CHAPTER TWO

HEIDEGGER
THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE WORLD

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2.1.0 The World: Preliminary Considerations

We identified in the previous chapter two perspectives that are significant for ecology. First, the present-day ecological discussions aim at developing a framework of interrelationship in existence. Second, they aim to move away from a human centered framework in thinking. Can we see these concerns reflected in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger? Heidegger establishes a relational world view in his fundamental ontology the result of which is the analytic of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. The elucidation of his understanding of the world brings him to confrontation with the Cartesian philosophy of the subject-object divide, and helps him to move beyond a subject dominated world view.

Normally we understand by the world as the universe, the sum-total of everything that exists. Quite often we use it in very specific ways. Thus the earth with all its countries and people is world for us. Sometimes we use it in an attributive way; as for example, English is a world language. At the outset it should be made clear that Heidegger does not make use of the term 'world' in any such normal usage. His concern is ontological to the core and he makes use of
the term from this perspective to draw out its implications.

Heidegger himself has clarified his meaning of the concept of 'world' in his writings. We shall make use of two texts to commence our analysis. The first text is from *The Letter on Humanism*. Here Heidegger emphatically states that the world signifies the openness of Being and it does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings. "World is the lighting of Being into which man stands out on the 'basis of his thrown essence."\(^1\)

World in this sense would be the "beyond" within existence. Man is not to be seen as a subject related to objects but before that he should be seen in his essence as eksistent into the openness of Being. The second text where Heidegger himself clarifies the meaning of the concept of world is in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.\(^2\) In this text Heidegger observes that since Descartes, in German Idealism the ontological constitution of the subject has been determined by way of self-consciousness. What is not important is the clarification of the concept of self-consciousness but Dasein's self-understanding. This self-understanding is clarified by way of the structure
of existence. The path for this is "reflection in the sense of self-understanding by way of the things themselves." Our very comprehension of things presupposes that they have the character of functionality. This leads to a functionality-totality that is meaningful only when something as a world is unveiled for us. Thus here too Heidegger elucidates his understanding of the world.

These texts bring us to the very problematic of Heidegger clarified especially in *Being and Time*. It is well known that the world of philosophy is caught up in puzzles, and it does not need any proof. Many philosophers spent their energy in proving the world for a long time. According to Heidegger such questions are not only scandalous but the 'scandal of philosophy' is that, "Such proofs are expected and attempted again and again." The puzzles are due to a particular way of understanding the nature of reality. This outlook can be characterized as "substance ontology," and it means that what is ultimately real is that which underlies properties and remains continuously present. The "substance ontology" is that which leads to the metaphysics of enduring presence, and a whole lot of dualistic thinking. Heidegger challenges that conception and points out that reality need not be
viewed in that way. The essential thing for him is not to submit to that metaphysical picture.

Such a radical challenge is not aimed at neglecting the importance of questions of mind or matter or any of the themes in classical discussions. Heidegger's point of view is that they are all derivative phenomena and the result of theorizing from a detached standpoint. Such a detached and objective approach kills the world. What is more primary than these derivative approaches are the analyses of reality at the pre-reflective level. That is why he has raised anew the question of Being and the world.

The central intuition of Heidegger is that Being (to be) means presencing. "Being (Sein) understood in the active sense of the infinitive 'to be' means the self-revealing or the self-manifesting of beings (Seinden)." Thus Being does not mean a mysterious "substance" that grounds a thing's predicates, nor does it imply a supreme entity that creates all other entities; rather Being is the Being-process. It is the manifesting of an entity within the historical-temporal clearing constituted through human existence called Dasein. For metaphysics Being means Seindheit, the reality of the real, but for Heidegger it means "to be
manifest." According to him entities are, in so far as they reveal themselves through the clearing that constitute human existence. Thus human existence or Dasein lets the intelligibility of what is revealed.

2.2.1 Dasein Analysis

Heidegger is a master craftsman in the use of appropriate expressions and his ingenuity lies in his choice of words. Dasein is one such expression Heidegger has popularized and Being and Time provides a profound elucidation of it. This German word, hardly translatable into English, generally stands for any kind of Being or 'existence' in the traditional German philosophy. In a narrower sense it stands for the kind of Being which belongs to persons. It connotes 'existence,' 'life,' and 'presence.' In a unified and deepened way Heidegger has retained all these shades of meaning. Dasein is the presence of Being, in particular human life and situations. The human person is the one who has an understanding of Being. The very first time he uses the term Dasein in Being and Time he conveys this idea. "This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'."
Dasein is the horizon in which something like Being in general becomes intelligible.

Though this term cannot be accurately translated into English, there has been a divided opinion among commentators as to the rendering of the term. Some scholars would provide a literal translation such as 'there-being', \(^{11}\) while others would take the meaning of the German term *da* as here. Since this term has various shades of meaning, and it does not refer to a fixed entity, it is customary to leave it untranslated.

We should not attempt to define Dasein. Rather keeping true to the method of Heidegger we should ask: how does Dasein stands in relation to Being? It is an entity (*Seindes*) like any other and yet it is an entity which has an understanding of Being. Dasein is a clearing of Being. It is the process by which a clearing is made so that beings may make their appearance. Thus we can describe Dasein as a 'window to Being.'\(^{12}\) Dasein is not to be equated with human reality per se. At the same time Heidegger would maintain that, "The Being of any such entity is in each case mine."\(^{13}\) It is not to be equated with self but the process of becoming "self." It is a process that happens within a human being. That is why Heidegger can
speak of Dasein as "in" man. The process of Dasein is such that in the Being of this entity there is a concern about its ability "to be." This process of becoming a Dasein is a neutral one in the sense that it may happen in an "I" or in a "thou," in male or in female. It does not mean that Dasein is an impersonal process but a pre-personal process.\textsuperscript{14} It is the a priori that renders individual selves possible.

Dasein is not a conscious subject\textsuperscript{15} in the Cartesian sense. One major aim of Heidegger is to overcome the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. It is with this aim in mind that he has chosen the term Dasein. As a pre-personal process Dasein should be seen much more basic than the self and the mental states. Dasein is that upon which both self and mental states are rooted. In his postscript of 1943 to "What is Metaphysics" Heidegger stated as follows:

To characterize with a single term both the involvement of Being in human nature and the essential relation of man to the openness ("there") of Being as such, the name of (being there) Dasein was chosen for that sphere of being in which man stands as man. ...Any attempt, therefore, to re-think \textit{Being and Time} is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in his study, the term 'being there' is used in place of 'consciousness.'\textsuperscript{16}
2.2.2 The Primacy of Dasein

Heidegger has some significant reflections on the priority of Dasein. He would say that, "Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities." 17 This distinctiveness lies in the fact that, "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being." 18

At this juncture it is important to note that Heidegger's Dasein analytic is based on a significant presupposition. 19 The presupposition is that in the human person there is a comprehension of Being. It is this starting point that enables him to develop the notions of existence, transcendence, Dasein and the like. How can one justify a presupposition in a radical philosophizing and all the more when one is inspired by a phenomenological method? Heidegger himself is aware of this problem. 20 He admits the circular nature of reasoning involved here but denies the justification for reproach. His response to the objection of circularity is that the basic comprehension of Being is not an explicit, conceptual awareness. Initially, the understanding of Being is vague, obscure, dark, nebulous and average. His aim is to make this vague, average understanding explicit and thematic. So the
movement of thought is from a vague comprehension to a clear understanding. This process is not a vicious circle in the logical sense but a victorious circle\textsuperscript{21} in the philosophical sense.\textsuperscript{22} The Philosopher's task is not to deny the circle but rather to endeavor to leap into the 'circle,' primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being.\textsuperscript{23}

Dasein's understanding of Being is not accidental but a definite characteristic that renders the question of Being possible. It is the capacity to understand Being that distinguishes Dasein from all other entities. Heidegger thus speaks of a three-fold priority of Dasein. This is based on a distinction between ontic and ontological types of inquiries. These terms are used abundantly but are not clearly defined. Ontological inquiry has a concern for Being while ontical inquiry has a bearing on entities and the facts about them.\textsuperscript{24} The first priority is that Dasein possesses an ontic primacy. The ontic priority of Dasein consists in the fact that Dasein is ontological. Dasein has an ontological primacy because only Dasein is capable of understanding Being. This constitutes the second level of primacy of Dasein. The third level is
what Heidegger calls the ontico-ontological priority. It consists in the fact that not only Dasein is capable of understanding its Being but also the Being of other entities.

2.2.3 Characteristics of Dasein

Our description of Dasein brings out two essential natures of Dasein. They are existence and mineness. Existence is the specific quality of Dasein. Entities are, but only Dasein exists. "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence." Heidegger makes use of the etymology of the word 'existence' almost virtually. The word existence arises from the Latin root ex-sistere and it means "to stand out from". Dasein stands out from all other entities in the sense that it is open to itself and to the world. Existence for Heidegger is an "ex-position" of the thinker. One is taken into an altogether different position, and it is from this position that one is able to ask the all-important question of Being. Thus Dasein is the only existing being.

In a later text, clarifying the meaning of existence, Heidegger writes thus: "In B.& T. the term 'existence' is used exclusively for the being of man." He further notes: "The word designates a mode
of Being: specifically, the Being of those beings who stand open for the openness of Being in which they stand, by standing it." This implies that Dasein is not a finished product but a process. It is a dynamic reality to be achieved. Hence possibilities become important. Moreover Dasein should not be approached from the perspective of fixed properties or stable categories but from existentials. "By 'existentiality' we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist." Thus Dasein's ways of being are existentials as opposed to existentiell that refers to categories and ontic inquiries. In other words, existential is that structure which pertains to Dasein's comprehension of the Being-structure of entities. It refers to those categories which belong exclusively to Dasein. Thus it refers to the ontological dimension of Dasein. It should be clearly distinguished from Existentiell that refers to the ontic dimension of entities. Moreover, these dimensions of existential and existentiell are only distinguishable, not separable. They are different dimensions of a unified phenomenon of Dasein.

The second characteristic of Dasein is 'mineness.' It expresses the unique individuality of each Dasein. It is always one's own existence and it is a state of
being owned. Therefore, Dasein cannot be grasped as an instance or special case of some genus of the things present-at-hand. This entity in each case is mine.

The question of 'mineness' enables Heidegger to introduce the concept of authenticity. Since Dasein is a project it has to choose from the possible ways open to it. Choosing the ways open to it and making them one's own will be a way of existing authentically. Such an option could very well be given up. One can live in a routine manner following the dictates of others and the pressures of society. This will be an inauthentic mode of existence according to Heidegger.

To be inauthentic means to objectify oneself as a continuing ego-subject, thereby concealing the fact that one is really openness or emptiness. To be authentic means resolving to accept the openness which, paradoxically, one already is. One can be open to other people and to possibilities only when freed from the distortion of egoism.

The inauthentic mode leads to an average everyday existence and he would call it das Man that is usually translated as the 'they' or the 'one.' It need not refer to a collective group but it could be the 'anyone' who is not in possession of oneself as existing. We could point out that Dasein is the
authentic pole of existing whereas *das man* is the inauthentic axis of being human.

2.3.1 Dasein as Being-in-the-World

The fundamental constitution and the innermost reality of Dasein is that it is Being-in-the-world. This is the most important existential, or the way of Being of Dasein. For Heidegger, "world" is not the sum total of the things nor is it a theological category. It means primarily the manner in which the things are in the whole as related to Dasein.

"World" in Heidegger's philosophy is essentially related to the existential analysis of Dasein the result of which could be summarized as follows: Dasein refers to the human person who has an awareness of Being. In the concept of Dasein what is referred to is the state of Being and not the entitiness of the human person. There is an essential ontological unity between the Being of the human person and the Being of the entities. Heidegger believes that the elucidation of significant ontological structures must begin with the exposition of 'everydayness' of Dasein. This term that is quite common in Heidegger's vocabulary refers to the uncritical mode of daily life in which Dasein finds itself. It portrays our everyday relationship to the
entities around us. His description of everydayness is carried out with the sole purpose of clarifying a background understanding that makes all types of everyday experiences possible.

In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit -- not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being.\footnote{35}

Traditional philosophy neglected everydayness because they viewed our relation to entities from a theoretical perspective rather than a pragmatic approach.\footnote{36}

The existential structures of Dasein's average everydayness reveal that we are Being-in-the-world. The description of our everyday relation to entities within the world is the appropriate way for Heidegger to arrive at a notion of the world. It is brought about by clarifying three crucial and different notions of world in Heidegger. The first notion is the world of the theoretical subject. The second one is the world of the practical subject.\footnote{37} The third notion is the worldhood of the world.
2.3.2 The World of the Practical Subject

This is the realm of the active, involved participant who uses objects. One of Heidegger's fundamental discovery is that our primary sense of things is not as objects of perception and knowledge. He would consider this as a derivative level. The basic level is that we make use of objects as equipments which fit naturally into our ordinary practical activity.

The kind of dealings which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use.  

This also implies that our fundamental awareness of ourselves is not as passive, disinterested, observers but as purposefully involved participants at home in the practical world.

Heidegger would show this by a graphic description. For instance, we use the door knob to open the door and to get into the next office. Here we do not attend to its perceptual characteristics. Our attention is directed towards where we are going to and what we are doing. The door knob is used so automatically in familiar surroundings like these that
it withdraws from our view and serves its instrumental function invisibly. In other words, the perceivable properties of the things that we use for the most part are not explicitly noticed. Heidegger's often repeated example of the hammer makes this obvious again. The skilled carpenter uses the hammer to drive the nails to build the house to shelter his family thereby providing for his family either directly or indirectly. Explicit attention is typically directed toward the work rather than the equipment used to accomplish it.

Heidegger should be credited for pointing out that in our natural movement towards things we never think of a single isolated thing. We always think of a thing as part of a wider context. Things are not given to us as a jumbled heap "but as environs, surroundings, which contain within itself a closed, intelligible contexture." An equipment functions only in a network of relationships. We become aware of this network of relationships only when there is a breakdown. When the practical activity is interrupted by the failure of the instrument, then we see the network of relations in which the functioning of the instrument is embedded. Here Heidegger introduces a complex expression called "ready-to-hand" (Zuhanden) to describe the way objects are for us in the midst of practical activity. "The
kind of Being which equipment possess -- in which it manifests itself in its own right-- we call "readiness-to-hand."

Thus readiness-to-hand refers to the Being of the equipment manifested in its usability as a specific instrument. It is not a quality that we can discover from the outward appearance. Thus world here is a network of relationships.

Here we can recognize internal relations among tools reflected in various assignments and external relations maintained in the purposes of the human beings who use them for their various goals. The practical world is more fundamental than the traditional sense of the world as a collection of things in objective space. This priority comes about because it is in this practical world that we inhabit first before we engage in scientific reflection. Moreover, the world in the traditional sense can be understood from the world in the practical sense but we cannot proceed the other way around.

2.3.3 The World of the Theoretical Subject

This is the world of the passive observer and can be seen in the traditional scheme of the knower (subject) and the known (object). Heidegger calls this as the theoretical standpoint. It is the standpoint of
the disinterested spectator. Such an observation is motivated by a kind of curiosity about the true nature of things. Descartes is the representative thinker in this realm. The components of this world are a mind whose contents are mental representations, and an independent substantial reality capable of being represented. To adopt this standpoint is equivalent to looking at things simply as perceivers and encountering the properties they present to us. Here the whole problematic is as simple as Fichte's remark: "Gentlemen, think of the wall, and then think of the one who thinks the wall." The attitude of viewing things from the perspective of the theoretical standpoint is what Heidegger names the present-at-hand (Vorhanden) view. Traditional ontology is the ontology of the present-at-hand, because they take this perspective as the most basic.

The main arguments of Heidegger against the priority of this traditional present-at-hand view could be summarized as follows: First, the traditional problem of knowledge resulting in skepticism arises from this perspective. The picture of subjects with their internal private representations confronting a world of independent public objects is the source for such a position. The best way to avoid this problem is
to avoid the picture of reality that gives rise to such a position. Second, the traditional explication cannot satisfactorily account for the transition to objects with value predicates that seem to depend on the relations of the object to us. He concludes that the priority assigned to the present-at-hand is the basis for the fact-value dichotomy and its associated problems.

Heidegger arrived at the distinctions of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand from our approach to reality from the perspective of the practical and theoretical standpoints. It is obvious that they are not two separate realms but are perspectives that we take towards objects.

2.3.4 The Worldhood of the World

There is a third and most important meaning of the world for Heidegger. The way to grasp the meaning of this third level is to approach it through the realm of the ready-to-hand. The world of the ready-to-hand presupposes something more fundamental than they ordinarily reveal. In the example of the hammer, it "refers" to the nails and boards with which it is used. The "being" of the hammer or for that matter any equipment whatsoever consists of such "reference"
relations to other equipments in an equipmental totality. The point that Heidegger wants to drive home is that we are able to make use of a particular equipment precisely because we have background familiarity and skills for coping with practical environments. More than that our day-to-day activities of using things and instruments are not a blind activity. It is a guided activity and our dealing with equipment subordinates them to a goal orientation. Our use of the equipments points to a directionality or an 'in-order-to.' It means that certain use or function determines the equipmentality of instruments.

This way of understanding points out that an equipment has an assignment -- that for which it is used. This assignment is never in isolation but functions always in relation to other equipments and in a totality of relations. This totality of relationship is manifested in the following way. An equipment has an assignment to Dasein that has produced it, to the materials it has been produced out of, to the nature these materials have been extracted from, and so on. Any equipment seen as ready-to-hand possesses a great range of assignments beyond itself. These assignments will intersect with those belonging to other equipment in a most complex pattern. All these assignments and
the intricate system belonging to the sum of our equipment are the referential totality for Heidegger. The referential totality or any portion of it is oriented towards some "for-the-sake-of-which." The realization of this is the final goal of some particular network of equipment. 47

This way of assigning an end to itself is also a way for Dasein to understand itself in terms of the end. Moreover, Dasein understands equipment by reference to the contribution it makes to this end. It is at this point that we ourselves are drawn into the referential totality. The structure of referential totality does not stand independently over and against us in such a way that we could have a detached acquaintance with it. We already possess a prior familiarity with our own ends and with the means for achieving them. For example, we do not discover any 'in-order-to' of any particular hammer by observing its structure. It is already contained in our prior directedness that may be achieved with hammers, and in our prior ability or preparedness to employ the hammer in achieving those ends. It is on the basis of this a priori familiarity with the assignments belonging to hammers, that it is possible for us to see or use some particular hammer as hammer. Thus we discover some
entity as a tool not because we have mastered any concepts, but because we are already pursuing some set of ends, and have a generalized competence over the system of equipment needed to achieve them.

This pursuit and this competence have as their object the whole system of assignments belonging to this end and other equipment. And it is precisely this system of assignments, understood as embodied within this competent directedness, that Heidegger refers to as the 'world.'

In order to refer to the ontological nature of this concept of the world he uses the expression "worldhood of the world." It is the most general structure of involvement and of all human behavior. A specific situation of ready-to-hand or a present-at-hand is just a particular case of this general worldhood. "Things show up for us or are encountered as what they are only against a background of familiarity, competence, and concern that carves out a system of related roles into which things fit." This is the broader and more basic background level of familiarity and competence without which things and others could not be encountered.

The worldhood of the world may thus be identified with significance as the relational structure of referential totalities, or in other words, the whole of the referential --
and significance -- totalities is the worldhood of the world.⁵⁰

Thus world is not a sum of the entities within the world, but a structure of Dasein. The phenomenon of "world" in Heidegger's own language is

The "wherein" of an act of unerstanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this "wherein" is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world.⁵¹

We have so far tried to put forward positively what Heidegger meant by the "world". This would become further clarified if we examine what the world is not for Heidegger. The world is not nature. The world is not cosmos in the Greek sense of the term. According to the Greeks, cosmos is an ordering principle which refers to the how of the beings in their totality. Heidegger would distance himself from the Cartesian sense of the world. World in the Cartesian sense is an object that stands against a consciousness. Neither would he approve of a Kantian sense of the world. According to Kant 'world' belongs to the regulative ideas of reason. It is the totality of causally related phenomena.
What we call the universe is not the world for Heidegger. He would state that the universe is within-the-world. This expression should be clearly distinguished from Being-in-the-world that is the characteristic of Dasein whereas the entities are within-the-world.

The world comes not afterward but beforehand in the strict sense of the word. The world is not the sum total of extant entities. It is not extant at all. It is a determination of being-in-the-world, a moment in the structure of the Dasein's mode of being. The world is something Dasein-ish, it is not extant as things but is a da, there-here, like the Dasein, the being-da (das Da-sein) which we ourselves are: that is to say it exists.... The world is not extant but rather it exists.52

Dasein as Being-in-the-world brings out the essential peculiarity of Dasein that it projects a world for itself. Dasein does this not subsequently and occasionally, but the very projecting of the world belongs to the Being of Dasein. In this projection, Dasein has already stepped out beyond itself. World for Heidegger is a "wherein," and this "wherein" is a confluence of various dimensions. Here we can recognize the convergence of the environmental world and the communal world. Thus,
The world, then, is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed 'there' wherein There-Being encounters the purposeful beings with which it is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the world about.53

It is clear from the discussions so far that in describing the phenomenon of world, Heidegger has been trying to get behind the intentionality of subjects directed towards objects. In the whole analysis he is trying to highlight a context or a background on the basis of which every kind of directedness takes place. In the third chapter of Being and Time Heidegger lays out the various ways in which the term world is used.54 In this section he lists out four senses of "world." (1) "World" can mean a universe in the sense of a totality of objects of a certain kind. In this sense it is used as an ontical concept. (2) "World" as an ontological term signifies the Being of the entities under consideration. For instance, when we use the expression "the world of the physical objects", we will be referring to what all physical objects have in common. (3) Another way of seeing "world" is as "that wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to live."55 This sense of the world is reflected in such expressions as "a child's world," "the world of fashion," etc. It is something like what Khun calls a
"disciplinary matrix" -- "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community." 56 (4) As an ontologico-existential concept "world" designates the concept of worldhood. The worldliness is the way of being, common to our most general use of equipment. It is an "a priori" in the sense of something existing beforehand. Worldhood is that previous dimension given as already structuring a particular sub-region.

The above analysis goes against any private 'my world.' For Heidegger there is no private sphere of experience and meaning which is self-sufficient and intelligible in itself. It is meaningful always in a shared public world and this is more fundamental than the private 'my world.' It is the Cartesian legacy that starts with 'my world' and then accounts for the shared world. Heidegger maintains that it belongs to the very idea of a world that it be shared. Thus the world is always prior to 'my world.'

The phenomenon of the world reveals itself in two ways. The first case is at the occurrence of disturbance, or breakdown. It means that world announces itself in the context of a breakage or some form of disturbance in the form of functioning of any
equipment. The idea is that when an equipment becomes unusable due to a breakdown, the whole context of interlocking practices, the equipment, and the skills for using them become manifest. In Heidegger's words,

the context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself.57

Heidegger's account reveals that disturbance or breakdown makes us aware of the function of equipment in a total context and thus a mode of the existence of the world is revealed.

Disturbance or breakdown is not the only context where the revelation of the world happens. There is a second situation where the revelation of the world happens, and Heidegger refers to this as 'signs.' Signs provide a context for becoming aware of the relational whole of significance without the presence of disturbance or breakdown.

A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [was...anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood.58
Signs function against a background and they direct attention to which they presuppose. For example the sign of a traffic light or an indicator light in a car is not only available for the driver but also for the others who drive along with him. Moreover, this sign functions within the total context of traffic regulation. Heidegger is pointing to the fact that we cope with particular signs without being thematically aware of them. This is also the case with the whole interconnected pattern of activity into which they are integrated. Thus signs do the function of pointing out a world of shared practical activity.

We have discussed at length the meaning of "world" for Heidegger. Being-in-the-world is the most important structure of Dasein. If this is the case, a common objection could be raised here. If the world belongs to Dasein is it not then something subjective? If this objection cannot be adequately met, it would follow that nature and other objects are really subjective. In other words, Heidegger's philosophy would become some sort of a subjective idealism. Heidegger is aware of this problem. He is of the opinion that this problem must be posed at a different level which goes beyond the compartmentalization of idealism and realism. The principal problem is to determine exactly the
subjectivity of the subject. It is this search that has lead to the phenomenon of the world. The world is something "subjective" in the sense that it belongs to Dasein. "The world is something which the "subject" "projects outward," as it were, from within itself."\textsuperscript{61} We should note that "inner" and "outer" are not the appropriate categories. This projection does not mean that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some other thing present in me as in a thing and that I throw the world out of this subject-thing in order to catch hold of the other things with it.\textsuperscript{62}

Instead Dasein exists in such a way that a world is cast forth. The meaning of existence is such that among other things it means that a world is cast forth. Thus world is thrown beforehand, in advance, and it is an a priori of Dasein. Thus without any contradiction Heidegger can maintain that world is only if, and as long as, Dasein exists.

The structure of being-in-the-world makes manifest the essential peculiarity of the Dasein, that it projects a world for itself, and it does this not subsequently and occasionally but, rather, the projecting of the world belongs to the Dasein's being. In this projection the Dasein has always already stepped out beyond itself, ex-sistere, it is in a world.\textsuperscript{63}
This description brings out the fact that there is never anything like a subjective inner space.

Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Heidegger is very quick to observe that this compound expression, Being-in-the-world, stands for a unitary phenomenon, and that it should be seen as a whole. This does not mean that it cannot be explicated into its constitutive structures. This one phenomenon may be looked at in three ways. However, "Emphasis upon any one of these constitutive items signifies that the others are emphasized always with it." Firstly, this unitary phenomenon can be viewed with the purpose of, "inquiring into the ontological structure of the 'world,' and defining the idea of worldhood as such." Secondly, this phenomenon can be viewed from the perspective of "that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is." Our elucidation of worldhood and Dasein has dealt with these two elements of this unitary phenomenon. Thirdly, this unitary phenomenon can be seen from the perspective of Being-in as such. Being-in clarifies the way Dasein is in the world. Here we should follow Heidegger in his precise explanations of the 'in' of Being-in. Normally we are inclined to understand the Being-in as 'Being-in-something.' We understand it
perfectly well in such expressions as "the pen is in the box," or the "shirt is in the cupboard." These spatial relations are characteristic of all present-at-hand. It is natural for us to think that this sense of 'in,' reflecting physical inclusion, is the most basic phenomenon. Heidegger, on the other hand, will show that the physical sense is derived from a much more primordial usage. He shows that 'in' reflects the meaning of "to reside," "to dwell." Even the expression "I am" primarily means "I dwell." He quotes authorities to support his view that the preposition is derived from the verbal usage, and not the other way around.68

In short, we can distinguish two senses of "in." The first one is a spatial sense, such as a pen is in the box. The second one is an existential sense, conveying involvement. For example, when one is in love, it is no more the spatial sense that is communicated.69 Being-in thus consists of the various ways in which Dasein takes up relationship to the world. Heidegger calls this orientation of Dasein as concern.70

Being-in is not a 'property' which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with it. ...Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak,
free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up relationship towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is.\textsuperscript{71}

The upshot of this description is that Being-in is not an occasional affair, but the basic state of Dasein. Being-in, as the basic state of Dasein, is dwelling. This dwelling is not a mere "inhabiting" based on a subject-object model of relationship. It is a dwelling based on the a priori of Being-in-the-world that makes it possible to take up a relationship towards the world.

2.4.1 Being-in as Disclosedness

The term disclosedness has a specific meaning in\textit{ Being and Time}. It stands for the character of having been laid open. Disclosedness should be clearly differentiated from "discoveredness," which refers to a direction towards a particular piece of equipment. In that sense it is an ontic transcendence. The basic idea that Heidegger wants to convey by the use of these two terms is as follows. "Disclosedness" refers to the primary background familiarity of Dasein by which we are masters of our world. Just as our eyes constantly accommodate light, we have a capacity to adapt
constantly to our situations. This basic activity is so pervasive and constant that he calls it Being-in-the-world. "The world which has already been disclosed beforehand permits what is within-the-world to be encountered." For Heidegger, "disclosedness" would refer to the holistic background of Being-in-the-world. "Discoveredness" would be the appropriate dealing in particular circumstances.

The originary transcendence of (disclosing) is the condition of the possibility of ontic transcendence (discovering), and on the side of the world, disclosedness is the condition of the possibility of anything being discovered."

In this connection it is highly instructive to quote a paragraph from The History of the Concept of Time (1925) which preceded the publication of Being and Time.

My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential whole...from which the individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out. Such an environment of the nature of a closed referential whole is at the same time distinguished by a specific familiarity. The...referential whole is grounded precisely in familiarity, and this familiarity implies
that the referential relations are well-known.⁷⁴

Prior to any specific engagement of Dasein with other beings, world is disclosed to Dasein. The very Being of Dasein refers to this disclosedness and it is implicit in the term da (there). "The 'there' of Being and the disclosedness of the world are but one."⁷⁵

2.4.2 Being-in as Truth

Our discussion of disclosedness brings us directly into the realm of truth. Heidegger has devoted much of his energy to the clarification of the reality of truth. This is evident not only from Being and Time, but also from his other writing such as "On the Essence of Truth"⁷⁶ and The Early Greek Thinking.⁷⁷

The elucidation of truth in Being and Time, "takes its departure from the traditional conception of truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception."⁷⁸ In order to achieve this Heidegger begins with the usual concept of truth. Truth in philosophy is discussed from the perspective of correspondence, coherence or pragmatic theories. The oldest and most widespread doctrine of truth is that of Aristotle and it is known as the correspondence theory of truth. According to Aristotle,
to say of what is, that it is, is true; and of what is not, that it is not, is likewise true; whereas, to say of what is not that it is, is false.\textsuperscript{79}

This theory postulates a certain standard relationship between words on the one hand, and the world or reality on the other. The proponents of the coherence theory maintain that truth does not lie in individual propositions. Individual propositions are true only within the system within which they are articulated and explained. Thus the statement that parallel lines do not meet is true only within the Euclidean system of geometry and not in non-Euclidean systems. The pragmatic theory of truth equates truth with utility or usefulness.

Heidegger's explication starts with a probing question. What do we ordinarily understand by truth? For example, we speak of true gold when it is genuine and when it is in accordance with what we mean by gold. We speak of true statements too. Thus a statement is true when it is in accordance with the matter about which it is made. This accordance was expressed in the traditional definition as \textit{veritas est aequatio rei et intellectus}. Thus truth as correspondence came to acquire a quasi absolute validity and a sense of self-
evidence. Heidegger is not satisfied with the correctness of the traditional understanding. According to him what is correct need not be true. His aim is to lay bare the ontological foundations of correspondence.

We recognize correspondence when two things have similarity in appearance. But how can there be correspondence between two distinct realities such as a statement and a thing or matter? Heidegger maintains that there is a representative relation. It means that the statement says something about the thing and how it is or what it is like. It is not a psychological representation but as "letting something take up a position opposite to us, as an object." Heidegger means by this "that the thing, though it remains in its place and remains generally what it is, traverses an overtness towards oneself." In other words the thing must enter into a realm of the open. It is here that we should see the whole discussion regarding truth in terms of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. The realm of the open is that which characterizes Dasein. The open is a matrix of relationships which constitutes the sphere of the potentialities of Dasein. Our judgments are capable of expressing correspondence precisely because in the vast horizon of the open Dasein is capable of entering into a comportment with a to-be-judged. This realm of
the open is the permanent and indispensable condition for all human knowledge and all purposive activities.

Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of various ways of being opens a clearing in which particular entities can be encountered as entities to be used or as the referents of true assertions, etc.82

Dasein as being-in-the-world is the primordial disclosedness83 and it is primordial truth for Heidegger.

Heidegger preferred to use the original Greek term aletheia for truth. This Greek term meant uncovering or unveiling of things. An uncovering presupposes that things were embedded in a mystery which shrouded them. It is against this background that all uncovering and all arriving at and establishing of truth takes place. Aletheia is the primary open space within which Being unfolds itself. Truth as aletheia is not to be restricted to correctness. It refers to the manifestness and openness of entities, and this manifestness is the basis for correctness of assertions.84

The term aletheia is derived from the root form letho85 and the first person form is lanthano which means 'I escape notice,’ 'I am hidden,' 'unseen or forgotten by others.' Alethes, an adjectival form of
aletheia, is also described as that which does not sink into lethe, the source of oblivion. Another scholar translates aletheia as "unconcealed" and so aletheia can be rendered as unconcealment. Even the German equivalent for truth too is significant for Heidegger. He has acknowledged this in his work The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. According to him the verbal form of Wahrheit (truth) is wahren which stands for 'safe keeping,' 'to watch over,' and 'to preserve.' Thus in Wahrheit (truth) the fundamental connotations of manifesting and watchful safeguarding are implied.

Truth as aletheia is also freedom according to Heidegger. He states that freedom is the foundation of truth. He desists from any naive understanding of freedom which sees it as the property of man. He would rather look for the very basis of freedom itself and that which renders it possible. Heidegger understands freedom as "letting beings be." It implies that man concerns himself with the things around him as they are and treat them, and among them himself, and his fellowmen as "beings." "Letting beings be" is not just any activity of man, but is that by virtue of which he becomes Dasein, an entity that is defined by its relationships to the open. The expression "letting
"beings be" in no way reflects a spirit of passivity. It means "to open up the ontological clearing in which things can disclose themselves and thus 'be'." This necessitates that there be no undue human interference in the process of allowing things to show themselves. Moreover, it calls for interacting with things in a respectful manner. Thus "letting be ... means participating in the open and its openness, within which every entity enters and stands."  

Truth as aletheia has enabled Heidegger to relate it to the fundamental problem of the question of Being. It also has enabled him to go beyond the epistemology of the subject and the object. He accepts correspondence theory of truth for all practical purposes but rejects the manner in which this agreement was seen as the correspondence of a subjective mental content with an objective state of affairs. His presentation of truth is an event of immediacy. It is an event of revealing which is at the same time an event of concealing. A leading metaphor for the experience of truth for him is the flash of lightning.
2.4.3 Dimensions of Being-in

We have seen that Being-in clarifies the way Dasein is in the world. Dasein is in the world not as a subject related to an object. Rather Dasein is always outside itself and is formed by shared practices. It is absorbed in one activity or other. Thus Dasein is always in the world by way of being in a situation, dealing with specific context of things and people, and directed towards some specific end. A situation is the result of a shared practice and it cannot be private like a mental state or experience. Situations by their very nature can be shared. Heidegger calls the situation a clearing. The term clearing may refer to the verbal use of the activity of clearing or the nominal use of the result of that activity. For example the activity of clearing a forest produces a clearing in the forest. Being-in a situation Dasein has stepped out beyond itself and it is in a world. "As Being-in-the-world it is cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing." It means that the luminosity of Dasein is not something added to it but that it is its innermost constitution. That is why Heidegger declares that "Dasein is its disclosedness." This clearing is not the work of a monadic, windowless transcendental subject but the activity of a being that presupposes
and produces a shared clearing.95 As a shared clearing Dasein finds itself situated. Heidegger clarifies here a three-fold structure of this situatedness. "When the 'there' has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding, state-of-mind and falling."96

2.4.3.1 Understanding

The first characteristic element of the "being-there" is understanding. In Being and Time Heidegger clearly demonstrates that interpretative understanding is central to human existence.97 In other words understanding is not just one of the various possible ways of Being but the very mode of the Being of Dasein itself. "Dasein, as existent, is itself an intrinsically understanding entity."98 Understanding for him is our most basic ability to live in and cope skillfully with our world. For instance, to understand a hammer "does not mean to be aware of the properties of hammer; rather it means knowing how to hammer."99 He describes this as 'primary understanding.' This primary understanding flows from the very situatedness of Dasein. Situatedness reflects that Dasein has got to deal with things. Such dealings with things presupposes that they are already found significant.
The structure of understanding is seen as pressing forward into possibilities. Heidegger names this characteristic as projection. "Projection means to seize by anticipation the structure of a being still to be encountered." The projecting that is referred to here is not a simple reasoning from a list of all the particular choices that one has to make in deciding over something.

The existential concept of understanding as projection of possibilities are determinates of Dasein's existence. "Because the Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, projection unveils in every instance a possibility of being-in-the-world." Thus in the understanding of Dasein's existence, there is a disclosure of other Daseins and the Being of intraworldly beings.

Heidegger's explication of 'primary understanding' is not complete without the clarification of the meaning of interpretation. Heidegger has two German terms for interpretation. The first term is Auslegung, which means "Laying-out," and is translated as "interpretation" with a lower case "i." It includes the everyday phenomena of ordinary skills which are largely unthematic. Interpretierung translated as
"Interpretation" with an upper case "I" stands for thematized and discursive articulation. It refers to academic interpreting of texts and to the theory of interpretation itself.

Heidegger clarifies the relationship between interpretation and understanding as follows. "In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. ...it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding." In other words what is primarily understood is the world and it comes to be "laid out"(ausleigt) in concrete situations. This implies that interpretation as such, unlike Dasein or understanding, does not disclose. "Interpretation always only takes care of bringing out what is disclosed as a cultivation of the possibilities inherent in an understanding." 

The primary form of all interpretation, according to Heidegger, is to see something in terms of its "as what," or in other words to see it as something. There is no bare perceptual seeing in him. Seeing for him is already interpreted as something. For instance, we do not hear sound in itself but as the noise of something specific, may be as wind.
The context of meaningfulness or the background of a shared understanding brings out the three-fold structure of interpretation. Heidegger calls this the "fore-structure" of understanding. An explicit interpretation of something as something we have a background grasp of the totality of possible practices involved. This given factor is what he calls as "fore-having". There is a second level that is required before anything is made explicit. He calls this as "fore-sight" where we see in advance the appropriate way in which things can appear. The third level is that of "fore-conception" where we grasp conceptually in advance the appropriate way to interpret something. According to Heidegger, to interpret something is to expose the as-structure which is grounded in a fore-structure. The relationship between the two is similar to the relationship between understanding and interpretation. Just as interpretation is founded in (and not added on) understanding so also the as-structure is founded on the fore-structure.¹⁰⁴

Clarification of interpretation in terms of the fore-structure leads to crucial questions. First of all there are a whole lot of questions related to hermeneutic circle.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, from a methodological point of view insistence on the circular nature of
understanding tend to imprison us in our outlook. It blocks us from recognizing the otherness of the text. Besides, the fore-structure of understanding makes us traditional and politically suspect since it becomes unable to challenge the cultural and political status quo. These criticisms have taken a clear division between the reconstruction of Gadamer and the deconstruction of Derrida.\textsuperscript{106}

2.4.3.2 State-of-mind

This is second in the list of a three-fold structure of Being-in. Heidegger's German expression is \textit{Befindlichkeit} and there is no unanimous agreement on the translation of this term.\textsuperscript{107} The whole problem is to arrive at an English term that conveys the sense of "being found in a situation where things and options already matter."\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Befindlichkeit}, thus, refers to Dasein's initial awareness of itself. \textit{Befindlichkeit} is an ontological existential and it reveals Dasein's throwness. Throwness is a technical term in \textit{Being and Time} and it refers to the facticity of Dasein.\textsuperscript{109} In other words it refers to the irreducible fact that Dasein already is amidst things and with others. Along with this its origin and destiny remain obscure. Moreover, the fact of existence of Dasein is different
from the factuality of entities. It means that Dasein by its very nature is not a completed entity but a task to be achieved.

The thrown existence of Dasein is the first characteristic of Befindlichkeit. Secondly, thrownness discloses the totality of Being-in-the-world as a whole. Here we can see Dasein as moving towards the world by actively relating it with the entities. Thirdly, it reveals the passivity of Dasein in so far as the world moves towards Dasein. These three characteristics thus reveal the basic thrownness of Dasein. The nature of this finding is not a type of knowing but an awareness of the affective order which Heidegger distinguishes as mood (Stimmung). He does not use the term mood for private feelings but he uses it to name any of the ways Dasein can be affected. Mood can refer to the sensibility of an age, the culture of a company, for instance, or the mood of a current situation such as the boredom or eagerness in a classroom situation. Moods for him perform the basic function of disclosing. "Mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and make it possible first of all to direct ourselves towards something." Dasein is able to encounter things in a specific way, for instance, as interesting or
threatening, boring or frustrating precisely because Befindlichkeit is the condition of the possibility of things showing up as mattering to Dasein. Thus moods provide the background due to which specific events can affect us.

2.4.3.3 Fallenness

The third constituent dimension of Being-in is 'falling' (Verfallen). The disclosedness that happens here reveals Dasein in its everyday mode of existence. In the context of Being-in, Heidegger is looking for the 'who' of Dasein in its everydayness. Heidegger is quick to point out that the concept of 'falling' should not be understood in the usual sense. Such uses have a negative connotation of 'falling from grace.' 'Falling' refers to a common and essential tendency in Dasein. It is the tendency to flee from or avoid the disclosure of one’s own Being and the Being of the entities within-the-world. Heidegger is not interested in searching for the motives of the falling tendency but in its consequences. The mysterious tendency of 'falling' blocks the disclosure of Being in two ways. The first case is that we fall into an absorption in entities within-the-world. This leads to the misinterpretation of ourselves and the world in terms
of the entities. The second way is that we end up in a particular mode of Being-with in which we accept uncritically the prevailing public interpretation of ourselves and the world.

A concrete feature of the public interpretation is the 'they' (Das Man). It refers to the anonymity of Dasein. The public understanding is conveyed in certain discourse that he calls as Idle talk. The situation of idle talk does not connote laziness but a form of communication in which one is not interested in the lighting up of what is talked about. We carry on our interactions not out of genuine concern but we follow the conventions. Idle talk lack concernful dealings that must flow from the fact of being Dasein. The second route by which we flee disclosedness is curiosity. This consists in preoccupation with entities in the world to the extent of neglecting our familiarity with Being that grounds such concern. Curiosity concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen ... but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty.¹¹³

Closely related to idle talk and curiosity is the phenomenon of ambiguity. It is a situation where "it
becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not." No genuine knowledge is made impossible in ambiguity. The situation of ambiguity affects one's being-with-one-another. "The Other is keenly watched under the mask of 'for-one-another,' but in fact, an 'against-one-another' is at play."115

The interpretation of fallenness clarifies Heidegger's notion of inauthenticity.

Inauthenticity does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world -- the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of Others in the 'they'.116

2.5.1 Care as Temporality

The various structural aspects of Dasein's ways of Being are brought to a unity in care. "Dasein's Being reveals itself as care."117 Here we should note the change in terminology that has taken place. In the beginning of the existential analysis of Dasein, Heidegger has pointed out that the Being of Dasein is existence. But here he devotes a relatively large section for the analysis of care as the Being of Dasein. This is not to be seen as
perspective or lack of consistency. It is rather the bringing out of the primordiality of existence as care.

We must distinguish this basic existential phenomenon of care from those which are identified with it such as will, wish, addiction and urge. Care has nothing to do with tribulation, melancholy, or the cares of life. It is an ontological concept and as such these phenomena are founded on it. It is, "The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole."\(^{118}\)

Heidegger began his analytic of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. We have seen his elucidation of this phenomenon and its constitutive elements. According to Heidegger, the average everydayness of Dasein can be defined as,

\begin{quote}
Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its own most potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others.\(^{119}\)
\end{quote}

His aim is to arrive at an intelligible concept by which he can grasp Dasein's everydayness in its totality. Heidegger's explication of care must be seen in this context. He sees care as the unifying totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole. He describes
care as follows: "The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)." This combined and hyphenated expression aims to communicate the structural wholeness of existentiality, facticity and fallenness. Dasein is found in a unique way in existence. Existentiality refers to Being-ahead-of-itself. This dimension points to Dasein's disclosure of itself as a project and a possibility. "As existentiality Dasein experiences freedom and responsibility to choose authentically its own most potentiality-for-Being." The existentiality of Dasein is not an empty concept but is revealed as facticity and fallenness. The facticity of Dasein reveals its thrownness. It is a naked thereness in which Dasein experiences the fact that it is thrown into a world without its choice. In other words there is a realm beyond the control or choice of Dasein and it is shaped by the environmental and the communal world into which it is cast. Hence, "'Being-ahead-of-itself' means, if we grasp it more fully, 'ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a world'." Thus "Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity." The facticity of Dasein manifests fallenness.
Fallenness points to the universal tendency of man to lose himself in his present preoccupation and concerns, alienating himself from his unique and personal future possibilities. In the description of care, the expression 'Being-alongside' refers to this aspect of fallenness. Thus the two structural aspects of 'ahead-of-itself' and 'Being-already-in-a-world' include the third aspect of 'Being-alongside.' It is the way of existing of any entity that exists. Care, for Heidegger, is the structural unity of existentiality, facticity, and fallenness. All these factors together constitute the Being of Dasein as care. Heidegger further distinguishes care from concern and solicitude.

Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as concern, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude. In short, Heidegger's understanding of care is not a pragmatic concern. The German equivalent of it is Sorge, and it means care as in "the cares of the world." Hubert Dreyfus observes that in a conversation with Heidegger he pointed out that "care" in English has connotations of love and caring. Heidegger responded to that in a positive manner, and
noted that with the term "care" he wanted to name the
very general fact that "Sein geht mich an," which
translated would mean Being gets to me.

2.5.2 The Temporal Dimension of Care

The basic insight of Heidegger is that the notion of
time plays a significant role in clarifying the meaning
of Being. In fact half of the published part of Being
and Time deals with the theme of Dasein and
temporality. What is important for us is to see the
way Heidegger explains care as temporality. In our
analysis of care we have seen that it is a structure
that unifies the various modes of existence of Dasein.
Heidegger would further maintain that it is the notion
of temporality that enables us to make sense of the
threefold structures of care.

When we inquire about the meaning of care, we
are asking what makes possible the totality
of the articulated structural whole of care,
in the unity of its articulation as we have
unfolded it.127

There are three distinctive elements in Heidegger's
definition of care, and they are Dasein as Being-
already-in, ahead of itself, and Being-amidst. "The
primordial unity of the structure of care lies in
temporality." The term 'temporality' is not referring to the fact that like all other things, we are confined to time nor does it mean that we have a sense of time. It means that we exist in the unity of three temporal dimensions. Our Being is constituted in the fact that any moment of our existence is a way of being ahead of ourselves in the future, drawing on our past, while being concerned with the present. "Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care." The sense of future grounds the ahead-of-itself. The character of past as "having been" is realized in the "Being-already-in," and the present becomes possible in "Being-alongside." The three phenomenal characteristics of future, the character of having been, and the present, manifests the ekstatikon or the "ecstases" of temporality. The expression "ecstases" derived from Greek means 'standing outside,' and is closely connected with 'existence.' "All it means is that we are already "extended" outward in temporal dimensions and so are never contained in a "punctual" here and now." Heidegger would maintain that temporality is not an entity which emerges from itself but "its
essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases.\textsuperscript{135}

It is obvious that Heidegger is having a different conception of time. According to him the ordinary understanding of time consists in the fact that it is a pure sequence of "nows," without beginning and without end. The various theories of time emphasize the present over the future. And so time is conceived as a series of instants and this character is founded in the present. The ordinary understanding of time as a series of "nows" is rooted in Aristotle's definition of time as the measure of motion. For Aristotle, to say that things are "in time" means that their movement is countable.\textsuperscript{136} We think that the more precisely we measure motion the deeper our grasp of time. In fact measuring the nows involved in motion is possible only because we ourselves exist as a kind of movement. This movement is the movement of the temporal transcendence which always opens up the horizon of the future, past, and present. The movement of things are countable because it is surrounded by the temporal movement of the soul which opens up the "earlier" and "later" in which counting of 'nows' becomes intelligible.\textsuperscript{137} Christopher Macan observes that the fundamental notion underlying such an understanding of time is the
interpretation of time in terms of space. Heidegger considers existential time as primordial. He sees our existence itself as the temporal openness which lets beings manifest. It is this temporality which makes possible all experiences whether they be of the everyday, inauthentic or authentic mode.

2.6.1 The Ecological Bearing of Heidegger’s Philosophy of ‘World’

We have provided, in this chapter, a detailed presentation of the important aspects of the fundamental ontology of Heidegger as developed in Being and Time. Our inquiry was guided by two central notions that are significant for developing an ecological perspective. First, an ecological perspective should manifest a dimension of interrelationship among various realms of existence. Second, it should enable one to move away from a human centered world view, so that a proper de-centering of the subject be achieved. It is from the standpoint of these two notions that we identify the ecological bearing of Heidegger’s philosophy of the world.

Heidegger is a philosopher of the world. World for Heidegger is not the universe or the cosmos or the sum total of entities but a how structure that essentially belongs to Dasein. Dasein is an entity which has an
understanding of Being, and it is Dasein that provides a clearing so that entities can be understood in their Being. The specific quality of Dasein is existence understood as Being-in-the-world. This unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, seen from the perspective of Being-in clarifies the way Dasein is in the world.

It is evident that Heidegger’s philosophy of the world is understood as an essential structure of Dasein. It is an a priori of Dasein and world is so long as Dasein exists. Characterizing Heidegger as the philosopher of the world is not going to increase our knowledge of the world nor does it enable us to be ecologically more conscious of the world around. On the other hand, the ecological bearing of his conception of the world can be recognized in the very approach that he has adopted. This approach is a departure from the self-enclosed consciousness of the objectifying subject to the open expanse of Dasein.

The traditional manner of philosophizing is a metaphysical stance according to which every being is conceived either as a subject or an object. The paradigm of self-enclosed consciousness of the objectifying subject is found in the philosophy of Descartes. The ego that gains certainty of existence in
the act of thinking is seen as a subject. Everything that is not a thinking subject becomes an object of thought. Such a perspective leads to the consequence of seeing all reality as divided into subjects and objects. This kind of philosophizing is unacceptable to Heidegger. Reality, for him, is much more than a conglomeration of subjects and objects. If everything is pressed into the categories of subject and object then the wondrous depth of reality is ignored, he holds.

It is this orientation that makes him raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. The way of raising this question is not done through the subject-object dichotomous model but through the analytic of Dasein. Dasein has a three-fold priority over other entities.\textsuperscript{140} An ontic priority in the sense that only Dasein exists; an ontological priority in the sense that only Dasein has an understanding of Being; and a fundamental priority in the sense that it understands its own Being as well as the Being of other entities. The most basic state of Dasein is Being-in-the-world and this basic awareness is foundational to other existentials which characterize the ways of Dasein's Being-in-the-world.
The elucidation of this complex phenomenon and its structural elements reveal that Dasein as to-be-in-the-world has a special relation to the world. The achievement of Heidegger in the analytic of Dasein has convincingly shown that all relatedness to the world is based on a prior relatedness, namely, the a priori of Being-in-the-world. In this approach Heidegger has gone beyond the agency of knowing and has seen that all knowing is a founded mode of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. There is no subject in this framework that steps out of the inner sphere in order to reach to the object out there. Neither is there an I which would at first have to establish a relationship to others but rather it primarily exists in Being-with-others.

The ecological significance of Heidegger's elucidation of the concept of the world lies in this fact that it brings forward the relational dimension well. All our relatedness is based on the a priori of Being-in-the-world. As a founding mode it helps to overcome the dualistic thinking of the epistemologies of skeptical orientation. A strictly scientific approach no doubt increases the fund of information but it is a detached approach from the perspective of present-at-hand(vorhanden). This approach, as Heidegger has shown, is freed of human purposes and even of human
existence. Thus from the perspective of fundamental ontology, ecology has to be approached not as an ontic issue, but as an ontological phenomenon. This would demand that we inquire into the Being of ecology that calls us to be open to the revelation of Being that takes place in the realm of ecology. This would amount to a search for the ultimate intelligibility of ecology as such. Intelligibility is not a property of things, but from the Heideggerian perspective, it is applicable to Dasein. Thus the ecological perspective has to be seen in relation to the human purposes and even of human existence. In other words it is an articulation of the meaningfulness of ecology as such.

We find that the significance of Heidegger's philosophy of the world consists in going beyond a dualistic framework and adopting a framework of basic relatedness. This is implied in his explication of the Being of equipment. He has convincingly shown that our primordial relation to things around is not that of present-at-hand but of readiness-to-hand. In other words we make sense of things as equipment before we are aware of them as objects of knowledge. Moreover, things are not given as isolated heaps but as environs pointing to a network of relationships. A significant insight in this connection is that it is breakdown that
brings to the fore this network of relationships as a whole.\textsuperscript{142} This is particularly applicable in the context of contemporary ecological crisis. We are experiencing the breakdown in this life-sustaining system and hence it is manifesting the dimensions of the network of relationships as a whole.

If the world essentially belongs to Dasein, how far can we see this approach as de-centering the subject? In other words, is it not an anthropocentrism in disguise? In our exposition we have noted that Heidegger was aware of this problem. According to him the principal problem is to determine exactly the subjectivity of the subject. Dasein is not a subject in the normal sense of the term but it is existence itself and characterized by an awareness of Being. This unique prerogative of Dasein does not mean that it lords over entities but guards and preserves them in their truth.\textsuperscript{143} Thus Dasein has a great responsibility. It is to let beings be. Ultimately it calls for interacting with entities in a respectful manner.

We find that Heidegger's philosophy of the world brings into focus the background familiarity and the structure of our involvement in our practical life. It
consists of a perspective of interrelationship which at the same time achieves a de-centering of the subject.

We can find in the approach of existential ontology a radical questioning from the perspective of Being. This necessitates that it resist any one-dimensional manner of revealing the meaning of entities. This becomes significant in the area of science and technology. Thus our culture's uncritical allegiance to science and technology becomes questionable from the perspective of existential ontology. What are the ecological implications of Heidegger's analysis of technology? It is to this that we turn in the next chapter.