CHAPTER FOUR

FROM HOMELESSNESS TO ROOTEDNESS
TOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL DWELLING

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4.1.0 Heidegger on Dwelling

In the previous chapter we examined Heidegger's thinking on technology. We find that his reflections provide an orientation to move from the dominating power of das gestell towards the freeing power of Gelassenheit. If the technological understanding of Being forces humanity to disclose everything in a one-dimensional manner, Gelassenheit is a positive mode of thinking that releases man towards things and opens up the mystery dimension of life. We dwelt at some length on the possibilities of ecological sensitivity that one can gather from releasement as letting-beings-be. We find that in his investigation, Heidegger realizes a framework of interrelationship and he achieves the de-centering of the subject.

The present chapter, as the title indicates, concentrates on Heidegger's reflections on dwelling and its ecological significance. He believed that the peculiar excess of the domination of technicity in the form of management and calculation should lead to a genuine need for dwelling. It should be noted that he doesn't bring in this dimension of dwelling as an added factor but it flows from the very thinking that he engaged in. Thus thinking in turn becomes dwelling for
him. The way of dwelling that Heidegger envisages is definitely opposed to the tendency of modern man, "that exploits the earth, controls the sky, encapsules 'God' in well-defined concepts, and refuses to accept his radical finitude." On the other hand Heidegger would envisage that man be a dweller in the Fourfold that would ultimately regain the ontological weight of human existence.

We shall begin by examining his explication of dwelling and its relation to building and thinking. Man dwells is in the Fourfold of the earth, the sky, the mortals, and the divinities. Dwelling, for Heidegger, is dwelling among things and so an explication of the meaning of things is in order. Heidegger believes that this dwelling manifests the character of poetry. Hence we shall deal with his reflection on poetry and language and their relation to dwelling.

Heidegger understood dwelling as a preservation of the Fourfold. There is no doubt regarding the ecological significance of dwelling, all the more in the context of the contemporary ecological crisis. Heidegger's reflections on dwelling is a saying about the human dwelling -- a genuine homecoming. Etymologically, Oikos is the root for the term ecology and it
refers to 'a house' or 'a dwelling.' Logos, which is inherently connected to Oikos, means 'saying,' which in turn strongly signifies the true sense of the term ecology as 'dwelling-saying.'

We rely on the following texts in this section. The major part of our discussion will be centered on the three lectures of Heidegger included in his book, Poetry, Language, Thought. They are, "Building Dwelling Thinking," "The Thing," and "Poetically Man Dwells...." We shall also rely on Discourse on Thinking and "Letter on Humanism."

Dwelling is one of the most common experiences of human beings. We dwell in our homes. The word resonates intimacy and the feeling of at-homeness, and consequently familial relationships. It is not just a matter of finding some shelter. We are primarily dwellers.

Heidegger thinks of dwelling in relation to building. They both are seen as one whole and that could be the reason for him to write the three words without the separation of the necessary commas. The connection that dwelling has to building is in no way aimed at bringing out architectural ideas or to recommend rules for building. He prescinds from such
technical concerns and wants to "trace building back into that domain to which everything that is belongs." Though the activity of building has dwelling as its goal, it is quite evident that every activity of building is not for dwelling. That is, every residential building that is well-planned does not necessarily guarantee the occurrence of dwelling. Heidegger wants to point out that it is true that the relation between building and dwelling is something akin to means and ends. However, Heidegger does not see them as two separate activities, which in turn would hide the essential relationship. It is through his favourite etymological analysis that he establishes the essential connection between building and dwelling.

4.1.1 Insights from Etymology

Heidegger maintains that the clue for understanding the essence of dwelling and building is to be found in language. Language tells us the essence of a thing, "provided that we respect language's own nature." He finds that there is a link between bauen which means 'to build' and buan which means 'to dwell.' Buan is so old a word that its meaning has been lost to us. Heidegger finds that a "covert trace" of it has been preserved in the German word for
neighbour, *viz.* Nachbar. Neighbour is experienced as the Nachgebauer, the near-dweller. He notes further, "The verbs buri, büren, beuren, beuron, all signify dwelling, the abode, the place of dwelling." Bauen originally means to dwell and in the original sense its significance reaches up to the very ordinary uses of 'I am' and 'You are.' It means that in the ordinary use of *Ich bin* (I am) and *du bist* (you are) the word *bin* belongs to *bauen*. Thus in the most original sense *Ich bin* means I dwell. "The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling." Heidegger also notes that the word *bauen* means to cherish, to protect, to preserve, and to care for. It is in the cultivation of the soil that such caring and protecting is manifested. Such caring is a type of building that preserves and not necessarily making anything new. Heidegger summarizes this section in the following manner:

But if we listen to what language says in the word *bauen* we hear three things:

1. Building is really dwelling

2. Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth

3. Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and take building that erects buildings.
Again, Heidegger makes use of etymological analysis when he wants to inquire into the nature of dwelling. The word dwelling is derived from the old Saxon wunon, and from the Gothic wunian, and these roots mean to remain and to stay in a place. The remaining implied in wunian means 'to be at peace,' 'to be brought to peace' and 'to remain in peace.' This is essentially connected with peace and freedom in the sense that something is preserved from harm and danger. Thus there is an element of sparing and it is positive in meaning. To dwell, therefore, is to be set at peace, and to preserve the free space that safeguards each thing in its nature.

The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth.

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The manner in which building belongs to dwelling necessitates that we clarify the meaning of the Fourfold (Geviert). The Fourfold is the primal oneness of the four realms of the earth, the sky, the divinities and mortals. These realms, though belonging
together, can be considered as the four aspects of Being.

The earth is the aspect that supports the growth of plants, providing for their blossoming, and rendering them fruitful. It is the earth that supports the rock and water, and supports all forms of life. Heidegger always insists, "When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three along with it." The sky is the realm of the sun, the moon, and the shining stars. The sun is the realm of the seasons and their changes.

The light and dusk of the day, the gloom and glow of the night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and the blue depths of the ether, all happen in the sky. The divinities are the messengers of the Divine. They appear and withdraw into concealment out of the holy sway of the Divine. The mortals are the human beings. Heidegger uses the term mortals to emphasize the importance of death. In this context he would maintain that only mortals are capable of death as death. It implies that we should not merely see death as the end of life, or as a mere Nothing. Death is a harbinger in the sense that it embodies the possibility of presencing Being. Heidegger would not
use the term mortals for animals for they only perish.\textsuperscript{15}

We now call mortals mortals -- not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. Mortals are who they are, as mortals, present in the shelter of Being. They are the presencing relation to Being as Being.\textsuperscript{16}

The Fourfold thus is the simple oneness of the four realms. They are not to be seen as four separate beings but as that dimension of the world where the play of the Fourfold is seen in the concealing and unconcealing dimension of Being itself.

Heidegger understands dwelling in the context of the Fourfold. Dwelling is the way of the mortals in the Fourfold. This way manifests the character of sparing and preserving. "Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the Fourfold in its essential being, its presencing."\textsuperscript{17}

As far as the earth is concerned, mortals dwell in such a manner that they save the earth. Saving, for Heidegger, is not to snatch something away from the face of danger but it means to free something into its own presencing. He is quick to point out that saving in no way implies exploitation or mastering the earth in order to subjugate it. Further the mortals dwell in
such a manner that they receive the sky as sky.\textsuperscript{18} Such dwelling too implies a non-exploitative attitude as far as the sky is concerned. It demands that the sun and the moon and the stars be left to their own courses of journey and the basic rhythms be respected. It also necessitates that the night be not turned into a day "nor day into a harassed unrest."

The dwelling of the mortals manifests an attitude that is open to the divinities. They await the divinities as divinities. In moments of presence and absence, it is the attitude of awaiting that gets precedence. As far as the mortals are concerned, their dwelling manifests that they initiate their own nature. Their nature is that they are capable of death as death. According to Heidegger, dwelling occurs when the Fourfold is preserved in the above manner. Thus, "in saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating the mortals, dwelling occurs as the Fourfold."\textsuperscript{19}

The Fourfold is the interplay of the earth, the sky, the mortals and the divinities. They are never by themselves but are only in the One-fold. Heidegger would call it the round dance of the four, as the play of the world.
The Four-fold represents the happening of a mutual owning and acknowledging of each by each and of each into the unity of the Geviert, such that each is at the same time expropriated into the freedom of its own nature. This owning-expropriating four-foldness in its unity is called by Heidegger the mirror-game.  

Heidegger understands this play of the Fourfold as the concealing and unconcealing dimension of Being itself. He uses a novel way of indicating the Being of the Fourfold. He writes Being with the crossed marks (as \( \overline{\text{Being}} \)).

The symbol of crossed lines can, to be sure, according to what has been said, not be a merely negative symbol of crossing out. Rather it points into the four areas of the quadrangle and of their gathering at the point of intersection.

4.2.3 Building and Dwelling

How is building related to dwelling? Building is not related to dwelling as any form of mere construction but as that form of making which guards the Fourfold. Guarding the Fourfold is, in other words, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities and to escort mortals. This in essence is the presencing of dwelling. "In this way, then, do genuine building give form to dwelling in its
presenting and house this presence."\textsuperscript{22} Thus there is a very close relation between dwelling and building. Heidegger maintains that, "only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build."\textsuperscript{23} Heidegger illustrates the type of dwelling and building through the example of a farmhouse in the Black Forest area. It is the dwelling of the peasants that enabled them to build. He observes that in their dwelling the power of the earth and the heaven, the divinities and the mortals entered into a simple oneness with things.

It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for hallowed places of child bed and the "tree of the dead" -- for that is what they call a coffin there: the Totenbaum -- and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse.\textsuperscript{24}

The reference to the Black Forest farm and the detailed illustration of the way of dwelling doesn't in any way imply that we should go back to such a peasant form of existence. Heidegger's intention is to portray the way of dwelling that enables people to build. In other words he is able to show that dwelling is the basic character and building belongs to dwelling and receives its meaning from dwelling. Heidegger states that such a
detailed description would have achieved the purpose if only we are able to raise building and dwelling to a level where they become worthy of questioning and enable us to thinking.

The path of thinking that Heidegger has followed so far indicates that thinking itself belongs to dwelling. He would observe that, "building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling." However, building and thinking should not be seen in separation. Rather, the two should listen to one another, and only then can they belong to dwelling. Heidegger is aware that for thinking and building to belong to dwelling long experience and constant practice is needed.

4.2.4 The Dwelling Among Things

We have explicated so far Heidegger's reflections on dwelling and it lead us to an investigation of the Fourfold. Dwelling for Heidegger is always staying with things. How does he understand the essence of a thing? Heidegger has some unique reflections to offer in this regard. Moreover, his reflections on things clarify further the realm of the Fourfold.
What is a thing? This is the central question that Heidegger tries to unravel in his reflection on things. At the outset he identifies the purview of the question and differentiates it from other ambiguous talk about things. He finds that there are three different meanings to the question, "What is a thing?" First, it means that something is a thing in the sense of being present-at-hand. Thus the concrete material things around us such as a rock, a piece of wood, etc. are things. Second, a thing could refer to our plans, decisions, attitudes, actions, and other historical "things." Third, a thing could mean all the above things and anything whatsoever that is a something and not a nothing. He limits himself to the first of these meanings.

Heidegger finds that the first narrow meaning of thing is closer to the normal linguistic usage. Moreover, the other meanings are included in this narrow use of the term. Thus Heidegger makes it clear that the question "What is a Thing?" means the concrete and observable things around us. Does it appear too simplistic? Heidegger is aware of this and so he observes that the purpose of the question is not to discover, for example, what a granite is. The intent of the question rather is to discern what a granite is as
a thing. It is obvious that the purview of the question does not fall under the realm of the sciences. These preliminary observations manifest the orientation of Heidegger as far as his reflections on things are concerned. Starting in this fashion, finally, he inquires into the thingness of a thing. However, the thingness of a thing is inextricably linked to the Fourfold and hence an examination of the relationship of the thing and the Fourfold is called for.

4.2.5 Thing: A Gathering of the Fourfold

A thing for Heidegger is not a bare object but it is somewhere the assembling of the world takes place. It is where the interplay of the Fourfold is witnessed. It is in this process that he sees the thingness of a thing. How is that a thing is the assembler of the Fourfold? Heidegger offers here, for example, a detailed description of a jug as a thing. The essence of a jug consists in the outpour of the flow of water or wine. Even if it is not used for this purpose, its essence consists in the fact that it can be used for the outpouring of water or wine.

The spring stays on in the water of the gift. In the spring the rock dwells, and in the rock dwells the dark slumber of the earth, which receives the rain and dew of the sky.

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In the water of the spring dwells the marriage of sky and earth. It stays in the wine given by the fruit of the vine, the fruit in which the earth’s nourishment and the sky’s sun are betrothed to one another. The gift of the pouring out is a drink for mortals... The outpouring is the libation poured out for the immortal gods... In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell together all at once.²⁸

Thus a thing for Heidegger is that which assembles the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. The assembling that happens in a thing is a belonging together. The Fourfold of the earth, the sky, the mortals, and the divinities, belong together in such a manner that unconcealment takes place. The jug presences itself as a thing.²⁹ When a thing is left to the way it is in itself it brings the structure of the world into light. This structure is the interplay of the Fourfold. Thus according to Heidegger, “the jug’s essential nature, its presencing, so experienced and thought of in these terms is what we call thing.”³⁰

At this juncture Heidegger makes use of the linguistic insights from related languages to bring out the similarity and difference with regard to the essential meaning of things. The very word thing is an Old High German and it means a gathering,
“and specifically a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter.” A similar idea is contained in another Old German word dinc. These words denote anything that has bearing on men and consequently is a matter of discourse. The Roman language conveyed the same notion in the word res. This word is associated with res publica which means not the state but that which concerns everybody and therefore is deliberated in public. The meaning of res as a contested matter, a case at law, brings in the word causa. This word in no way signifies 'cause' as we understand it today. It means, rather the case and that which is the case in the sense that something comes to pass and becomes due.

The Old German word thing or dinc, with its meaning of a gathering specifically for the purpose of dealing with a case or matter, is suited as no other word to translate properly the Roman word res, that which is pertinent, which has a bearing. From that word of the Roman language, which there corresponds to the word res -- from the word causa in the sense of case, affair, matter of pertinence -- there develop in turn the Romance la cosa and the French la chose: we say, "the thing."

Heidegger is of the view that the English word "thing" has preserved the full semantic power of the Roman
word res. Expressions such as, "he knows his things," or "he knows how to handle things," suggest the above connotations of the word res.

What is decisive for Heidegger is not the given semantic history but the possibility of thought that these semantic details offer. The word res of the Romans denotes reality as that which has a bearing-upon, and a concern. Instead of thinking through the nature of what they experienced, they conceived the reality of res through the Greek category of on. The Greek category of on and its Latin form of ens means that which is present, in the sense of presented before us. The reality of res as originally experienced as a bearing upon or concern is relegated to everything present in any way whatever, even mental representation. A similar thing, according to Heidegger, happened with the term thing or dinc. What did he achieve, one may be inclined to ask, by this laborious linguistic and etymological examination? Heidegger finds that the various linguistic uses of the word does not help to discover and give adequate thought to the essential source of jug as a thing. However, there is one exception to this and this is the Old High German thing as "gathering."
The jug is a thing neither in the sense of the Roman res, nor in the sense of the medieval ens, let alone in the modern sense of object. The jug is a thing in so far as it things.\textsuperscript{34}

In other words something is a thing in so far as it gathers the Fourfold. Heidegger is very fond of the expression that a thing things. This expression refers to the gathering that unites the Fourfold.\textsuperscript{35}

The gathering and assembling that takes place in a thing is the drawing near of the world. Heidegger expresses this in the following manner. "Each thing stays the Fourfold into a happening of the simple oneness of the world."\textsuperscript{36} The gathering, in other words, is a worlding of the four structural elements of the world. The world as the Fourfold dimension, of the earth, the sky, the mortals and the divinities, is the very dynamism itself which comes forward from concealment to revelation.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, according to Heidegger, Being presences in the thinging of a thing.

4.2.6 Traditional View of Things

We have seen the rather strange Heideggerian conception of a thing. In what sense is it different from the traditional manner of viewing things? Heidegger himself raises this issue elsewhere, though
he deals with it very briefly in the essay on things. From the traditional point of view one finds different answers to the question, what constitutes the essence of things? These answers can be reduced to the following three positions: A thing is the composition of substance and accidents; it is a unity of a manifold of sensible properties; and, finally the thing as the unity of matter and form.

According to the first view, a thing is that around which the properties have been assembled. Thus substance is that which is in it itself and the accidents are the properties that are in another. What we call substance was named as ὑποκείμενον by the Greeks. The characteristics were called as συμβεβεκότα. According to Heidegger, the translation of these into Latin was not an innocent process. The basic Greek experience of Being as presence is carried on here. This process is essentially related to what Heidegger calls the oblivion of Being. However, this determination of the thingness of a thing seems to correspond to our natural view of things. There is a subject-predicate structure in our propositions, and this is the way we speak about things. Here he raises the crucial question:
Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (of the union of substance with accidents)? Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the sentence?40

Heidegger is not interested in entering into this controversy as to whether the sentence structure or the thing structure comes first. According to him this question should be decided "from a common and more original source."41 In other words it should be decided from the question of Being. This enables him to maintain that the substance-accident structure of a thing is not natural and that it does not reflect the true structure of a thing. If at all it appears to be natural it is because it has been in use for a long time.

The second conception regarding the thingness of a thing deals with the thing as the unity of the manifold of what is given in the senses. The characteristic trait of this conception is that a number of perceived sense impressions are united and a thing will be understood as this unity. It is quite obvious that Heidegger will not uphold this view of a thing. According to him perception is not an acquaintance with
sensations. Understanding is a founded mode of Being and it enables him to maintain that there is an 'as structure' in our perceptions.\textsuperscript{42} Consequently the things themselves will be much more close to us than mere sensations.\textsuperscript{43}

The third conception regarding the thingness of a thing deals with the conception of thing in terms of matter and form. It is this matter and form combination that gives constancy in a thing. Thus in this conception, a thing is a formed matter. The conception of form and matter has a long history straight from Aristotle down to the medieval Scholastics. But as far as Heidegger is concerned the principles of matter and form are insufficient to disclose the thingness of a thing. He finds that these principles can be applied to any being whatsoever, whereas Heidegger deals with a strict understanding of things. Moreover, the principles of matter and form do not bring out the ontological structure of things. "The matter and form structure has its proper place in the description of the manner in which equipment comes-to-pass and abides."\textsuperscript{44}

These three theories or their various combinations dominate the traditional view of things. According to
Heidegger these theories do not reveal the thingness of a thing. He does not question the correctness of these theories but he questions their truth in the sense that their real origin is not brought forward. This he believes should relate to the concealment-revealment structure of the question of Being.

4.3.1 Poetic Dwelling

We have seen earlier the various dimensions of dwelling. An important aspect of dwelling that Heidegger envisages is brought out in his reflections on poetry. Heidegger believes that dwelling should be of a poetical nature. In fact the same idea is communicated by the title of one of his short essays, viz. "...Poetically man dwells..."45 Here we shall dwell on Heidegger's reflections on poetry and language.

4.3.2 The Nature of Poetry

Heidegger's reflections on poetizing stretches over a long period of time starting from 1935 to 1953. He had exceptional attachment to the poetry of Hölderlin46 whom he considered the poet of the poets. Heidegger deals with the power and role of poetizing in his essay "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry."47
Normally we understand poets as the creative ones endowed with a great sense of imagination. They are the ones who recollect their thoughts in tranquillity and give utterance to their inspirations in words. A sense of the cult of "genius" is attached to them.

Heidegger on the other hand goes beyond the normal understanding of the nature of poets and poetry. Poetry is the establishment of Being by means of the word. Poetizing is a manner of opening up of Being so that entities may appear in a given manner. Heidegger describes poetizing as a process in which Being as the Holy addresses itself to the poet. The poet responds to this address by articulating it in words.

Poetry is the disclosure of concealment. It is a coming to pass of truth. In this sense it is similar to a work of art. According to Heidegger, a work of art is a means of establishing truth in a new and unprecedented way. In the process a world is formed and meaning emerges.

Poetizing is measure-taking. It does not in any way imply spatial and metrical measures. It is an opening of the dwelling of man in such a way that he is able to dwell between the heavens and the earth. In other words the dwelling of man is opened up to the
dimensions of the Fourfold. This way of dwelling bestows the measure for the breadth of the human essence in general.48

In Heidegger's reflections on the nature of poetry there are different metaphorical characterizations of Being. We are familiar with the conception of Being in terms of the metaphor of light. This metaphor is further enriched by his use of the expression, "the Glad-some." It suggests a sense of serenity and light-heartedness. The "Holy" is another important expression. It is neither God nor the gods. Being as Holy is beyond God, the gods and men and guarantees the integrity of their Being. It is the opening up of that domain in which God, the gods and men may come to presence.49

Heidegger refers to primordial poetizing. According to him, the coming to presence of language itself is the disclosure of Being. In other words, the essence of language is the coming of Being into words. If this is the case, then man's original concern with words enjoys a privileged affinity with Being. Thus an access to Being is possible by a careful attendance of original meaning of basic words. Such an original
concern with words is the primordial poetizing for Heidegger.⁵⁰

Heidegger sees a close relation between poetry and dwelling, though in ordinary terms they are apparently incompatible. According to him it is poetry that enables us to dwell. What he means is that the essential nature of poetry enables us to a distinctive kind of building and it is this building that lets us dwell.⁵¹ It does not mean that the poetic character is an ornament to dwelling in the sense that it brings in a respectable appeal to our dwelling. The poetic dwelling in essence demands that we think the nature of human existence by way of the nature of dwelling and that we think of the nature of poetry as enabling us to dwell.

According to Heidegger genuine dwelling necessitates that the poets first measure the dimension. It means to open us to the realm of the in-between, viz. the between of heaven and the earth. This brings us to his reflections on the Fourfold. Once the poets have poetized the Fourfold it becomes possible for the mortal to inhabit it. It is a learning "to heed it in its essence," in the absence of which the Fourfold would remain closed to him.
4.4.1 The Nature of Language

Heidegger's reflections on the nature of poetic dwelling is inherently related to his unique doctrine of language. He is known for his strongly anti-subjectivistic views on language which inverts our usual relation to language. Heidegger would see language speaking in us, rather than human beings speaking language.

Heidegger's reflections on language must be seen as going against the current perceptions of language. The normal way of viewing language is to see it as the vocal utterance of inner thoughts. The vocal utterance is grasped as a phenomenon of the body. What gets articulated in vocal utterance is the content of language and it is this that gives sense and meaning. Heidegger would name this characteristic way of viewing language as language of expression. It is not that this normal way of viewing language is not correct. "They hold sway, as if unshakable, over the whole field of the varied scientific perspectives on language." But they are not true in the sense that they do not enable us to undergo "an experience with language."

Language is not a mere tool that man possesses in addition to many others; on the contrary, it is only language that affords
man the very possibility of standing in the openness of Being. Only where there is language is there a world, i.e. the perpetually changing environment of decision and work, of action and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness and noise, of decay and confusion. Only where world holds sway is there history.... Language is not a tool which is at man's disposal but rather that event which disposes of the supreme possibility of man's being.55

4.4.2 Language Speaks

Language offers the possibility of opening man's Being. In this sense Heidegger would say that it is language that speaks. The inversion that is taking place is obvious. Normally we would understand that it is man who speaks a language. But here he would emphatically state that it is language that speaks. The speaking that he refers to is not a chatter but it is a naming. This naming is not a placing of various objects and events with words of a language.56 It is not a question of handing out titles or applying terms.

Naming is a function of calling things into words. It implies bringing things closer into nearness. It is not a matter of making things present among things already present. Nearness and remoteness are a correlation which Heidegger uses quite often. And, they are applicable to Being itself. Being is "far" because
it is not an entity. In other words it is the same as saying that Being conceals itself behind the entities to which it gives presence. At the same time Being is near to man because he has a comprehension of it and it is the source of all nearness.57

When Heidegger states that language speaks, he would see the function of speaking as an elucidation of Being itself. It is because speaking is naming, and naming implies bringing things to nearness. He would develop this idea in the following manner. Naming is calling things into arrival. Things are invited so that they may bear upon men as things.58 The things that are named gather themselves as the sky and the earth, the mortals and the divinities. Here we need to bear in mind his reflections on the Fourfold and the thinking on things.

4.4.3 The Essence of Language as Saying

Heidegger reflected further on the nature of language as saying. He uses the term 'saying' to develop the notion of manifestation. "To say" is related to the old Norse "saga" which means to show, to make appear, and to set free. Thus, saying seen from the perspective of these meanings enables Heidegger to see it as the world-lighting and concealing event.
"This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential being of saying." Heidegger, thus, would maintain that the essential being of language is saying as showing. The saying that he refers to is not identical with speaking. It may happen that a man may speak endlessly but at the same time he need not say anything. Another may remain silent and yet could say a great deal.

Heidegger tries to get closer to the essence of language by the following guiding principle. He states this as "the essence of language: the language of essence." Essence in the first part of the statement is understood as quiddity. Language is the subject and the search is to understand the quiddity of the subject. The second part of the statement is not a mere change of terms. It is not the metaphysical quiddity that is sought after. The second part of the statement must be understood as Being itself in the sense that it abides and lingers on, not as mere duration but as that which touches us and moves us. "Language belongs to this continuous abiding and is inherent in that which moves everything as that which is most characteristic of it." The way to think of this dimension as that which moves every thing is to relate it to the realm of the Fourfold.
Language, Saying of the world's Fourfold is no longer only such that we speaking human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world's regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself-Saying-reserve.  

Thus for Heidegger language is nothing separate from and found outside the Fourfold but it is the very relatedness of the Fourfold itself. It is not a transcendent power which would amount to a metaphysical representation. It is the original gathering and the nearness to man that governs the Fourfold.

4.4.4 Language as the House of Being

The essential nature of language is further brought out by the assertion that language is the house of Being. Heidegger has referred to this way of expressing the essence of language in many places. A clear statement of this is found in his "Letter on Humanism":

"Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. The thinkers and the poets are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring the manifestation to
language and maintain it in language through their speech.\textsuperscript{65}

House is a place that reflects intimate relationship and close familiarity. It is that which gives security and well-being. It is that makes one "feel at home." Language as speaking and saying manifests the realm of Being that is brought to word. Once it arrives in words, then "...language is the language of Being in the same way that the clouds are the clouds of the sky."\textsuperscript{66} It is language that provides a protection for the presencing of Being insofar as its coming to light is entrusted to the appropriate saying. Thus as a protection language is the house of Being. It is in this house that things find themselves. "Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is the mode of Appropriation,"\textsuperscript{67}

The intimate relationship between language and the question of Being is in no way a matter of grammar and etymology. In his \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, Heidegger develops the special relationship between Being and language in an altogether different manner.\textsuperscript{68} It is possible to make a threefold differentiation in our use of language to refer to things. A word such as pen, for instance, may be considered first, in respect to the audible and visible form of the word. Second, it
may be considered with regard to the meaning of what we represent in connection with it. Third, it may be considered in respect to its purpose, i.e. it is to write something on a piece of paper. Thus we can differentiate a thing from the perspective of word form, word meaning and word thing. Heidegger's contention is that this form of a threefold differentiation is not possible as far as the word Being is considered. We can have only word meaning with regard to Being. He would put forward this idea in a striking manner in the following way. The Being of a building is not just another thing of the same kind as the roof or the cellar. Does this mean that Being consists only of the word meaning? Heidegger would maintain that, "the meaning of the word does not, as a meaning, constitute the essence of Being." But we aim at Being itself by going through the word meaning. It follows from this that "Being itself is dependent on the word in a totally different and more fundamental sense than any essent." It is this fundamental relation that enables Heidegger to use this imaginative expression that language is the house of Being.

Heidegger made some observations regarding the use of this expression in his "A Dialogue on Language." He stated that,
...with that expression, I do not mean the Being of beings represented metaphysically, but the presence of Being, more precisely the presence of the two-fold, Being and beings but this two-fold understood in respect of its importance for thinking them.\textsuperscript{72}

Though he admitted that the phrase "house of Being" gives a hint to the nature of language, yet he admitted that it was a clumsy expression.\textsuperscript{73} He never bothered to give an explanation for calling this a clumsy expression.

4.5.1 Man: The Shepherd of Being

The preceding analysis brings about an entirely different picture of man. He enjoys a privileged position which demands of him to play a special role. He plays his privileged role by dwelling in the Fourfold. This necessitates that he becomes a mortal and as a mortal he dwells insofar as he saves the earth, receives the sky as the sky, and await the divinities. The poetic dwelling opened up in this manner presences the intimate relationship between Being and language. The true picture of man thus consists in being related to and owned by Being. Heidegger uses a beautiful imagery to convey this picture of man. According to him man is the shepherd of Being.\textsuperscript{74}
Shepherd is not the owner of the sheep-fold. He is entrusted with the care, protection and the safe-keeping of the sheep. In the like manner,

Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this "less"; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth.75

It is against the image of the lord that Heidegger employs the image of the shepherd. This image of the shepherd clearly brings out the true nature of man as the privileged partner of Being. Man as the shepherd of Being is opposed to the technological man who is characterized by homelessness and rootlessness. Technological man lacks a neighbourhood. He appears to be not at home anywhere. He acts as a stranger to Being that is the really nearest and a friend of entities that are apparently nearest.76

It is obvious that Heidegger uses the image of man as the shepherd of Being in opposition to a long-standing definition of man as animal rationale. This definition conceives man as a living being endowed with reason. This age-old definition of man is based on the notions of genus and differentia. Thus in this
definition *genus* consists in *animality* and *rationality* is the specific difference. According to Heidegger this well-founded definition lacks the original experience of man as man. The definition of man as *animal rationale* presupposes an understanding of Being that is developed by looking at an extant being, by not viewing man as man." Concepts such as *genus* and specific difference are thought as essence in the sense of what-ness. The essence of a thing or its whatness is distinguished from that-ness or being-real. These concepts reflect the metaphysical concepts of being and they are extended to all beings. According to Heidegger, this metaphysical determination covers over man's ownmost being as an existence that comprehends Being.

4.6.1 The Ecological Bearing of Dwelling

The ecological perspective that we have adopted is guided by two key notions. They are a search for a framework of interrelationship and a de-centering of the subject. Heidegger's reflections on dwelling is ecologically significant from the perspective of these two key notions. Of course the terminological similarity between ecology and dwelling is implicit. Dwelling is a saying about the human dwelling. *Oikos*
which is the source for the term ecology too refers to house or dwelling. Saying brings us close to logos. So the dwelling-saying is ecology in the true sense of the term.

Heidegger understands dwelling as a preservation of the Fourfold. It is the primal oneness of the four realms of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. Mortals dwell insofar as they save the earth. Saving is not understood as rescuing something from danger but a type of freeing something into its own root unfolding. Preserving the earth thus goes against all tendencies of exploitation and domination. Mortals dwell insofar as they receive the sky as sky and wait on the divinities. Thus the dwelling is a dwelling with things, sparing, preserving and protecting the Fourfold of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals.

The framework of interrelationship which Heidegger established in his fundamental ontology receives an added emphasis in his reflections on the Fourfold. The Fourfold is not seen as separate entities but are only in the One-fold. He would call it the round dance of the four or as the play of the world. It is a mutual owning and acknowledging of each by each other. Thus the essential oneness of Being is manifested in the
polyvalence of the four dimensions. This dimension of interrelationship that is manifested in the Fourfold is ecologically a very significant notion.

All through the reflection on dwelling the underlying picture of man is a de-centered subject. This is reflected best in the imagery of the shepherd. This image of man manifests the essential poverty of the shepherd who does not own but is entrusted with the care and protection of the sheep. Similarly man guards the truth of Being. Such a de-centering takes away the hubris of modern man who shows the domination of technicity and reduces everything one-dimensionally as raw materials. Thus we see a shift of perspective occurring here. It enables us to be open to the mystery dimension in life. Things are no more seen as isolated entities but as the gathering of the Fourfold. Language is not viewed from an instrumental perspective but as the house of Being.

Thus the possibilities of ecological sensitivity that are opened up from Heidegger's reflection on dwelling are enormous. It provides a solid critique of our existing unpoetic, exploitative sheltering and opens us to genuine dwelling.