital as the region navigates a period of economic and political uncertainty and adjusts to the growing Chinese power (Ott 2006).

However, with the closing of the US bases in the Philippines in 1992 and the drawing down of its forces from the Asia Pacific diminished its physical presence in the region (Hernandez 1996). Particularly, the absence of a known enemy makes the US commitment a doubtful one in the eyes of its Asian allies. This resulted in perceived uncertainty of US commitment to the security of the region. This perception is reinforced by the assessment that the US power is in relative decline, circumscribed by continuing economic problems and the rise of isolationist sentiments at home (Wood 1996). The failure of President Clinton to attend the APEC forum in November 1995 due to the budget impasse in Washington as a sign of this preoccupation and neglect of Southeast Asia (Holloway 1995; Wood 1996). Particularly, Rice’s absence from the annual ARF meetings in 2005 and 2007, which was the first Secretary of State in 20 years to miss the ARF meeting emphasized the US increasing ignorance on the strategic importance of the region (Cossa 2005; Japan Today 2007). Moreover, the Eurocentrism of American policy has led to a secondary role for the Asia-Pacific in American thinking. The Middle East strategic concerns have also weakened the US strategic concerns in Asia-Pacific. The continued neglect of the region ignores the enormous changes that have occurred in Southeast Asia.

\textsuperscript{xxviii} "Japan-US Joint Declaration—Alliance for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century" (Nathan 1998-1999).
which have led to the increasing interdependence between Northeast and Southeast Asian security (Wood 1996; Cossa 2005; Japan Today 2007).

Geographically, Southeast Asia is the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Any obstruction of the key straits through the Indonesian archipelago is a threat to the American interest in free and rapid transit between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The freedom of unimpeded transit through the maritime straits of Indonesia and Malaysia remains central to American strategic interests in Southeast Asia. The other straits, however, all lie within Indonesia’s archipelagic waters. The United States Navy (USN) and the United States Air Force (USAF) regularly transit this strategic region en route to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea from their bases in Japan and the continental United States (CONUS). The extent of Indonesian authority over these sea-lanes has been an issue of contention between the United States and Indonesia. However, the two countries continue to discuss these matters and have to date avoided any confrontation over the issue since this would serve neither country’s interests (Wood 1996).

Nonetheless, Australia, an American ally has also played a significant role in regional security issues. The Australia’s regional activism was the announcement of a security agreement with Indonesia at the ASEAN Summit Meeting in December 1995, which was later revoked in 1999. It constituted the first military pact of Indonesia, a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement has signed with any nation. The United States welcome the agreement because the Australia’s security activities in Southeast Asia generally complement American actions, since the two countries basically share the same strategic interest in the region (Wood 1996; CNN 2005). This treaty called the AMS-Agreement on Mutual Security has fallen through after the 1999—Australia led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) mission in East Timor—after which again on 13, November 2006 the two countries have signed a new agreement when Australia agreed to respect Indonesia’s territorial integrity (Thompson 2006; The Voice of ASEAN 2008).

In addition the US allies namely the Britain and Australia already strategically involved in the region under Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with Singapore, New Zealand, and Malaysia. UK has now signed defense-cooperation agreements with every ASEAN members, except Vietnam and Myanmar, related to training and joint exercises, information on defense requirements, research and
development, cooperation in defense technology and logistics (Wood 1996; Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999).

Comparatively speaking, for most of the three decades since the end of the Vietnam War, US security policy has treated Southeast Asia as if it hardly existed. Such neglect might be tolerable if the United States did not face formidable strategic challenges to its interest in the region. In fact, the US interest has been challenged by emerging military and economic power of China that influenced the sea lane in the South China Sea. Even China assured the international community on free and fair navigation through the sea-lane, the US worrisome remains. This was escalated by the threat to American governmental property in the region caused by terrorist group. Particularly, after 9/11 America's security planners rediscovered Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the war on terror and built productive counterterrorism cooperation with most governments. This has produced a variety of initiatives to strengthen liaison and cooperation with intelligence, police, and customs counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Meanwhile, the most dramatic consequence of the US focus on terrorism has been the return of American troops to the Philippines in order to exercise, train, and assist counterterrorist movement. Most specifically, the US Special Forces have supported operations by the Philippines armed forces against Abu Sayyaf (Ellings et al. 1996; Cunha 2000; Severino 2004, 2006; Ott 2006).

3.3.2 ASEAN and Japan

Japan is increasingly being propelled into a political-military role by virtue of its status as an economic superpower. Tokyo's desire to strengthen security relations with the United States for the 21st century is strongly premised on perceived fears of resurgent China in Asia. On the other hand it hesitated to assume a high security profile that could revive Asian fears of a militarily resurgent Japan (Nathan 1998-1999).

Significantly, the announcement of new guidelines by the United States and Japan on military cooperation in June 1997 was the latest sign that security alignments were being adjusted in the Asia-Pacific region (Ghoshal 1999). This initiative commits Tokyo to send military personnel overseas to ostensibly defuse
tension and deter conflicts in areas surrounding Japan. Such an interpretation of 
Japanese national security could well include protection of Japanese assets in 

Having realized their announcement sensitized China's strategic concern in 
the region, then Tokyo and Washington assured China through international 
community that the arrangements is peaceful and not to against anyone. However, 
China is clearly suspicious of the entire exercise, and warned Japan that going ahead 
with the US-Japan military guidelines could threaten regional stability instead of 
enhancing it. If the US and Japan proceed despite China's implacable opposition then 
the stage will be set for other counties to choose sides, in particular the members of 
ASEAN. Presumably, under such a situation China will adopt more conciliatory 
stance vis-à-vis territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is here that ASEAN has 
to play its cards cautiously. It will depend on how ASEAN will position itself and 
whether all three players are comfortable with ASEAN (Ghoshal 1999).

Significantly, it had long assumed that the Chinese as well as the countries of 
Southeast Asia accept the US security treaty with Japan because it serves to inhibit 
any revival of militarism in Japan. But the US-Japan summit meeting in 1997 
suggested to Chinese leaders that the US-Japan alliance could promote rather than 
inhibit a Japanese defense build-up (Ghoshal 1999; Ott 2006). However, since the end 
of the Cold War, Japan significantly supported the multilateral approaches of security 
in Asia-Pacific, which was motivated by its uncertainty on the US strategic policy in 
the region. As a result, Japan has its officials participated in all levels of strategic 
mechanism in the region: governmental, semi-governmental and non-governmental. 
Its effort was to balance China's rising military influence over the Asia-Pacific 
(Katzenstein and Okawara 2001).

From the whole picture of the Japan's strategic performance in broader Asia-
Pacific and smaller Southeast Asia mainly aimed to balance the China's strategic 
influence. This in turn benefited ASEAN because its conciliatory role is needed as 
well as Japan and China softened their strategic concerns toward ASEAN. The only 
thing ASEAN has to keep in mind that how to deal with them effectively and 
certainly ignorance or distance itself from this situation is not the option.
Japan's significant role on economic interaction will be dealt with in greater
detail in the following chapter.

3.3.3 ASEAN and China

One of the key external threats to Southeast Asia that has often been identified
comes from China. The so-called 'China threat' is often identified as the most
pressing challenge for regional security. China pursued a policy of active interference
in the domestic affairs of Southeast Asia on behalf of the sizable ethnic Chinese
communities that exist through the region, and has also had important territorial
disputes with several ASEAN member countries over the ownership of islands and
reefs in the South China Sea. It is also a major military power with an armed capacity
much greater than that of all the Southeast Asian states put together (Bellamy 2004).

For China, Southeast Asia is an arena of opportunity: geographically
proximate, economically attractive, and historically subordinate with influential
resident Chinese populations. Southeast Asia sits astride sea-lanes that are rapidly
becoming China's energy lifeline. Moreover, Chinese security analysts see Southeast
Asia as the weak link in any US effort to contain China, particularly since the end of
the Cold War (Ott 2006). That is why the ASEAN leaders have tried to engage the US
through the ARF as well as the bilateral relation between individual country and the
US in terms of strategic concern.

The resurgent China whose military modernization and southward geo-
economic expansion with its already asserted claims to the whole of South China Sea
are the primary cause of concern for ASEAN (Wood 1996; Ghoshal 1999). These
concerns coupled with victories over their major internal security threats and rising
economic resources to devote to defense (Wood 1996). With uninterrupted economic
growth, China leaves no room for ASEAN to escape from correlation with it.
However, China's ability to convert increasing economic power into political-
diplomatic influence is constrained by the US factors i.e. Sino-American political
tensions especially over the future of Taiwan; the controversy over intellectual
property rights has bedeviled Sino-American relations; and Washington's support of
human rights and pressure to gain freedom for jailed pro-democracy activists in
China, invariably produce intermittent strain in Sino-American ties (Nathan 1998-
1999). Notably, American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, although somewhat reduced, is potentially the greatest obstacle to the flexing of Chinese muscle vis-a-vis its neighbors. In return, the former Premier Li Peng’s visit to Moscow in December 1996 resulted in a strategic agreement with Moscow aimed at countering the global influence of the United States and contributing to a multi-polar world. Against this development, the US-Japan new guideline endorsed the future role of Japan’s self defense force to operate outside the country in order to protect its property (Nathan 1998-1999; Katzenstein and Okawara 2001).

Apparently, the great concern to ASEAN is due largely to Spratly disputes for which China has employed a dual track policy, a “talk and take strategy”. This encompasses both diplomacy and unilateral, aggressive assertion of its claims in dealings with other claimants over South China Sea (Wood 1996; Nathan 1998-1999; Ghoshal 1999). As a result, the Chinese military is clearly the dominant force in the Spratly. Meanwhile it also initiated economic integration with ASEAN through various frameworks. The most significant agreement is through the ASEAN Plus Three, which excluded the US. The key question for the future is how China will pursue its claims. Will China attempt to seize the islands by force or will it pursue diplomacy? (Wood 1996).

In addition, China’s ambitious program for harnessing and exploiting the Mekong River will have the side effect, intended or otherwise, of making downstream states such as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam hostage to Chinese decisions concerning water flow. Burma comes close to fitting the profile of a Chinese client state. Among other incidents, China’s aggression could be witnessed when Singapore’s deputy prime minister visited Taiwan, a semi-official commentator from Beijing promised that Singapore would pay “a huge price” for such temerity (Ott 2006).

China is central to any discussion of Southeast Asian politics, economics, and security. It is Asia’s aspirant and, to an increasing extent, real, great power by its geographic centrality, its population size, and its cultural strength and sophistication. China’s growth in power coincides with the contemporary disappearance of the strategic threats from Russia in the North and West and Japan in the East that have historically constrained the Middle Kingdom. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars, writing with official sanction, characterize the US strategic intentions toward China as “encirclement” and “strangulation.” They identify Southeast Asia as the weak link in
this chain and the point where China can break through and defeat attempted American “containment” (Ott 2006). Against this backdrop, the Chinese policy makers have initiated its dual track strategy as well as multilateralism with its neighboring countries particularly ASEAN through the ARF in 1994, the ASEAN Plus Three in 1998, and finally the East Asia Summit in 2005. These developments implied China’s attempts in distancing its partner countries from the US (Schmiegelow 2006).

What emerges from this picture is a multifaceted strategic challenge to Southeast Asia. Chinese diplomats have worked assiduously and successfully to portray that challenge as opportunity and not threat. Recent public opinion polling shows clear evidence of their success. This coincides with a precipitous drop in favorable opinions of the United States since the advent of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In short, the balance of power between China and Southeast Asia had shifted in Beijing’s favor (Ott 2006). Accordingly, Ott further identifies a series of Chinese strategic objectives into six general terms as follows.

First, China surely prefers a peaceful and prosperous Asia, one that will be a continuing source of trade and investment so critical to China’s modernization. Moreover, such a benign environment will allow China to avoid the trap that the Soviet Union fell into—that is, allowing military expenditures to rise to the point that they undercut the economic and political viability of the state.

Second, China wants a sharp diminution in the US influence in Asia Pacific, especially in terms of its military deployments to the region and from China’s perspective its encircling chain of bilateral security arrangements with many of China’s neighbors.

Third, China seeks a Japan that is passive, defensive, and strategically neutered, that has effectively withdrawn from the competition for power and influence in Asia. Almost by definition, such a Japan will resist being an instrument of American strategic designs.

Fourth, China is determined that Taiwan will come under the sovereign jurisdiction of Beijing. That much is clear, what is less clear is exactly how much real authority, how much actual control, will meet China’s minimum requirements.
Fifth, China aspires for a day when the South China Sea will become, in effect, a Chinese lake and will be accepted as such internationally. As previously noted, China’s territorial sea law stipulates Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea and authorizes the use of force to keep foreign naval and research vessels away.

Sixth, China expects that Southeast Asia will be progressively subordinated to Beijing’s strategic interests. Perhaps the closest analogy would be the assertion, in time, of a kind of Chinese Monroe Doctrine for Southeast Asia. Such a strategy would seek to expel any non-Asian and Japanese military presence from the region and create a strategic environment in which Southeast Asian governments understood that they were not to make any major decisions affecting Chinese interests or the region without first consulting, and obtaining the approval of, Beijing. It is with this scenario in mind that several ASEAN governments have watched with concern China’s growing influence in Burma and to a lesser, but significant, extent in Laos and Cambodia (Ott 2006).

China’s effort to increase its influence and military presence in Myanmar as well as its base building and massive military assistance to Myanmar’s government have been viewed with great concern by the United States and India (Gilbert 1996). Chinese activities and China’s forceful diplomatic claims to the islands constitute a creeping expansionism that demonstrates China’s true colors as a belligerent regional hegemon in need of balancing (Shambaugh 1996). However, whilst China has declared that its sovereignty over the whole South China Sea is indisputable, it has also committed itself to resolving the dispute through the UN Law of the Sea (UNLOS) (To 1999).

Its movement to have access into the Indian Ocean via Myanmar, China’s thrust towards the Ocean may raise concern in India as well as in ASEAN. Particularly, this may induce India to take due responsibility for the security of Asia Pacific. Realizing the strategic possibilities, China, despite its mounting military budget, has presented itself and increasingly acted as an integral part of the regional system in order to mitigate the worries of the countries concerned in the region (Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999).
3.3.4 ASEAN and India

India with its strong historical and cultural link with the region has been encouraged by its rising economic and strategic power. This certainly provides India an important role to play in the strategic architecture of the region. The strategic relevance of India to ASEAN and the wider Asia-Pacific is based on the following factors:

(1) India’s attempts to forge new political and economic alignments after the collapse of its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War;

(2) India’s role as a counterweight to the other major powers especially China and Japan;

(3) the current economic reforms in India away from central planning and towards greater marketisation and free enterprise;

(4) the Indian naval presence in Southeast Asia at Andaman and Nicobar, carrying prospects of further development for strategic positioning in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters;

(5) the prospect of Indian technological cooperation with Southeast Asian states in the military and civilian sectors, serving as an alternative as well as additional source of purchases of sophisticated military technology and equipment for defense establishments in Southeast Asia; and

(6) the nuclear blasts conducted by New Delhi in May 1998, signifying its entry into, and desire for recognition as the world’s sixth nuclear power after the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China (Nathan 1998-1999).

In addition, Devare (2006) argued that there are three factors in favor of cooperative security between India and ASEAN. First, India’s long record of a dispute-free relationship with Southeast Asia. Second, India is increasingly seen in Southeast Asia as a dynamic democracy focusing on knowledge and technology based economic development. Third, for India, ASEAN continues to be an example of successful regional integration. Furthermore, he said India through its accession in October 2003 of the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) has reaffirmed ASEAN’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty and also non-interference in the ASEAN’s internal affairs.

Indeed, mutual concerns about the evolving Sino-Myanmarese strategic relationship could well strengthen security linkages between India and ASEAN. Through Myanmar, India shares a common territorial boundary with ASEAN (Nathan 1998-1999). There is a common land boundary running for over 1,600 kilometers adjoining four Northeastern states of India, a region marked by ethnic insurgency and violence. The situation in Myanmar requires close consultation and co-ordination between ASEAN and India, and a strategic view needs to be taken by both with regard to Myanmar’s future as it will directly impinge on theirs (Devare 2006).

Significantly, the security of both India and ASEAN was threatened by transnational terrorism. As a result, terrorism provides unique opportunities for both to work together in terms of strategic and economic interdependence. However, the perception of India by the ASEAN member countries, as a stakeholder in the economic and strategic issues in the region was rather low during the Cold War era. Moreover, India’s foreign policy in the region had always been conditioned by its strategic rivalry with China. In South Asia itself, India was already facing a crisis in credibility due to what its neighbors perceived as New Delhi’s hegemonistic and interventionist tendencies (Arabinda Acharya 2006).

New positive relationship between India and ASEAN had been re-established after the end of the Cold War with the former’s initiative of “Look East” policy. Since then, their relationship had increasingly improved through many frameworks. With the exception of the forum for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), India is now a member of all the region’s institutions including the ARF, the ASEAN-India Summit, and the East Asia Summit (Chongkittavorn 1997; Mohan 2007). Significantly, the recent development in terms of security, at the end of 2004, Indian Navy was quick to respond, on its own, to the tsunami disaster and later joined the navies of the US, Japan and Australia to provide relief in Southeast Asia. In 2005, the Indian Aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, arrived for the first time in the ports of Southeast Asia—Singapore, Jakarta in Indonesia and Klang in Malaysia (Mohan 2007).

These developments were in favor of both India and ASEAN. India with its gradual rising economic and strategic powers became the fourth key actor after the
US, Japan and China. Meanwhile, ASEAN has India together with Japan and the US in balancing China's rising power in the region as well as in stabilizing economic ties with India to explore the huge market of the latter.

Among the four key actors in shaping strategic architecture in Southeast Asia as discussed, the US has played the guarantor's role of security in the region. Against this backdrop Japan—the economic superpower has increasingly played a strategic role in the region, whilst China has dramatically and increasingly resurged in the region in both the economic and strategic arenas. India gradually emerged in the picture of economic and strategic cooperation in the region. These developments were significantly proceeded with the end of the Cold War—new wave of regionalism. These strategic developments prove the validity of the second and third hypotheses—new regionalism would lead to much wider and deeper integration process in ASEAN; and new regionalism will introduce more competitive integration with East Asian community, respectively.

3.4 ASEAN'S STRATEGIC RESPONSE

The security situation in Southeast Asia is remarkably complex, with multiple forces and trends emanating from within the region and impacting it from without. The forces at work fall into two broad categories. One involves globalized, transnational, and multinational factors, such as the sudden emergence of militant jihadist networks that have mounted violent attacks against the political and cultural status quo in much of the region. Second, the dramatic growth in Chinese power (economic, military, and diplomatic) confronts the region with a situation familiar to traditional geopolitics. The most recent challenges have come in the form of militant Islamic terrorism, an upsurge in maritime piracy, and viral epidemics (SARS and avian flu). With regard to terrorism, the emphasis has been in shared intelligence and criminal databases (Ott 2006).

The question now for ASEAN is not whether to confront or to ignore the major powers, but how best to manage their ties with them at acceptable level and the positive aspects of the relationship. So far the ASEAN member countries have attempted to cope with the problem through economic engagement as well as security
dialogues to build confidence in the continuance of friendly relations and cooperation for economic benefits (Ghoshal 1999).

Aware of these challenges to regional peace and security, ASEAN has resorted to several means to meet them more effectively. It includes the forging and redefinition of military security arrangements, the creation of dialogue mechanisms, the adoption of codes of conduct of inter-state behaviour, preventive diplomacy and confidence building measures, the expansion of regional cooperation and the rise and increasing utility of track-two diplomacy (Hernandez 1996).

Now ASEAN is moving to engage Beijing in shaping a new strategic order in East Asian in which the rising power of China will counterbalance the weight of the United States and Japan. Such a strategy, however, will require ASEAN to play a constructive role in the relationship between the United States, Japan and China, the key triangular relationship that would determine the future of Asia-Pacific (Ghoshal 1999).

As a result, i) the ASEAN member states were attempting to preserve strong security ties with the United States because first, they believed the US provides an indispensable stabilizing presence during this difficult transition period. Second, they perceived the United States as a benign power with no territorial ambitions in the region relative to the ambitions of less benign extra-regional powers, resurgent Asian powers such as China, India and Japan. (Wood 1996; Gilbert 1996; Hernandez 1996).

ii) The Southeast Asian states have begun to strengthen their own military capabilities, with their focus largely on expanding their air and naval capabilities. This focus reflects the maritime nature of the ASEAN member states, which all have long coastlines and large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to protect; the absence of land-based threats; and the conviction that the long-term potential threat to regional security is posed by the naval and air forces of powers from outside Southeast Asia (Mak 1993; Wood 1996). Military modernization and force restructuring, the probability of nuclear proliferation within the context of the availability of military inventories from the former Soviet Union and other arms merchants, and new wealth in Northeast and Southeast Asia have combined to raise the prospects for an arms race in the region (Hernandez 1996). Such acquisitions could certainly create an environment of tension and apprehension within ASEAN, if member states perceive
these purchases as a threat to their own security. Strengthened regional security dialogues and operational cooperation reduce any such risks (Wood 1996).

iii) Operational cooperation also has been growing rapidly among the ASEAN member states in recent years. There is also a sense that some of the items on the new security agenda demand cooperative efforts in order to deal with them effectively. Anti-piracy, counter-narcotics, maritime commercial traffic separation and safety measures, environmental monitoring, EEZ surveillance, fishery protection, and illegal immigration are all issues increasingly likely to preoccupy regional military forces, especially naval and air forces (Wood 1996).

iv) Thailand and the Philippines both have bilateral defense arrangements with the United States, while the United States also has security ties with all the other ASEAN member nations, although no formal alliance commitments. Australia, an ANZUS ally of the United States, is also a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) with Singapore, Great Britain, New Zealand, and Malaysia. Great Britain, another US ally, has a bilateral defense agreement with Brunei (Wood 1996).

In sum, two factors will play a critical role in the future of the region namely the American military presence in Asia and Chinese policy on the Spratly Islands (Wood 1996). ASEAN chose to address these new circumstances in a manner consistent with traditional patterns of Southeast Asian interstate politics. The informality, flexibility, and gradualism that currently characterize the ASEAN’s approach to security issues are, in fact, typical of indigenous security architecture. Only the extension of ASEAN’s approach to regional security to the whole of Asia offers much hope to its member nations that they may play a significant role in any Asian security regime (Gilbert 1996).

As the purpose of this research work is to discuss ASEAN as a whole so that the ASEAN collective response to the two phases of strategic developments in the region namely the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) will be discussed in greater details. The former broadly reflects its response to the strategic concerns before 9/11 and the latter is largely to due the strategic development in post 9/11.
3.4.1 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Amidst these uncertainties, ASEAN saw the need for a new political and security framework that would help them maintain the necessary equilibrium for sustainable peace and prosperity in the region. The question remained what modality should be undertaken. The core concern of the new security arrangement was how to bring together the major powers and interested countries in the region into a single framework through the ASEAN Way, consensual approach to regional political and security issues.

In this regard, Australia and Canada in 1990 proposed the idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia (CSCA), a type of institutional process that was patterned along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), at an ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Jakarta, Indonesia. The proposal was scrapped due to the opposition from both China as well as the ASEAN member states (Sundararaman 1998).

In fact the more the non-Asian states tried to push their ideas, the more reservations the member states of this region had. Japan, on the other hand, had also proposed a similar idea with specific suggestion that the format could be that of an extended ASEAN PMC, which endorsed even by the then Soviet Union in April 1991. Meanwhile, ASEAN between 1990 and 1991, also started to explore other possible models that were more suitable to regional conditions. One of those resulted proposals was the recommendation from the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) in 1991 that ASEAN should use the PMC forum for political and security dialogues with non-ASEAN member countries in the region (Anthony 2005). Following this, the United States, which had earlier preferred bilateral security arrangements in the region, showed a willingness to accept a multilateral approach to security (Sundararaman 1998). Accordingly, Bellamy (2004) unhesitatingly stated that the idea was first mooted by the ASEAN-ISIS think-thank.

The breakthrough finally came during the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992. The ASEAN leaders decided to use the existing PMC forum, but extended in composition, as the mechanism to promote an expanded political and security dialogue with countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The meeting of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) was held in May 1993 and it was
during this meeting, Singapore proposed the name of the new security mechanism, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The acronym "ASEAN" was used rather than the word "Asian" to reflect the ASEAN's leading role in the Forum (Anthony 2005).

In order to deal with all of the actors involved and the issues concerned, Southeast Asia became a multipolar theater integrated into the broader Asian international environment, which resulted in an establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It is the only inter-governmental forum aimed at contributing to the promotion of peace and security through dialogue and cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Yong 2007). The establishment of the ARF clearly reflects both the very real security concerns of regional states and the increasing integration of Southeast and Northeast Asian regional politics. In sum, the ASEAN member states have invested in enhanced external military capabilities, promoting greater ASEAN security cooperation, and sponsoring an Asia-wide forum on security issues. (Wood 1996). The ARF made ASEAN the hub of the Asia-Pacific confidence-building and preventive diplomacy activities (Paribatra 1994).

Therefore, Shankari Sundararaman (1998) argued that the very cause for the formation of the ARF is seen in the context of keeping the United States within the region; trying to minimise the role of both China and Japan; and finally using the ARF as a platform to keep the relevance of ASEAN alive in Southeast Asia and within the broader context of the Asia-Pacific. She further attributed, among various problems, three main facets that forced ASEAN to establish the security forum such as ARF. They were, first, in the post-Cold War period there was a compelling need to establish a balance among the powers that were involved in this region, especially among the US, Russia, China and Japan. Second, the region has also been witness to some on-going inter-state conflicts; and third, the issue of an arms build-up in the region.

This was compatible with the purposes of ARF stated by Amitav Acharya (2000: 147) that through the ARF, ASEAN sought to influence and manage regional order in five ways. The first was to offset the strategic uncertainties of the post-Cold war period. A multilateral security forum could help to avoid misperceptions and generate new ideas about, and approaches to, regional order.
The second was to "engage" China in a system of regional order to dilute the threat to regional stability posed by its unprecedented economic growth and military build-up. This strategy was seen as being preferable to the alternative of "containment" which, to ASEAN member states was as an impractical and dangerous strategic option.

Third, the ARF could be a useful device to ensure the continued engagement of the US in the region's security affairs. This in turn would preclude the emergence of an independent Japanese security role, a development that ASEAN viewed as highly destabilizing.

The fourth goal that ASEAN sought to pursue through the ARF was to ensure that intra-regional conflicts, such as the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, could be managed peacefully through multilateral norms and principles. To this end, the ARF sought to develop measures of confidence-building and preventive diplomacy to constrain the use of force in inter-state relations.

Finally, the ARF provided ASEAN, a coalition of small powers, with a measure of a set of ideas and principles which might persuade the region's major powers to view diplomacy and rules of acceptable conduct rather than arms races and alliances, as the principal means of preserving regional equilibrium (Ellings and Simon 1996; Castro 2000; Acharya 2001; Palmujoki 2001; Collins 2003; Lovell 2003; Cabaliero-Anthony 2005; Severino 2006).

The ongoing process of the institutionalization of multilateral security dialogues through the ARF appears as a practical mechanism in the absence of a more viable alternative. The significant value of the ARF lies primarily in the recognition by its members of interdependent nature of security in the post-Cold War era, expressed in the notion of comprehensive security as the basis for deliberation and dialogue within the ARF. The ASEAN's leading role in the ARF is also meant to ensure that security process in the region will not be dominated by any major power, and that voices of regional countries be heard (Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999).

There are at least five critical issues, according to Rizal Sukma (1999), that ASEAN must address if it has to maintain the leadership role in the ARF. First, it is imperative for ASEAN to strengthen internal structure as a prerequisite for
maintaining its credibility either as the manager of Southeast Asian regional order or as the primary driving force of the ARF.

Second, ASEAN should work towards finding a correct balance between two differing approaches regarding the question of how fast and how slow the ARF should proceed.

Third, ASEAN should devise a more effective way in dealing with China through an improvement of relations between the two parties.

Fourth, ASEAN faced the daunting task of maintaining the relevance of the ARF to every member of the forum.

Finally, in order to sustain its primacy role in the ARF, ASEAN should initiate some concrete programs or actions that would satisfy those who want to see quick results. It is imperative for ASEAN to prepare a mechanism, which may function well in responding to insecurity implications of interdependence when and if they arise.

Such a mechanism should take into account three central elements of security arrangement. First, it should reflect a close link between economic interdependence and security. Second, it should continue to place high priority to the need for institution-building in promoting regional security. Third, it is difficult for ASEAN to escape the harsh reality that balance of power continues to be a defining framework within which regional relations operate (Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999).

3.4.1.1 ARF Member and Mechanism

The first formal meeting of the ARF was conducted on 25 July 1994, among the Foreign Ministers of eighteen states: the ASEAN-6, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, Laos, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and Vietnam, following the Ministerial Meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand and it was agreed that the ARF would be convened on an annual basis. The official statements recognized that the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern (Chairman Statement 1994). The 1995 meeting held in Brunei in August was an attempt to define a framework for the future of the Forum. Its evolution was perceived through three
stages: the promotion of confidence building; the development of preventive diplomacy; and the elaboration of approaches to conflict. The ministers, having conceded to a request by China not to discuss explicitly the Spratly Islands, expressed concern at overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. In a further statement, the ministers urged an immediate end to the testing of nuclear weapons, then being undertaken by the French Government in the South Pacific region (Roberts 2006; Chanto 2007).

The ARF at its third meeting in July 1996, which was attended for the first time by India and Myanmar, agreed on a set of criteria and guiding principles for the future expansion of the grouping. In particular, it was decided that the ARF would only admit as participant countries that had direct influence on the peace and security of the East Asia and Pacific region. The ARF held in July 1997 reviewed progress made in developing the first two tracks of the ARF process, through the structure of inter-sessional working groups and meetings. The Forum's consideration of security issues in the region was dominated by concern at the political situation in Cambodia; support was expressed for the ASEAN mediation to restore stability within that country (Camilleri 2000; Severino 2006).

Mongolia was admitted into the ARF at its meeting in July 1998. India rejected a proposal that Pakistan attend the meeting to discuss issues relating to both countries testing of nuclear weapons. The meeting ultimately condemned the testing of nuclear weapons in the region, but declined to criticize specifically India and Pakistan. In July 1999 the ARF warned the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to conduct any further testing of missiles over the Pacific. At the 7th meeting of the ARF, convened in Bangkok, Thailand, in July 2000, the DPRK was admitted to the Forum. The meeting considered the positive effects and challenges of globalization, including the possibilities for greater economic interdependence and for a growth in transnational crime (Sukma 1999; Acharya 2001; Caballero-Anthony 2005).

The 8th ARF meeting in July 2001 in Hanoi, Vietnam, pursued these themes, and also discussed the widening development gap between nations. The meeting agreed to enhance the role of the ARF Chairman, enabling him to issue statements on behalf of ARF participants and to organize events during the year. In March and April 2002, the ARF workshops were held on financial measures against terrorism and on
the prevention of terrorism, respectively. The 9th ARF meeting, held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, in July 2002, assessed regional and international security developments, and issued a statement of individual and collective intent to prevent any financing of terrorism. The statement included commitments by participants to freeze the assets of suspected individuals or groups in order to implement international financial standards and to enhance cooperation and the exchange of information. In October the Chairman, on behalf of all ARF participants, condemned the terrorist bomb attacks committed against tourist targets in Bali, Indonesia (Sukma 1999; Ott 2006).

The developments of the ARF according to its Concept Paper were aimed to achieve the concept of security community, which set up in the first and second meetings (1994 and 1995). The Paper identified the gradual evolution of the ARF’s approach to security cooperation in three stages: i) promotion of confidence building measures; ii) development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and iii) development of conflict-resolution mechanisms. This evolution moves along two tracks. Track One activities will be carried out by governments. Track Two activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-governmental organizations in the region, such as the ASEAN Institute of International and Security Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) (Caballero-Anthony 2005; Severino 2006; Chanto 2007).

The CSCAP is a voluntary organizations that operate in the non-governmental sectors such as academician, journalist and scholar and is self-funding. Virtually every state in the wider Asia-Pacific region has an office for coordinating CSCAP activities and each submits an annual report to the CSCAP in Kuala Lumpur. The CSCAP, like the ARF is another region-wide process that had its origins within ASEAN but extends beyond the Association, making the distinction between insider and outsider less important in security matters (Bellamy 2004). Within the CSCAP each member state may establish its own National Council and this has been done so by ASEAN, Japan, Canada, Australia, the ROK, and the US (Sundararaman 1998). In addition to work individually on security measures, the CSCAP has created five working groups to consider issues of mutual concern: confidence and security-building measures; comprehensive security; maritime security; north-Pacific security; and transnational crime (Bellamy 2004; Chanto 2007).
The Paper stated neither Institution nor Secretariat would be established in the near future. Particularly no voting will take place in decision making process, but on the basis of consensus like ASEAN (Bellamy 2004). In this regard, ASEAN shall be the repository of all the ARF documents and information and provide the necessary support to sustain the ARF activities. The Paper further stated that the ARF should not move too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast.

In addition, the Paper with its Annex A and B, which were the two lists of implemented measures for confidence building and preventive diplomacy. The first list (Annex A) spelled out measures to be implemented by ARF participants in the immediate future. Whilst, the second was the indicative proposals to be explored over the medium and long-term by ARF participants and considered in the immediate future by the Track Two process. These included confidence building measures; preventive diplomacy; non-proliferation and arms control; peacekeeping; and maritime security cooperation. Among them, the first three were considered by Sundararaman (1998) as the main objectives instilled into the complexity of the political issues in the region.

In general, the nature of these measures can be categorized into three facets: implementation, encouragement, and experiment. The measures to be immediately implemented by the ARF’s Track One participants are the existing principles, which already endorsed by ASEAN and the UN such as the TAC, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)xxxix in Resolution 47/53 (B). The publication of defense policy paper, the participation in the UN Conventional Arms Register, observation of military exercises, and seminar for defense officials are some examples of measures, which the ARF participants are encouraged to undertake. Finally, the experiment considered as an immediate task of Track Two participants in order to find out other alternative mechanisms for the formers. As a result of its consensus-based decision making style, it has been less than successful in persuading members to establish arms registers.

xxxix The purposes and principles of the TAC and its provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes endorsed by the UN (Concept Paper of ARF 1995).
though it has been more successful in areas such as the reaffirmation of a pluralist position on humanitarian intervention.

In order to move from confidence building to preventive diplomacy measures, the CSCAP Working Group on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on Preventive Diplomacy held a meeting in Bangkok on 28 February – 2 March 1999. An agreement on a working definition of preventive diplomacy was reached and this was forwarded to the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on CBMs which had its meeting immediately after the Track Two meeting (Anthony 2005).

Preventive diplomacy is defined as consensual diplomatic and political action with the aim of: a) preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between States which pose a serious threat to regional peace and stability; b) preventing such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and c) limiting the intensity of violence and humanitarian problems resulting from such conflicts and preventing them from spreading geographically. The key principles of preventive diplomacy are as follows (Chairman’s Summary 1999):

(i) It is about diplomacy. It relies upon diplomatic and peaceful methods such as persuasion, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, and conciliation.

(ii) It is voluntary. Preventive diplomacy practices are to be employed only at the request of the parties or with their consent.

(iii) It is non-coercive activity. Acts that require military action or the use of force, or other coercive practices, such as sanction, are outside the scope of preventive diplomacy.

(iv) It rests upon international law. Any action should be in accordance with the basic principles of international law.

(v) It is based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state. This includes the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

(vi) It requires timeliness. Action is to be preventive, rather than curative. Preventive diplomacy methods are most effectively employed at an early state of a dispute or crisis.
3.4.1.2 Contribution of ARF to Regional Security

From the time the ARF was established, the forum has received mixed responses. Among the major reservations regarding the prospects of the ARF pertained to: the ASEAN's centrality in the ARF and its assumed leadership to ensure that it remains at the "driver's seat"; the slowness of its pace, specifically its progress in moving beyond the stage of CBMs to preventive diplomacy (PD); and its viability in resolving more intractable regional conflicts like the disputes in the South China Sea, and the challenges from major powers (Anthony 2005).

The above arguments implicitly suggested that the ARF would move better if ASEAN transferred its driver's seat to a non-ASEAN member states such as the US or China. Since the ARF was realized under the initiative of ASEAN then it has been given the prerogative to be at the driver's seat. It has been envisaged that if the US or Japan initiated the idea and harnessed the ARF, this would have aroused suspicions from China as well as Russia and would not have been possible to bring North Korea to the Forum. More significantly, it is a multilateral security forum that has as its members all the major powers in the international system, yet none of them dominates the forum. It would not have been imaginable that a modest organization comprising small powers could have played such a major role in steering a multilateral security forum of this nature (Anthony 2005). Apparently, ASEAN, in the post-Cold War environment, strategically was the acceptable interlocutor with major powers. This was due largely to its credible success in coping with the Cambodian conflict and the incapability of the major Asia-Pacific powers in forming a concert arrangement among themselves (Leifer 1996; Anthony 2005).

Bellamy (2004) argued that whilst the ARF has not made much substantive progress, it has had three significant effects on regional security politics. First, it is predicated on the norms of behavior described earlier (the ASEAN Way). As a result, the ARF has been an important vehicle for spreading those norms and the shared identities that derived from them beyond the ASEAN's borders. Second, the ARF is the world's only regional gathering that includes Europe, the US, Russia, Japan, India and China. This has contributed to the further legitimization and consolidation of Southeast Asian states and has provided ASEAN and its neighbors with diplomatic tools to peacefully manage change in the region. Third, although the ARF is centered
on ASEAN, it has allowed non-ASEAN member states to contribute to the Association’s political agenda.

With regard to the criticisms that the ARF after ten years is more like a “talk shop” rather than a viable multilateral security organization, members of the forum were divided into two groups. Those that wanted to see an institutionalized ARF which moves forward at a faster pace were the Western countries and Japan, and those who preferred a more incremental approach in directing the nature of institutionalization of the ARF were China and the ASEAN member states (Anthony 2005).

Among other major criticisms, an inability to address the regional conflicts such as the disputes in the South China Sea, which was a core regional security issue has been the topic of debate. This argument has been caused by a limit of the ASEAN Way as a model for ARF in dealing with the issues. Its preference for non-interference and consensus is seen as severe shortcomings since the ARF has been reluctant to push ahead with sensitive issues, and as sweeping things under the carpet (Lim 1999; Anthony 2005). Consequently, the value attached to norms and processes, which the ASEAN Way encapsulates, are regarded as inconsequential.

The above criticism has been articulated by the realist perspective that unless there is a suitable balance of power, which is the prerequisite for a successful ARF. Otherwise it becomes irrelevant (Leifer 1996; Anthony 2005). Anthony argued that the ARF was not created to become an alternative to the balance of power. Its very modest objective stated in the Concept Paper as a forum for security co-operation. The AFR supporters would not claim more than that and would acknowledge that it has to work hand in hand with the other mechanisms of enhancing regional security including bilateral military arrangements and alliances. However, Ralf Emmer (2003) stated that the nature of the ARF was in tandem with the principles of balance of power and cooperative security that the ARF represented, which served to constrain power through political means. In this regard, Anthony (2005) emphasized that an important point to consider in applying or stretching the balance of power approach to both ASEAN and the ARF is the issue of trust and confidence building, in its absence the two regional initiatives would not reach its viable potential. Therefore, the establishment of ARF, which has brought all major powers on the same forum is itself considered as a success.
This clearly reflects the nature of ASEAN and its created mechanism, the ARF which needed to be understood through a set of international theories as discussed in previous chapters. In this regard, when the US resumed its presence in the region in the wake of its antiterrorism campaign. Having considered the terrorism itself as threat to the region and the US campaign as the challenge in balancing power in the region, ASEAN, to considerable extent, launched the recent step in order to establish the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in order to respond to these issues.

3.5 ASEAN: QUEST FOR SECURITY COMMUNITY

From the discussion in the previous sections on the ASEAN’s strategic response to new regionalism and its goal in establishing the ASEAN Security Community, the Association can be viewed through three different points of view. First, ASEAN is considered as a security community in some particular senses. Second, ASEAN by all means cannot be identified with a security community. Third, ASEAN does not share any character even of a community. This section will deal with discussion on the three arguments as well as will explore the prospects and the possible evolution into becoming the ASC.

From the discussion in previous sections in this chapter ASEAN can be recognized as a security community in some sense as in Emmerson’s (2005) suggestion: ASEAN has never been an amalgamated security community and shows no signs of becoming one. But it could be a pluralistic security community particularly in historical perspective because it meets Deutschian minimal requirement: ‘a real assurance that [members] will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch et al. 1957). Accorded with what Acharya (2001) argued: Security communities emerge when a group of states collectively renounce violence as a means of resolving their differences with an attendant significant muting of disputes among them. ASEAN came to exhibit such characteristics in its diplomatic role during the Cambodia conflict.

In this regard, ASEAN is considered as ‘a security community in the full causal sense. The ASEAN’s member countries enjoy regional security because of the normative community that ASEAN has created’ (Solidum 2003). According to Vayrynen’s (2007) statement: ASEAN is often considered at least a nascent pluralistic
security community, its members have a common identity that stresses restraint, non-confrontation, and consultation. Particularly, the Vayrynen's notion accredited the ASEAN Way that 'by stressing the evolution of their common identity, norms, and the general ASEAN Way of solidarity, the Association has been seen moving towards a pluralistic security community'. His notion is compatible with that of Acharya (2001) that the ASEAN Way has 'played a central role in the development of nascent regional identity sought by ASEAN'.

In addition, the ASEAN's leaders claimed that its newer members have been successfully engaged and have sufficiently embraced the ASEAN norm of peaceful change so as to be characterized as a nascent security community (Roberts 2006).

3.5.1 ASEAN Way and Its Strategic Relevance

However, there are also the opponent arguments against the ASC such as in the strong statement: 'ASEAN is 'neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in prospect' (Jones and Smith 2001). This is compatible with Saravanamuttu's (2005) conclusion: A security community remains an object rather than a reality of ASEAN. The Vayrynen's (2007) and Acharya's (2001) notions as mentioned were also opposed by Saravanamuttu (2005): The embedded diplomatic and security culture of the ASEAN Way is increasingly becoming counter-productive to the construction of a genuine security community. This is due largely to ASEAN consensual decision-making targeted at the lowest common denominator and its principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member-states. Particularly, the principle of non-interference has rendered ASEAN an anti-institutional and thereby anti-integrational force within Southeast Asia (Roberts 2006).

Even, Vayrynen (2007) himself admitted the negative impact of non-interference: This has permitted the leaders to continue their non-democratic rule at home, undisturbed by the political pressures by the neighboring states. In turn, says Vayrynen, the lack of democratic traditions and practices has failed to make it a liberal cognitive region, leading to a pluralistic security community (PSC). He further conceded to the limitation of the ASEAN Way that the dated methods and limited impact of its inter-governmental cooperation show that such a community is inadequate to deliver more comprehensive peace and security. Acharya (2001) also
agreed with Vayrynen’s (2007) notice and made his own observation: the norms of ASEAN, including those associated with the ASEAN Way were not always upheld in practice.

Moreover, the ASEAN’s member states all have some means and plans for national defense. Requiring on preparation for organized violence would disqualify the ASEAN region from being considered as a preventive security community (PSC) (Emmerson 2005). The original ASEAN member states may have avoided large-scale military confrontation, but there are now newer ASEAN member states that had previously been in armed conflict with each other (Roberts 2006).

An understanding of the above arguments cannot be wholly explained through the application of functionalism as a theoretical approach. In explaining the successes and failure of ASEAN’s approach to new regionalism, the 'ASEAN Way', which emphasizes norms based approach find greater application of constructivism than functionalism. Particularly, throughout the mechanism and operations in establishing the ASC focused only on the first step namely confidence building and the absence of war, which is not enough to maintain the sense of community and security in the region.

Significantly, Sukma’s (2003) statement, the transformation of ASEAN into a security community would require not only the absence of war but also the absence of the prospect of war. Therefore ASEAN is yet to develop into a full-fledged Security Community. Vayrynen (2007) compiled the counter-arguments to the assumption of ASC: first, its member states, especially Malaysia, continue to have territorial disputes with other members, though most of them are not very serious. Second, they have been also converting their economic resources into large-scale arms acquisitions that have tipped the balance in favor of offensive weapons resulted from an insurance against the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era and the potential instrument for the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the rise of China (Collins 1999).

3.5.2 Challenges to ASEAN’s Emergence as a Security Community

Even Acharya, says Emmerson (2005: 182), 'a constructivist could not make up his mind whether the Association had become even a 'nascent' security community’. He goes further in the emphasis on not being security community of
ASEAN that ‘the Association itself by finally deciding to become a security community by 2020, admitted that it was not one yet’. ASEAN cannot be characterized by any level of security community, but is more relevant to the nature of Security Regime (Sukma 2003). This is because the various expectations of peaceful change in the region are little more than transient in nature. In other words, there is no guarantee that any expectations of peaceful relations that exist today, will exist tomorrow (Roberts 2006). He further concluded: Therefore, the security architecture of Southeast Asia is characterized by a grouping of states who maintain diverging interests and foreign policies with little security integration and cooperation.

‘If managed consciously, however,’ says Sukma (2003) ‘ASEAN could in fact develop, not into a Pluralist Security Community in a Deutschian sense, but into a Comprehensive Security Community more attuned to the region’s own needs and characteristics’. He provided the supportive reasons that Deutschian concept is based only on the notion of security in military terms, but also that of comprehensive security community comprised of elements of non-military security.

Moreover, Emmerson (2005) referred to ASEAN in opinion of a Filipino National Security Adviser, Jose Almonte (2001) that it was not yet ‘a true regional community’ when he urged the Association to deal with the daily lives of ordinary Southeast Asians felt own the Southeast Asian community. According to Sukma’s (2003) argument: If ASEAN wants to have a meaningful political and security cooperation, it needs to define the end condition that it wants to achieve in a more concrete form. In other words, ASEAN needs to agree on what it wants itself to evolve into and how to achieve it.

These discussions led to a conclusion that ASEAN is now a nascent pluralist security community, which might be conceived as security regime. The next question is will ASEAN be able to achieve the higher degree of pluralist security community i.e. ascendant and mature stages respectively.

According to Roberts (2006: 279) Southeast Asia has not yet integrated to a point where it will be feasible to reach the status of a security community by 2020. Sukma (2003) assured us of the possibility in development of ASEAN in order to realise such regional security community because it already possesses elements of all
the characteristics of a Security community mentioned above. According to constructivists, security community can be developed by the process comprised of three factors: institution, norms and identity. These all already existed within ASEAN namely the Association as the institution and the ASEAN Way reflected both norms and identity of ASEAN community, which does not necessarily resemble that envisaged by North Atlantic countries (Sukma 2003). In this regard, ‘an ASEAN Security Community’, says Sukma (2003: 1), ‘needs to be based on a set of principles sensitive to, and cognizant of, (a) historical and contemporary reality of the region, (b) aspirations and condition of member states, and (c) the strategic context within which ASEAN faces its own security challenges. The only thing, Sukma (2003:1) suggested, those principles also need to be adjusted to the current reality so that they will meet new challenges and requirements.

Through this entire discussion on the ASEAN’s strategic response to the politics of new regionalism, the ASEAN Way was considered as a key condition for the success or failure in dealing with the strategic challenges in the past as well as in establishing the ASEAN Security Community (ASC). Notably, the entire structure of ASEAN has been transformed when the ASEAN Charter was endorsed by its member countries on November 20, 2007. This development might also transform the ASEAN Way. The Charter conferred the loosely-organized ASEAN as a rules-based legal entity like the EU. The Charter comprises fifty-five articles in thirteen chapters, which aimed at creating a framework and legal foundation for the regional grouping to restructure its existing mechanism and to improve decision-making. Dispute settlement mechanisms were also included. (See Appendix II) Therefore, the ASEAN Way under the rules-based legal inter-governmental organization needs to be adjusted in order to better meet the challenges posed by regional integration at the globalization era. Particularly, the motto of its decision making process, “agree to disagree” might be in the light of changes that are shaping the region today (Caballero-Anthony 2005; ASEAN 2007h; Lin 2007; China View 2007).

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Sukma’s security community for ASEAN meant ‘pluralist security community’, which share the same characteristic with the two higher degrees of security community developed by constructivists after Deutsch. However, his notion of security is not strictly meant ‘comprehensive security community’, even strictly meant, it always mentioned as only ‘security community’. It suggests us the similarity of both.
Since the timeframe of this thesis is between 1991 and 2005, meanwhile the Charter had been initiated in 2005 and was endorsed in 2007 so that the compulsion to look beyond the ASEAN Way with the emergence of a new Charter can be the matter of any further study after this thesis.